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Abstract
Private information is at the heart of many economic activities. For decades, economists
have assumed that individuals are willing to misreport private information if this maxi-
mizes their material payoff. We combine data from 90 experimental studies in economics,
psychology and sociology, and show that, in fact, people lie surprisingly little. We then for-
malize a wide range of potential explanations for the observed behavior, identify testable
predictions that can distinguish between the models and conduct new experiments to do
so. Our empirical evidence suggests that a preference for being seen as honest and a
preference for being honest are the main motivations for truth-telling.
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Reporting private information is at the heart of many economic activities; for example,
a self-employed shopkeeper reporting her income to the tax authorities (e.g., Allingham and
Sandmo 1972), a doctor stating a diagnosis (e.g., Ma and McGuire 1997), or an expert giving
advice (e.g., Crawford and Sobel 1982). For decades, economists made the useful simplifying
assumption that utility only depends on material payoffs. In situations of asymmetric infor-
mation this implies that people are not intrinsically concerned about lying or telling the truth
and, if misreporting cannot be detected, individuals should submit the report that yields the
highest material gains.
Until recently, the assumption of always submitting the payoff-maximizing report has
gone basically untested, partly because empirically studying reporting behavior is by definition
difficult. In the last years, a fast growing experimental literature across economics, psychology
and sociology has begun to study patterns of reporting behavior empirically and a string of
theoretical papers has been built on the assumption of some preference for truth-telling (e.g.,
Kartik et al. 2007, Matsushima 2008, Ellingsen and O¨stling 2010, Kartik et al. 2014b).
In this paper, we aim to deepen our understanding of how people report private infor-
mation. Our strategy to do so is threefold. We first conduct a meta study of the existing
experimental literature and document that behavior is indeed far from the assumption of
payoff-maximizing reporting. We then formalize a wide range of explanations for this aver-
sion to lying and show that many of these are consistent with the behavioral regularities
observed in the meta study.1 Finally, in order to distinguish among the many and varied
explanations, we identify new empirical tests and implement them in new experiments.
In order to cleanly identify the motivations driving aversion to lying, we focus on a setting
without strategic interactions. We thus abstract from sender-receiver games or verification
of messages, such as audits. We do so because the strategic interaction makes the setting
more complex, especially if one is interested in studying the underlying motives of reporting
behavior, as we are. We therefore use the experimental paradigm introduced by Fischbacher
and Fo¨llmi-Heusi (2013): subjects privately observe the outcome of a random variable, report
the outcome and receive a monetary payoff proportional to their report (for related methods
using inferences about the population, see Batson et al. 1997 and Warner 1965). While
1We will use the terms “aversion to lying” and “preference for truth-telling” interchangeably (but see
Sa´nchez-Page´s and Vorsatz 2009).
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no individual report can be identified as truthful or not (and subjects should thus report
the payoff maximizing outcome under the standard economic assumption), the researcher
can judge the reports of a group of subjects. This paradigm is the one used most widely
in the literature and several recent studies have shown that behavior in it correlates well
with cheating behavior outside the lab (Hanna and Wang forthcoming, Cohn and Mare´chal
forthcoming, Cohn et al. 2015, Ga¨chter and Schulz 2016c, Potters and Stoop 2016, Dai et al.
forthcoming).2
In the first part of our paper (Section 1 and Appendix A), we combine data from 90 studies
that use setups akin to Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi (2013), involving more than 44000 sub-
jects across 47 countries. Our study is the first quantitative meta analysis of this experimental
paradigm. Interactive versions of the analyses can be found at www.preferencesfortruthtelling.com.
We show that subjects forgo on average about three-quarters of the potential gains from lying.
This is a very strong departure from the standard economic prediction and comparable to
many other widely discussed non-standard behaviors observed in laboratory experiments, like
altruism or reciprocity.3 This strong preference for truth-telling is robust to increasing the
payoff level 500-fold or repeating the reporting decision up to 50 times. The cross-sectional
patterns of reports are extremely similar across studies. Overall, we document a stable and
coherent corpus of evidence across many studies, which could potentially be explained by one
2Three other paradigms are also widely used in the literature. In the sender-receiver game, introduced by
Gneezy (2005), one subject knows which of two states is true and tells another subject (truthfully or not)
which one it is. The other subject then chooses an action. Payoffs are determined by the state and the
action. The advantage is that the experimenter knows the true state and can thus judge individually whether
a subject lied or not, although the added strategic complexity makes it harder to identify subjects’ motivations
for lying. In the “matrix task”, introduced by Mazar et al. (2008) (and similar real-effort reporting tasks,
e.g., Ruedy and Schweitzer (2010)), subjects solve a mathematical problem, are then given the correct set of
answers and report how many answers they got right. Finally, they destroy their answer sheet, making lying
undetectable. This setup is quite similar to Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi (2013) but has the advantage of being
less abstract. It does add ambiguity about the truthful proportion of correct answers in the population which
makes testing theories harder. In Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), subjects can send a message promising (or
not) a particular future action. Incorrect messages can thus be identified for each subject ex-post. Charness
and Dufwenberg show that the message affects the action, and the truthfulness of the message at the time of
sending is thus unclear. Other influential experiments in this literature are, e.g., Ellingsen and Johannesson
(2004) and Vanberg (2008).
3Our results imply that in a typical experiment based on the Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi (2013) paradigm
and offering a maximum payment of $1, subjects take on average only 62c home and thus forgo 38c. Altruism
is often measured by the amount given in dictator-game experiments. There, subjects forgo on average 28c
out of each $1 (Engel 2011). Positive reciprocity is often measured by the behavior of second-mover subjects
in trust games who forgo on average 38c out of each $1 (Johnson and Mislin 2011; Cardenas and Carpenter
2008). Negative reciprocity is often measured by the behavior of second-mover subjects in ultimatum-game
experiments who forgo on average less than 16c out of each $1 (Oosterbeek et al. 2004).
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unifying theory.4
In the second part of the paper (Section 2 and Appendices B, C and E), we formalize a
wide range of explanations for the observed behavior, including the many explanations that
have been suggested, often informally, in the literature. The classes of models we consider
cover three broad types of motivations: a direct cost of lying (e.g., Ellingsen and Johannesson
2004, Kartik 2009); a reputational cost derived from the belief that an audience holds about
the subject’s traits or action (e.g., Mazar et al. 2008), including guilt aversion (e.g., Charness
and Dufwenberg 2006); and the influence of social norms and social comparisons (e.g., Weibull
and Villa 2005). We also consider numerous extensions, combinations and mixtures of the
aforementioned models (e.g., Kajackaite and Gneezy 2017, Boegli et al. 2016). For all models
we make minimal assumptions on the functional form and allow for heterogeneity of preference
parameters, thus allowing us to derive very general conclusions.
Our empirical strategy to test the validity of the proposed explanations proceeds in two
steps. First, we check whether each model is able to match the stylized findings of the meta
study. This rules out many models, including models where the individual only cares about
their reputation of having reported truthfully. In these models individuals are often predicted
to pool on the same report, whereas the meta study shows that this is never the case. However,
we also find eleven models that can match all the stylized findings of the meta study. These
models offer very different mechanisms for the aversion to lying with very different policy
implications. It is therefore important to be able to make sharper distinctions between the
models. In the second step, we thus design four new experimental tests that allow us to further
separate the models. We show that the models differ in (i) how the distribution of true states
affects one’s report; (ii) how the belief about the reports of other subjects influences one’s
report5; (iii) whether the observability of the true state affects one’s report; (iv) whether
some subjects will lie downwards, i.e., report a state that yields a lower payoff than their true
state, when the true state is observable. Our predictions come in two varieties: (i) to (iii) are
comparative statics while (iv) concerns properties of equilibrium behavior.
4In most experiments using this paradigm, the money obtained by reporting comes from the experimenter
but there are almost a dozen studies in which the money comes from another subject and behavior is very
similar, see Appendix A for details.
5Technically, for some models this test works through updating the belief about the distribution of other
subjects’ preferences. For other models, it works through directly changing the best response of subjects (see
Section 2 for details).
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We take a Popperian approach in our empirical analysis (Popper 1934). Each of our
tests, taken in isolation, is not able to pin down a particular model. For example, among
the models we consider, there are at least three very different motives that are consistent
with the behavior we find in test (i), namely a reputation for honesty, inequality aversion and
disappointment aversion. However, each test is able to cleanly falsify whole classes of models
and all tests together allow us to tightly restrict the set of models that can explain the data.
Since we formalize a large number of models, covering a broad range of potential motives,
the set of surviving models is more informative than if we had only falsified a single model,
e.g., the standard model. The surviving set obviously depends on the set of models and the
empirical tests that we consider. However, the transparency of the falsification process allows
researchers to easily adjust the set of non-falsified models as new evidence becomes available.
In the third part of the paper (Section 3 and Appendices F and G), we implement our
four tests in new laboratory experiments with more than 1600 subjects. To test the influence
of the distribution of true states (test (i)), we let subjects draw from an urn with two states
and we change the probability of drawing the high-payoff state between treatments. Our
comparative static is 1 minus the ratio of low-payoff reports to expected low-payoff draws.
Under the assumption that individuals never lie downwards, this can be interpreted as the
fraction of individuals who lie upwards. We find a very large treatment effect. When we move
the share of true high-payoff states from 10 to 60 percent, the share of subjects who lie up
increases by almost 30 percentage points. This result falsifies direct lying-cost models because
this cost only depends on the comparison of the report to the true state that was drawn but
not on the prior probability of drawing the state.
To test the influence of subjects’ beliefs about what others report (test (ii)), we use anchor-
ing, i.e., the tendency of people to use salient information to start off one’s decision process
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974). By asking subjects to read a description of a “potential”
experiment and to “imagine” two “possible outcomes” that differ by treatment, we are able to
shift (incentivized) beliefs of subjects about the behavior of other subjects by more than 20
percentage points. This change in beliefs does not affect behavior: subjects in the high-belief
treatment are slightly less likely to report the high state, but this is far from significant. This
result rules out all the social comparison models we consider. In these models, individuals
prefer their outcome or behavior to be similar to that of others, so if they believe others report
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the high state more often they want to do so too.
To test the influence of the observability of the true state (test (iii)), we implement the
random draw on the computer and are thus able to recover the true state. We use a double-
blind procedure to alleviate subjects’ concerns about indirect material consequences of lying,
e.g., being excluded from future experiments. We find significantly less over-reporting in the
treatment in which the true state is observable compared to when it is not. This finding is
again inconsistent with direct lying cost models and social comparison models since in those
models utility does not depend on the observability of the true state. Moreover, we find that
no subject lies downwards in this treatment (test (iv)).
In Section 4, we compare the predictions of the models to the gathered empirical evidence.
The main empirical finding is that our four tests rule out almost all of the models previously
suggested in the literature. Of the models we propose and consider, only two cannot be falsified
by our data. Both models combine a preference for being seen as honest with a preference
for being honest. This combination is also present in the concurrent papers by Khalmetski
and Sliwka (2016) and Gneezy et al. (2018). Both papers assume that individuals want to
be perceived as honest and suffer from a lying cost related to the material gain from lying.
A distinct intuition is explored in another concurrent paper by Dufwenberg and Dufwenberg
(2018), who suppose that individuals care about the perception about by how much they
have cheated, i.e., lied for material gain. We discuss how these studies relate to ours in the
Conclusions. We then turn to calibrating a simple, linear version of one of our non-falsified
models, showing that it can quantitatively reproduce the data from the meta study as well as
the patterns in our new experiments. In the model, individuals suffer a fixed cost of lying and
a cost that is linear in the probability that they lied (given their report and the equilibrium
report). Both cost components are important.
Section 5 concludes and discusses policy implications. Three key insights follow from our
study. First, our meta analysis shows that the data are not in line with the assumption of
payoff-maximizing reporting but rather with some preference for truth-telling. Second, our
results suggest that a preference for being seen as honest and a preference for being honest
are the main motivations for truth-telling. Finally, policy interventions that rely on voluntary
truth-telling by some participants could be very successful, in particular if it is made hard to
lie while keeping a good reputation.
5
1 Meta Study
1.1 Design
The meta study covers 90 experimental studies containing 429 treatment conditions that
fit our inclusion criteria. We include all studies using the setup introduced by Fischbacher
and Fo¨llmi-Heusi (2013) (which we will refer to as “FFH paradigm”), i.e., in which subjects
conduct a random draw and then report their outcome of the draw, i.e., their state. We require
that the true state is unknown to the experimenter (i.e., we require at least two states) but
that the experimenter knows the distribution of the random draw. We also include studies
in which subjects report whether their prediction of a random draw was correct (as in Jiang
2013). The payoff from reporting has to be independent of the actions of other subjects,
but the reporting action can have an effect on other subjects. The expected payoff level
must not be constant, e.g., no hypothetical studies, and subjects are not allowed to self-select
into the reporting experiment after learning about the rules of the experiment. We only
consider distributions that either (i) have more than two states and are uniform or symmetric
single-peaked, or (ii) have two states (with any distribution). This excludes only a handful of
treatments in the literature. For more details on the selection process, see Appendix A.
We contacted the authors of the identified papers and obtained the raw data of 54 studies.
For the remaining studies, we extract the data from graphs and tables shown in the papers.
This process does not allow to recover additional covariates for individual subjects, like age or
gender, and we cannot trace repeated decisions by the same subject. However, for most of our
analyses, we can reconstruct the relevant raw data entirely in this way. The resulting data set
thus contains data for each individual subject. Overall, we collect data on 270616 decisions
by 44390 subjects. Experiments were run in 47 countries which cover 69 percent of world
population and 82 percent of world GDP. A good half of the overall sample are students, the
rest consists of representative samples or specific non-student samples like children, bankers
or nuns. Table A.4 lists all included studies. Studies for which we obtained the full raw data
are marked by *.
Having access to the (potentially reconstructed) raw data is a major advantage over more
standard meta studies. We can treat each subject as an independent observation, clustering
over repeated decisions and analyzing the effect of individual-specific co-variates. More im-
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portantly, we can separately use within-treatment variation (by controlling for treatment fixed
effects), within-study variation (by controlling for study fixed effects) and across-study vari-
ation for identification. For other meta studies using the full individual subject data (albeit
on different topics), see e.g., Harless and Camerer (1994) or Weizsa¨cker (2010).
Since the potential reports differ widely between studies, e.g., sides of a coin or color of
balls drawn from an urn, we focus on the payoff consequences of a report as its defining char-
acteristic. To make the different studies comparable, we map all reports into a “standardized
report”. Our standardized report has three key properties: (i) if a subject’s report leads to
the lowest possible payoff, the standardized report is −1, (ii) if the report leads to the highest
possible payoff, it is +1 and (iii) if the report leads to the same payoff as the expected payoff
from truthful reporting, the standardized report is 0. In particular we define:
rstandardized = pi−E[pi
truthful]
E[pitruthful]−pimin if pi < E[pi
truthful]
rstandardized = pi−E[pi
truthful]
pimax−E[pitruthful] if pi ≥ E[pitruthful]
where pi is the payoff of a given report, pimin the payoff from reporting the lowest possible
state, pimax the payoff from reporting the highest state and E[pitruthful] is the expected payoff
from truthful reporting. For example, a roll of a six-sided die would result in standardized
reports of −1, −0.6, −0.2, +0.2, +0.6, or +1.
In general, without making further assumptions, one cannot say how many people lied or
by how much in the FFH paradigm. We can only say how much money people left on the
table. An average standardized report greater than 0 means that subjects leave less money
on the table than a group of subjects who report fully honestly.
To give readers the possibility to explore the data in more detail, we have made interactive
versions of all meta-study graphs available at www.preferencesfortruthtelling.com. The graphs
allow restricting the data, e.g., only to specific countries. The graphs also provide more
information about the underlying studies and give direct links from the plots to the original
papers.
1.2 Results
Finding 1 The average report is bounded away from the maximal report.
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Figure 1: Average standardized report by incentive level
Notes: The figure plots standardized report against maximal payoff from misreporting. Standardized
report is on the y-axis. A value of 0 means that subjects realize as much payoff as a group of subjects
who all tell the truth. A value of 1 means that subjects all report the state that yields the highest
payoff. The maximal payoff from misreporting (converted by PPP to 2015 USD), i.e., the difference
between the highest and lowest possible payoff from reporting, is on the x-axis (log scale). Each bubble
represents the average standardized report of one treatment and the size of a bubble is proportional
to the number of subjects in that treatment. “FFH BASELINE” marks the result of the baseline
treatment of Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi (2013).
Figure 1 depicts an overview of the data. Standardized report is on the y-axis and the
maximal payoff from misreporting, i.e., pimax − pimin, is on the x-axis (converted by PPP
to 2015 USD). As payoff, we take the expected payoff, i.e., the nominal payoff used in the
experiment times the probability that a subject receives the payoff, in case not all subjects
are paid. Each bubble represents the average standardized report of one treatment. The
size of the bubble is proportional to the number of subjects in that treatment. The baseline
treatment of Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi (2013) is marked in the figure. It replicates quite
well.
If all subjects were monetary-payoff maximizers and had no concerns about lying, all
bubbles would be at +1. In contrast, we find that the average standardized report is only
0.234. This is significantly (p < 0.001) lower than 0.25 or any higher threshold (clustering
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on subject; 0.38 when clustering on study) and thus bounded away from 1. This means that
subjects forego about three-quarters of the potential gains from lying. This is a very strong
departure from the standard economic prediction.
This finding turns out to be quite robust. Subjects continue to refrain from lying maxi-
mally when stakes are increased. Figure 1 shows that an increase in incentives affects behavior
only very little. In our sample, the potential payoff from misreporting ranges from cents to
50 USD (Kajackaite and Gneezy 2017), a 500-fold increase. In a linear regression of stan-
dardized report on the potential payoff from misreporting, we find that a one dollar increase
in incentives changes the standardized report by -0.005 (using between-study variation as in
Figure 1) or 0.003 (using within-study variation). See Appendix A for more details and for
a comparison of our different identification strategies. This means that increasing incentives
even further is unlikely to yield the standard economic prediction of +1. In Appendix A, we
also show that subjects still refrain from lying maximally when they report repeatedly. In
fact, repetition is associated with significantly lower reports. Learning and experience thus do
not diminish the effect. Reporting behavior is also quite stable across countries and adding
country fixed effects to our main regression (see Table A.2) increases the adjusted R2 only
from 0.368 to 0.455.
We next analyze the distribution of reports within each treatment.
Finding 2 For each distribution of true states, more than one state is reported with positive
probability.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of reports for all experiments using uniform distributions with
six or two states, e.g., six-sided die rolls or coin flips. We exclude the few studies that have
non-linear payoff increases from report to report. The figure covers 68 percent of all subjects
in the meta study (the vast majority of the remaining subjects are in treatments with non-
uniform distributions – where Finding 2 also holds). Each line corresponds to one treatment
and the size of the bubbles is proportional to the number of subjects in that treatment.
The dashed line indicates the truthful distribution. The bold line is the average across all
treatments, the grey area around it the 95% confidence interval of the average. As one can see
in Figure 2, all possible reports are made with positive probability in almost all treatments.
More generally, for each distribution of true states we have data on, the likelihood of the
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modal report is significantly (p< 0.001) lower than 0.79 (or any higher threshold), and thus
bounded away from 1. We have enough data to cluster on study for the two distributions in
Figure 2 and the result is robust to such clustering.
Finding 3 When the distribution of true states is uniform, the probability of reporting a given
state is weakly increasing in its payoff.
The figure also shows that reports that lead to higher payoffs are generally made more often,
both for 6-state and 2-state distributions. The right panel of Figure 2 plots the likelihood
of reporting the low-payoff state (standardized report of −1) for 2-state experiments. The
vast majority of the bubbles are below 0.5 which implies that the high-payoff report is above
0.5. This positive correlation between the payoff of a given state and its likelihood of being
reported holds for all uniform distributions we have data on (OLS regressions, all p < 0.001).
We have enough data for the distributions with 2, 3, 6, and 10 states to test report-to-report
changes and find that the reporting likelihood is strictly increasing for 2, 3 and 6 states (all
p < 0.008) and weakly increasing for 10 states. We have enough data to cluster on study for
2- and 6-state distributions and the result is robust to such clustering.
Finding 4 When the distribution of true states has more than 3 states, some non-maximal-
payoff states are reported more often than their true likelihood.
Interestingly, some reports that do not yield the maximal payoff are reported more often than
their truthful probability, in particular the second highest report in 6-state experiments is
more likely than 1/6 in almost all treatments. Such over-reporting of non-maximal states
occurs in all distributions with more than three states we have data on (see Figure A.7 for
the uniform distributions). We test all non-maximal states that are over-reported against
their truthful likelihood using a binomial test. The lowest p-value is smaller than 0.001 for all
distributions (we exclude distributions for which we have very little data, in particular, only
one treatment). We have enough data to cluster on study for the uniform 6-state distribution
and the result is robust to such clustering.
We relegate additional results and all regression analyses to Appendix A.
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Figure 2: Distribution of reports (uniform distributions with six and two outcomes)
Notes: The figure depicts the distribution of reports by treatment. The left panel shows treatments
that use a uniform distribution with six states and linear payoff increases. The right panel shows
treatments that use a uniform distribution with two states. The right panel only depicts the likelihood
that the low-payoff state is reported. The likelihood of the high-payoff state is 1 minus the depicted
likelihood. The size of a bubble is proportional to the total number of subjects in that treatment.
Only treatments with at least 10 observations are included. The dashed line indicates the truthful
distribution at 1/6 and 1/2. The bold line is the average across all treatments, the grey area around
it the 95% confidence interval of the average.
2 Theory
The meta study shows that subjects display strong aversion to lying and that this results in
specific patterns of behavior as summarized by our four findings. In this section, we use a
unified theoretical framework to formalize various ways that could potentially explain these
patterns (introduced in Section 2.1). In order to address the breadth of plausible explanations
and to be able to draw robust conclusions, we consider a large number of potential mechanisms,
most of them already discussed, albeit often informally, in the literature. Indeed, one key
contribution of our paper is to formalize in a parallel way a variety of suggested explanations.
There are three broad types of explanations of why subjects seem to be reluctant to lie:
subjects face a lying cost when deviating from the truth; they care about some kind of
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reputation that is linked to their report (e.g., they care about the beliefs of some audience
that observes their report); or they care about social comparisons or social norms which affect
the reporting decision. In Section 2.2, we discuss one example model for each of the three
types of explanations, including one of the two models that our empirical exercise will not be
able to falsify. We discuss the remaining models in the appendices.
To test the models against each other, we first check whether they are able to explain the
stylized findings of the meta study (Section 2.3). We find that many different models can do
so. We therefore use our theoretical framework to develop four new tests that can distinguish
between the models consistent with the meta study (Section 2.4). Table 1 lists all models and
their predictions. For comparison purposes, we also state the results of our experiments in
the row labeled Data.
2.1 Theoretical Framework
An individual observes state ω ∈ Ωn, drawn i.i.d. across individuals from distribution F
(with probability mass function f). We will suppose, except where noted, that the drawn
state is observed privately by the individual. We suppose Ωn is a subset of equally spaced
natural numbers from ω1 to ωn, ordered ω1, ω2, . . . , ωn with n > 1. As in the meta study,
we only consider distributions F that have f(ω) ∈ (0, 1) for all ω ∈ Ωn and that either (i)
have more than two states and are uniform or symmetric single-peaked, or (ii) have two states
(with any distribution). Call this set of distributions F .6 After observing a state, individuals
publicly give a report r ∈ Rn, where Rn is a subset of equally spaced natural numbers from
r1 to rn, ordered r1, r2, . . . , rn. Individuals receive a monetary payment which is equal to
their report r. We suppose that there is a natural mapping between each element of Rn and
the corresponding element of Ωn.7 For example, imagine an individual privately flipping a
coin. If they report heads, they receive £10, if they report tails they receive nothing. Then
ω1 = r1 = 0, and ω2 = r2 = 10. We denote the distribution over reports as G (with probability
mass function g). An individual is a liar if they report r 6= ω. The proportion of liars at r is
Λ(r).
6A handful of papers in the meta study use non-equally spaced states. All our results also hold for these
distributions and for any distribution where the payoffs are not “too” unequally spaced.
7Formally, we can think of there being as an order-preserving bijection between Ωn and Rn. A simpler
(albeit slightly less general) conceptualization is that a report is the identity function from Ωn to itself.
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We denote a utility function as φ. For clarity of exposition, we suppose that φ is differen-
tiable in all its arguments, except where specifically noted, although our predictions are true
even when we drop differentiability and replace our current assumptions with the appropriate
analogues (we do maintain continuity of φ). We will also suppose, except where specifically
noted, that sub-functionals of φ are continuous in their arguments.
We suppose that individuals are heterogeneous. They have a type ~θ ∈ Θ, where ~θ is a
vector with J entries, and Θ is the set of potential types ×J [0, κj ], with κj ∈ R++. Each of
the J elements of ~θ gives the relative trade-off experienced by an individual between monetary
benefits and specific non-monetary, psychological costs (e.g., the cost of lying, or reputational
costs). When we introduce specific models, we will only focus on the subvector of ~θ that is
relevant for each model (which will usually contain only one or two entries). We suppose that
~θ is drawn i.i.d. from H, a non-atomic distribution on Θ. Each entry θj is thus distributed
on [0, κj ].8 In Appendix E, we show that the set of non-falsified models does not change if we
assume that H is degenerate. The exogenous elements of the models are thus the distribution
F over states and the distribution H over types while the distribution G over reports and
thus the share of liars at r, Λ(r), arise endogenously in equilibrium.
We assume that individuals only report once and there are no repeated interactions. We
suppose a continuum of “subject” players and a single “audience” player (the continuum of
subjects ensures that any given subject has a negligible impact on the aggregate reporting
distribution). The subjects are individuals exactly as described above. The audience takes
no action, but rather serves as a player who may hold beliefs about any of the subjects after
observing the subjects’ reports. The audience could, e.g., be the experimenter or another
person the subject reveals their report to. Subjects do not observe each others’ reports.
Utility may depend on the distribution of others’ reports, the drawn state-report combinations
of others, or beliefs.9 Because subjects take a single action we can consider a strategy as
8Our assumptions on κj and H imply that our framework for more general models does not nest, strictly
speaking, the standard model, where individuals only care about their monetary payoff. Instead, the standard
model is a limit case of our models (where the κs go to 0, or the support of H becomes concentrated on 0).
This allows the predictions generated by more general models to be sharply distinguished from the predictions
of the standard model (as opposed to nesting them). The same reasoning applies to other “nested” models,
e.g. the lying cost (LC) model is a limit case of the Reputation for Honesty + LC model.
9Our approach is similar to population games in many ways; for example, in that we have a continuum
of agents (see Sandholm (2015) for a summary of population games). However, in many models utility may
depend not just on the aggregate distribution of reports, but also the relationship between a given report and
its associated drawn state.
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mapping type and state combinations (~θ × ω) into a distribution over reports r.10 When
an individual’s utility depends on the beliefs of other players, we consider the Sequential
Equilibria of the induced psychological game, as introduced by Battigalli and Dufwenberg
(2009). (The original psychological game theory framework of Geanakoplos et al. (1989)
cannot allow for utility to depend on updated beliefs.). When utility does not depend on
others’ beliefs, the analysis can be simplified and we assume the solution concept to be the
set of standard Bayes Nash Equilibria of the game. In some of our models, an individual’s
utility depends only on their own state and report. In this case, our solution concept is simply
individual optimization, but for consistency, we also use the words equilibrium and strategy
to describe the outcomes of these models.
2.2 Modelling Preferences for Truth-telling
In this section, we introduce one example for each of the three main categories of lying aver-
sion: lying costs (Section 2.2.1), social norms/comparisons (2.2.2), and reputational concerns
(2.2.3). The remaining models are described in Appendix B. Some of these models represent
other ways of formalizing the effect of descriptive norms and social comparisons on reporting,
including a model of inequality aversion (Appendix B.1); a model that combines lying costs
with inequality aversion (B.2); and a social comparisons model in which only subjects who
could have lied upwards matter for social comparisons (B.3). Other models build on the idea
of reputational concerns and include a model where individuals want to signal to the audience
that they place low value on money (B.4); a model where individuals want to cultivate a repu-
tation as a person who has high lying costs (B.5); and a model of guilt aversion (B.6). Finally,
we include a model of money maximizing with errors (B.7), and a model that combines lying
costs with expectations-based reference-dependence (B.8). In addition, Appendix C describes
several models that fail to explain the findings of the meta study and that are therefore not
further considered in the body of the paper. Most prominently, we discuss a model in which
individuals only care about the audience’s belief about their honesty (Appendix C.2).
10Almost all individuals will play a pure strategy in our framework. This is because all types have measure
zero and, given our assumptions on the interaction between ~θ and the non-monetary costs in the models we
consider (detailed below), if an individual of type θ¯ is indifferent between the two reports, then no other type
can be indifferent. Because subjects in the experiment are anonymous to each other we also only focus on
equilibria where strategies cannot depend on the identity of the player (but of course, it can depend on their
preference parameters).
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2.2.1 Lying Costs (LC)
A common explanation for the reluctance to lie is that deviating from telling the truth is
intrinsically costly to individuals. The fact that individuals’ utility also depends on the
realized state, not just their monetary payoff, could come from moral or religious reasons;
from self-image concerns (if the individual remembers ω and r)11; from “injunctive” social
norms of honesty, i.e. norms that are based on a shared perception that lying is socially
disapproved; or from the unwillingness to defy the authority of the person or institution who
asks for the private information. Such “lying cost” (LC) models have wide popularity in
applications and represent a simple extension of the standard model in which individuals only
care about their monetary payoff. Our formulation of this class of models nests all of the
lying cost models discussed in the literature, including a fixed cost of lying, a lying cost that
is a convex function of the difference between the state and the report, and generalizations
that include different lying cost functions.12
Formally, we suppose individuals have a utility function
φ(r, c(r, ω); θLC)
c is a function that maps to the (weak) positive reals and denotes the cost of lying. We
suppose that c has a minimum when r = ω which is not necessarily unique. (For some
specifications, for example fixed costs of lying, c will not be differentiable in its arguments.)
For our calibrational exercises we normalize c(ω, ω) = 0, so that individuals experience no
cost when they tell the truth. In order to make the model non-trivial we suppose that there
is at least one non-maximal state ω such that there exists an r > ω where c(r, ω) > c(ω, ω)
(otherwise no one would ever pay any costs to lying). The only element of ~θ that affects utility
is the scalar θLC which governs the weight that an individual applies to the lying cost. We
make a few assumptions on φ. First, φ is strictly increasing in the first argument, fixing all the
11If the individual forgets about their own state ω and cares about what their own future selves think about
them, judging only from their report r (similar to Be´nabou and Tirole 2006), then our Reputation for Honesty
model, described in Appendix C, may be more appropriate. Only the predictions regarding observability would
need to be adjusted if the audience is “internal”. In our setting, given the short length of time between draw
of state and report, it seems, however, unlikely that individuals would forget the state but not the report.
12This includes, for example, Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004); Kartik (2009); Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi
(2013); Gibson et al. (2013); Gneezy et al. (2013); Conrads et al. (2013); Conrads et al. (2014); DellaVigna
et al. (2014); and Boegli et al. (2016).
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other arguments; this captures the property that utility is increasing in the monetary payment
received. Second, φ is decreasing in the second argument, fixing all the other arguments,
capturing the property that utility falls as the cost of lying increases. In particular, it is
strictly decreasing for all θLC > 0. Third and fourth, fixing all other arguments, φ is (weakly)
decreasing in θLC , and the cross partial of φ with respect to c and θLC is strictly negative,
while other cross partials are 0. This captures the properties that an individual with a higher
draw of θLC has both a higher utility cost of lying, for the same “sized” lie, and faces a higher
marginal cost of lying. In other words, utility exhibits increasing differences with respect to
c and θLC .13 The solution to LC models can be found by simply solving a single decision
maker’s optimization problem.
2.2.2 Social Norms: Conformity in LC
Another potential explanation for lying aversion extends the intuition of the LC model. It
posits that individuals care about social norms or social comparisons which inform their
reporting decision. The leading example is that individuals may feel less bad about lying
if they believe that others are lying too. Importantly, the norms here are “descriptive” in
the sense that they are based on the perception of what others normally do, rather than
“injunctive”, which are instead based on the perception of what ought to be done and do
not depend on the behavior of others (injunctive norms are better captured by LC models).
We call such a model “Conformity in LC”. Such concerns for social norms are discussed, for
example, in Gibson et al. (2013), Rauhut (2013) and Diekmann et al. (2015). Our model
follows the intuition of Weibull and Villa (2005). We suppose that an individual’s total utility
loss from misreporting depends both on an LC cost (as described in the previous model), but
also on the average LC cost in society. The latter depends not just on players’ actions, but
the profile of joint state-report combinations across all individuals. Because we can think of
any individuals’ drawn state as part of their privately observed type, we use the framework
13Our results regarding the LC model can be easily generalized further: they do not require that utility is
weakly decreasing in θLC , only that the restriction on the cross partials hold. We make the assumption that
utility is weakly decreasing in θLC as it allows for a natural interpretation of θLC (the same applies to the
following models). Our results also do not depend on individuals all having the same functional form c so long
as the assumptions regarding θLC hold. So, for example, our results hold when some individuals have fixed
and others convex costs of lying.
16
of Bayes Nash Equilibrium.14
Formally, in the Conformity in LC model individuals have a utility function
φ(r, η(c(r, ω), c¯); θCLC)
c(r, ω) has the same interpretation and assumptions as in the LC model and types are het-
erogeneous in the scalar θCLC (where CLC denotes the “Conformity in LC” model specific
parameter; analogous abbreviations are used for the rest of the models); the rest of the vector
~θ again does not affect utility. c¯ is the average incurred LC cost in society. This average cost
is determined in equilibrium, and thus all individuals know what it is; for notational ease we
supress the dependence of c¯ on the other parameters of the model. η captures the “normalized
cost of lying”, i.e., the cost of lying conditional on the incurred LC cost in society (for our
calibrational exercises we suppose η(0, c¯) = 0) and is strictly increasing in its first argument.
For c > 0, η is strictly falling in the second argument so that the normalized cost is increasing
in the individual’s own personal lying cost and falling in the aggregate LC cost, i.e., their
lying costs are falling as others lie more (for c = 0, the partial of η with respect to its second
argument is 0). As in the previous model φ is strictly increasing in its first argument, and
decreasing in the second argument (strictly so for all θCLC > 0). φ is (weakly) decreasing in
θCLC fixing the first two arguments, and the cross partial of φ with respect to η and θCLC
is strictly negative, while other cross partials are 0. These assumptions are analogous to the
ones presented in the previous models and capture the same intuitions.
2.2.3 Reputation for Honesty + LC
A different way to extend the LC model is to allow individuals to experience both an intrinsic
cost of lying, as well as reputational costs associated with inference about their honesty (e.g.,
Khalmetski and Sliwka 2016, Gneezy et al. 2018). We suppose that an individual’s utility is
falling in the belief of the audience player that the individual’s report is not honest, i.e., has
a state not equal to the report. Akerlof (1983) provides the first discussion in the economics
14Since we suppose a continuum of agents, one can also think of utility as depending on the strategies of
others (integrating out over θCLC). Observe that we suppose in this model that individuals’ utility depends
on the actual costs of others. An alternative framing would be where the utility for an individual depends on
their own beliefs about others’ costs. With a continuum of agents, and correct beliefs, these equal the realized
costs.
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literature that honesty may be generated by reputational concerns and many recent papers
have built on this intuition.15 Thus, an individual’s utility is belief-dependent, specifically
depending on the audience player’s updated beliefs. Thus, we must use the tools of psycho-
logical game theory to analyze the game. We use the framework of Battigalli and Dufwenberg
(2009) in our analysis.16 Of course, the audience cannot directly observe whether a player is
lying, and has to base their beliefs on the observable report r. Utility is thus a decreasing
function of the audience’s belief about whether an individual lied. Because the audience player
makes correct Bayesian inference based on observing the report and knowing the equilibrium
strategies, their posterior belief about whether an individual is a liar, conditional on a report
r, is Λ(r), the fraction of liars at r in equilibrium. We therefore directly assume that utility
depends on υ(Λ(r)), with υ a strictly increasing function.
Since lying costs are our preferred way to capture self-image concerns about honesty,
one possible interpretation of this model is that individuals care about self-image and social
image (i.e., the audience’s beliefs). We focus on a situation where there is additive separability
between the different components of the utility function.17 Formally, in the “Reputation for
Honesty + LC” model utility is
φ(r, c(r, ω),Λ(r); θLC , θRH) = u(r)− θLCc(r, ω)− θRHυ(Λ(r))
u is strictly increasing in r. Types are heterogeneous in the scalars θLC and θRH and the
rest of ~θ does not affect utility. c is as described in the LC model. υ is a strictly increasing
function of Λ(r) with a minimum at 0 (and in calibrational exercises we normalize υ(0) = 0).
Thus the individual likes more money, but dislikes lying and being perceived as a liar by the
audience. The functional form implies analog patterns for the cross partials as the previous
15This includes, for example, Mazar et al. (2008); Suri et al. (2011); Hao and Houser (2013); Shalvi and
Leiser (2013); Utikal and Fischbacher (2013); Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi (2013); Gill et al. (2013) and Hilbig
and Hessler (2013).
16Some researchers have suggested that a simple model in which individuals care only about the audience’s
belief that they are a liar, conditional on their report, could explain behavior. We discuss in Appendix C.2
why such a model fails to match the findings of the meta study, and why reputational concerns need to be
combined with some other motive to explain the data within our theoretical framework. A related model by
Dufwenberg and Dufwenberg (2018) posits that individuals care about the inferred degree of over-reporting.
This model builds on different distributional assumptions than those we use in our paper. We discuss the role
of distributional assumptions for our results in Appendix E.
17A similar additive-separability assumption has been used in related papers combining intrinsic lying costs
and reputational concerns (Khalmetski and Sliwka 2016; Gneezy et al. 2018).
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models.18
2.3 Distinguishing Models Using the Meta Study
We now turn to understanding how our models can be distinguished in the data. The first
test is whether the models can match the four findings of the meta study. We find that the
three models presented in the previous section, as well as all those listed in Appendix B, can
do so.
Proposition 1 There exists a parameterization of the LC model, the Conformity in LC
model, the Reputation for Honesty + LC model and of all other models listed in Appendix
B (i.e., Inequality Aversion; Inequality Aversion + LC; Censored Conformity in LC; Repu-
tation for Being Not Greedy; LC-Reputation; Guilt Aversion; Choice Error; and Ko˝szegi and
Rabin + LC) which can explain Findings 1–4 for any number of states n and for any F ∈ F .
All proofs for the results in this section are collected in Appendix D. The proof for the
LC model constructs one example utility function, combining a fixed cost and a convex cost
of lying, and then shows that it yields Findings 1–4 for any n and any F ∈ F . Many of the
other models considered in this paper contain the LC model as limit case and can therefore
explain Findings 1–4. However, there are several models, e.g., the Inequality Aversion model
(Appendix B.1) or the Reputation for Being Not Greedy model (B.4), which rely on very
different mechanisms and can still explain Findings 1–4.
2.4 Distinguishing Models Using New Empirical Tests
Proposition 1 shows that the existing literature, reflected in the meta study, cannot pin down
the mechanism which generates lying aversion. The meta study does falsify quite a few popular
models, which we discuss in Appendix C, but the data is not strong enough to narrow the set
of surviving models further down. This motivates us to devise four additional empirical tests
which can distinguish between the models that are in line with the meta study. Three of the
four new tests are “comparative statics” and one is an equilibrium property: (i) how does the
18If we suppose that H may be atomic, then we can also capture “mixture” models, where each individual
either only cares about lying costs, or only cares about reputational costs, but there is a mix in the total
population. In this case, H would have zero support everywhere where both θs are strictly greater than 0.
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distribution of true states affect the distribution of reports; (ii) how does the belief about the
reports of other subjects influence the distribution of reports; (iii) does the observability of
the true state affect the distribution of reports; (iv) will some subjects lie downwards if the
true state is observable. As a prediction (iv’), we also derive whether some subjects will lie
downwards if the true state is not observable, as in the standard FFH paradigm. We cannot
test this last prediction in our data but state it nonetheless as it is helpful in building intuition
regarding the models as well as important for potential applications.19
We derive predictions for each model and for each test using very general specifications
of individual heterogeneity and the functional form. We present predictions for an arbitrary
number of states n and for the special case of n = 2. On the one hand, allowing for an
arbitrary number of states generates predictions that are applicable to a larger set of potential
settings. On the other hand, restricting n = 2 allows us to make sharper predictions, and
thus potentially falsify a larger set of models. For example, for models where individuals care
about what others do (e.g., social comparison models), it doesn’t matter whether individuals
care about the average report or the distribution of reports when n = 2. For models that rule
out downward lying, the binary setting also allows us to back out the full reporting strategy
of individuals without actually observing the true state: the high-payoff state will be reported
truthfully, so we can deduct the expected number of high-payoff states from the number of
observed high-payoff reports and we are left with the reports made by the subjects who have
drawn the low-payoff state. Moreover, conducting our new tests with 2-state distributions is
simpler and easier to understand for subjects. Recall that across all results, we only consider
distributions F ∈ F .
The models, as well as the predictions they generate in each of the tests, are listed in
Table 1. We report the 2-state predictions in the columns describing the effect of shifts in the
distributions of true states F and beliefs about others’ reports Gˆ (see below for details), since
we use 2-state distributions in our new experimental tests of these predictions. Some of the
models we consider do not guarantee a unique reporting distribution G without additional
parametric restrictions. We discuss below in more detail how we deal with potential non-
uniqueness for each prediction and we mark the models which do not necessarily have unique
19Peer et al. (2014) and Gneezy et al. (2013) study downward lying in a setting in which at least some
subjects will feel unobserved.
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equilibria with an asterisk (*) in Table 1. Importantly, no model is ruled out solely on the
basis of predictions that are based on an assumption of uniqueness. Similarly, the models
that cannot be falsified by our data are not consistent solely because of potential multiplicity
of equilibria.
We now turn to discussing our four empirical tests. The first test is about how the
distribution of reports G (recall that g(rj) gives the unconditional fraction of individuals
giving report rj) changes when the higher states are more likely to be drawn (but while
maintaining the same set of support for the distribution). Specifically we suppose that we
induce a shift in the distribution of states F (recall that f(ωj) gives the probability that state
ωj is drawn) that satisfies first order stochastic dominance. We then look at one minus the
ratio of the observed number of reports of the lowest state to the expected number of draws
of the lowest state: f(ω1)−g(r1)f(ω1) = 1 −
g(r1)
f(ω1) . For those models in which no individual lies
downwards we can interpret the statistic as the proportion of people who draw ω1 but report
something higher, i.e., r > r1.
Definition 1 Consider two pairs of distributions: FA, GA and FB, GB where Gj is the report-
ing distribution associated with F j, and where FB strictly first order stochastically dominates
FA and they all have full support. A model exhibits drawing in/drawing out/f -invariance if
1− gB(r1)
fB(ω1) is larger than/smaller than/the same as 1−
gA(r1)
fA(ω1) .
Thus, the term “drawing in” means that the lowest state is even more underreported when
higher states become more likely. “Drawing out” refers to the opposite tendency. As we will
show below, several very different motivations can lead to drawing in. For example, increasing
the true probability of high states increases the likelihood that a high report is true, leading
subjects who care about being perceived as honest, as in our Reputation for Honesty + LC
model (Section 2.2.3), to make such reports more often. But increasing the true probability
of high states also increases the likelihood that other subjects report high, pushing subjects
who dislike inequality (Appendix B.2) to report high states. And subjects who compare their
outcome to their recent expectations (Appendix B.8) could also react in this way.20
20In models where the equilibrium is potentially not unique, caution is needed in interpreting the effect
of changes in F on behavior. We have two types of predictions. First, for some models the set of possible
equilibria is invariant to changes in F . In this case we believe that it is reasonable to assume that our treatment
does not induce equilibrium switching and therefore behavior does not change with F . In Table 1 we list these
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The second test looks at how an individual’s probability of reporting the highest state
will change when we exogenously shift their belief about the distribution of reports. We will
refer to Gˆ as the beliefs of players about the distribution of reports. In equilibrium, given
correct beliefs about others, Gˆ = G. Our experiment focuses on experimentally manipulating
the beliefs about others, i.e. Gˆ, so that they may no longer be correct, and then observing the
resulting actual reporting distribution G. We focus on situations where there is full support
on all reports in both beliefs and actuality.
Definition 2 Fix a distribution over states F and consider two pairs of distributions GˆA, GA
and GˆB, GB, where Gj is the reporting distribution induced by F and by the belief that others
will report according to Gˆj. Moreover, suppose all exhibit full support and GˆB strictly first
order stochastically dominates GˆA. A model exhibits affinity/aversion/gˆ-invariance if gB(rn)
is larger than/smaller than/the same as gA(rn).
Thus, the term “affinity” means that reporting of the highest state increases when the
subject believes that higher states are more likely to be reported by others. The term “aver-
sion” refers to the opposite tendency. Such an exercise allows us to test the models in one
of three ways. First, in some models, e.g., Inequality Aversion (Appendix B.1), individuals
care directly about the reports made by others and thus Gˆ (or a sufficient statistic for it)
directly enters the utility. Therefore, we can immediately assess the effect of a shift in Gˆ on
behavior.21 For these models, shifting an individual’s belief about Gˆ directly alters their best
response (and since subjects are best responding to their Gˆ, which may be different from the
actual G, we may observe out-of-equilibrium behavior). These models all predict affinity.
Second, in some other models (Conformity in LC and Censored Conformity in LC), in-
dividuals care about the profile of joint state-report combinations across other individuals
(i.e. the amount of lying by others). In these models no individual lies downwards and so,
for binary states, Gˆ contains sufficient information about the joint state-report combinations.
Thus, shifting Gˆ directly alters an individual’s best response. These models again predict
models as exhibiting f -invariance. Second, for other models the set of equilibria changes with changes in F .
For these models the predictions of drawing in/out listed in Table 1 are based on the assumption of a unique
equilibrium.
21Not all models can rationalize all Gs for a given F . We do not directly test whether subjects’ predicted
beliefs about distributions are allowed by any given model, given that we only elicit an average prediction of
beliefs about reports.
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affinity.
Finally, this exercise allows us, albeit indirectly, to understand what happens when beliefs
about H (the distribution of ~θ) change. Directly changing this belief is difficult since this
requires identifying ~θ for each subject and then conveying this insight to all subjects. However,
for models with a unique equilibrium, because G is an endogenous equilibrium outcome, shifts
in Gˆ can only be rationalized by subjects as shifts in some underlying exogenous parameter —
which has to be H, since our experiment fixes all other parameters (e.g., F and whether states
are observable).22 For many of these models, the conditions defining the unique equilibrium
reporting strategy are invariant to shifts in Gˆ and H, which means that our treatment should
not affect behavior. For another set of models, in particular Reputation for Being Not Greedy,
Reputation for Honesty + LC and LC-Reputation, there is no simple mapping from Gˆ to
beliefs about H and a shift in Gˆ could lead to affinity, aversion or gˆ-invariance.
Our third test considers whether or not it matters for the distribution of reports that the
audience player can observe the true state. In particular, we will test whether individuals’
reports change if the experimenter can observe not only the report, but also the state for each
individual.
Definition 3 A model exhibits o-shift if G changes when the true state becomes observable
to the audience, and o-invariance if G is not affected by the observability of the state.
In some of the models we consider, the cost associated with lying are internal and therefore
do not depend on whether an audience is able to observe the state or not. In other models,
however, the costs depend on the inference the audience is able to make, and so observability
of the true state affects predictions.23
Our fourth test comes in two parts. Both parts try to understand whether or not there
are individuals who engage in downward lying, i.e., draw ωi and report rj with j < i. The
22To specify the updating process more precisely, we suppose that individuals have a single probability
distribution H which induces Gˆ (and G). In a more complete model, individuals would think many different
possible H distributions to be possible, and hold a prior over these different distributions. Thus, observing a
different Gˆ would induce a shift in the inferred distribution over the different possible Hs. Given reasonable
assumptions about the prior distribution over H our results will continue to hold.
23As for f -invariance, whenever a model has potentially multiple equilibria and this set of equilibria is
invariant to observability, we list the model as exhibiting o-invariance because we believe that pure equilibrium
switching is unlikely to occur. In contrast to drawing in/out, we do not need to assume a unique equilibrium
for o-shift predictions as we do not specify in which direction behavior will move, just that the set of equilibria
has changed.
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first is whether downward lying can occur in an equilibrium with observability of the state by
the audience and where G features full support. The second is an analogous test but in the
situation where the state is not observed by the audience. We will only focus on the former
test in our experiments.
Definition 4 Fix a distribution over states F and an associated full-support distribution G
over reports. The model exhibits downward lying if there exists some individual who draws ωi
but reports rj where j < i. The model does not exhibit downward lying if there is no such
individual.
Although lying down may seem counter-intuitive, as we will show below, there can be a
number of reasons why individuals may want to lie downwards. In models where individuals
are concerned with reputation, lying downwards may be beneficial if low reports are associated
with a better reputation than high reports. Alternatively, in models of social comparisons,
such as the inequality aversion models, downward lying may arise because individuals aim to
conform to others’ reports.
The following proposition summarizes the predictions for the three models described above.
Proposition 2 • Suppose individuals have LC utility. For an arbitrary number of states
n, we have f -invariance, gˆ-invariance, o-invariance and no lying down when the state
is unobserved or observed.
• Suppose individuals have Conformity in LC utility. For arbitrary n, depending on pa-
rameters, we may have drawing in, drawing out or f -invariance, we may have affinity,
aversion or gˆ-invariance, we have o-invariance and no lying down when the state is
unobserved or observed. For n = 2, we have drawing out when the equilibrium is unique
and we have affinity.
• Suppose individuals have Reputation for Honesty + LC utility. For arbitrary n, depend-
ing on parameters, we may have drawing in, drawing out or f -invariance, we may have
affinity, aversion or gˆ-invariance, we have o-shift, depending on parameters, we may
have lying down or not when the state is unobserved, and we have no lying down when
the state is observed. For n = 2, we have drawing in when the equilibrium is unique.
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“Depending on parameters” refers to the distribution over states F , the distribution H
over types, any sub-functions that might be introduced in a model definition, e.g., the cost
function c in the LC model, and when considering affinity, aversion and gˆ-invariance, Gˆ (as
this is something we experimentally manipulate). In the cases when predictions depend on
parameters, the proofs will provide examples for each possible behavior. If the statement is
unqualified, it means that it holds for any F ∈ F , any H, sub-functions, and Gˆ.
Before moving on, we provide some intuition for the results. For simplicity, we focus on
2-state/report distributions. In the LC model, individuals never lie downwards, because they
(weakly) pay a lying cost and also receive a lower monetary payoff when doing so. Since only
their own state and their own report matter for utility, conditional on drawing the low state,
for a fixed ~θ, an individual will always make the same report, regardless of F or Gˆ. Thus, we
observe both f -invariance and gˆ-invariance. Last, the lying cost is an internal cost and does
not depend on the inference others are making about any given person. Thus, individuals do
not care whether their state is observed.
In the Conformity in LC models, individuals will never lie downwards since, as in the
LC model, they would face a lower monetary payoff as well as a weakly higher cost of lying.
Morever, with a unique equilibrium, as f(ω2) increases, more individuals draw the high state
and can report r2 without having to lie. Thus, the average cost of lying falls. This increases
the normalized cost of lying (η) for all individuals. Thus, an individual who draws ω1, and
was indifferent before between r1 and r2 will now strictly prefer r1. This implies drawing
out. In the Conformity in LC model, because G enters directly into the utility function and
because no one lies downwards, we can tell how the individual’s best response changes with
shifts in expected G, i.e. Gˆ. Fixing F , if gˆ(r2) increases, more people draw the low state
but say the high report. This means that more individuals are expected to lie, and so the
normalized cost of lying (η) decreases. Thus, individuals who draw the low report will be
more likely to say the high report, i.e., we have affinity. Last, as in the LC model, these costs
do not depend on any inference others are making, and so individuals do not care whether
their state is observed.
In the Reputation for Honesty + LC model, because individuals have a concern for repu-
tation and also have lying costs, they may or may not lie down if the state is unobserved. If
an individual is motivated relatively more by reputational concerns, then they will lie down
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if the state is unobserved. In contrast, if lying costs dominate as a motivation, they will
not lie down. If the state is observed, no one lies downwards. Although multiple equilibria
may occur, whenever the equilibrium is unique, the Reputation for Honesty + LC model
exhibits drawing in. As f(ω2) increases, some individuals who previously drew ω1 will now
draw ω2. Those individuals now face a lower LC cost when giving the high report (which is
in fact zero). Fixing the reputational cost, this implies some of them will now give the high
report (instead of the low report). Fixing the behavior of others, this reduces the fraction
of liars giving the high report and thus the reputational cost of the high report decreases;
and similarly, increases the fraction of liars giving the low report. This reduces the (relative)
cost of giving the high report even more. Therefore, we observe drawing in. Our intuition
here relies on partial equilibrium reasoning, but the formal proof shows how to extend this to
full equilibrium reasoning. Even with a unique equilibrium, we may observe either aversion,
affinity or gˆ-invariance since it depends on how the distribution of H is perceived to have
changed when Gˆ shifts.24 Because the model includes reputational costs, whether or not the
audience observes just the report, or also the state, matters for behavior.
In Appendix F, we provide additional evidence regarding predictions of the Ko˝szegi-Rabin
+ LC model which are not listed in the table. We also test specific f -invariance predictions
for the LC model in a 10-state experiment, where we show that drawing-in like behavior also
obtains in an experiment with 10 states.
3 New Experiments
In this section we report a large-scale (N = 1610) set of experiments designed to implement the
four tests outlined above. The experiments were conducted with students at the University of
Nottingham and University of Oxford. Subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner 2015).
The computerized parts of the experiments were programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).
24If, for example, the change is interpreted as a shift by individuals who have low reputational costs, and
so care mostly about LC costs, then an increase in gˆ(r2) will be interpreted as more individuals who drew ω1
being willing to give the high report. This decreases the proportion of truth-tellers at the high report, driving
aversion. In contrast, suppose the change is interpreted as a shift by individuals who have medium LC costs,
but relatively high reputational costs. This means that it is interpreted as a shift in the reports of individuals
who drew the high state (since individuals who drew the low state and have medium LC costs are unlikely to
ever give the high report). An increase in gˆ(r2) is then interpreted as individuals who drew ω2 as being more
willing to pay the reputation cost of reporting r2. Thus, the fraction of truth-tellers at r2 increases, driving
affinity.
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All instructions and questionnaires are available in Appendix G.
3.1 Shifting the Distribution of True States F
We test the effect of a shift in the distribution of true states F using treatments with 2-state
distributions. Subjects are invited to the laboratory for a short session in which they are
asked to complete a questionnaire that contains some basic socio-demographic questions as
well as filler questions about their financial status and money-management ability that serve
to increase the length of the questionnaire so that the task appears meaningful. Subjects
are told that they would receive money for completing the questionnaire and that the exact
amount would be determined by randomly drawing a chip from an envelope. The chips have
either the number 4 or 10 written on them, representing the amount of money in GBP that
subjects are paid if they draw a chip with that number. Thus, drawing a chip with 4 on it
represents drawing ω1 and drawing a chip with 10 represents drawing ω2. Reports of 4 and
10 are similarly r1 and r2. The chips are arranged on a tray on the subject’s desk such that
subjects are fully aware of the distribution F (see Appendix G for a picture of the lab setup).
Subjects are told that at the end of the questionnaire they need to place all chips into a
provided envelope, shake the envelope a few times, and then randomly draw a chip from the
envelope. They are told to place the drawn chip back into the envelope and to write down
the number of their chip on a payment sheet. Subjects are then paid according to the number
reported on their payment sheet by the experimenter who has been waiting outside the lab
for the whole time.
We conduct two between-subject treatments, varying the distribution of chips that subjects
have on their trays. In one treatment the tray contains 45 chips with the number 4 and 5
chips with the number 10. In the other treatment the tray contains 20 chips with the number
4 and 30 chips with the number 10. We label the two treatments F LOW and F HIGH
respectively to indicate the different probabilities of drawing the high state (10 percent vs.
60 percent). Note that the distribution used in F HIGH first-order stochastically dominates
the distribution in F LOW in line with Definition 1. We select samples sizes such that the
expected number of low states is the same (and equal to 131) in the two treatments. Thus, we
have 146 subjects in F LOW and 328 subjects in F HIGH. Most of the sessions were conducted
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in Nottingham and some in Oxford between June and December 2015.
3.2 Results
Finding 5 We observe drawing in, i.e., the statistic 1− g(r1)f(ω1) is significantly higher in F HIGH
than F LOW.
Figure 3 shows the values of the statistic 1− g(r1)f(ω1) across the two treatments. In F LOW
we expect 131 subjects to draw the low £4 payment and we observe 80 subjects actually
reporting 4, i.e. our statistic is equal to 1 − 80131 = 0.39. In F HIGH we also expect 131
subjects to draw 4, but only 43 subjects report to have done so, so our statistic is equal to
0.67 (this means that 45 percent of subjects in F LOW and 87 percent in F HIGH report 10).
This difference of almost 30 percentage points is very large and highly significant (p < 0.001,
OLS with robust SE; p < 0.001, χ2 test).25
Figure 3: Effect of shifting the distribution of true states
25This result is based on a pooled sample using observations collected both in Nottingham and Oxford. We
obtain similar results if we focus on each sub-sample separately. Using only the Nottingham sub-sample (n =
391), we find a treatment difference of about 27 percentage points (p < 0.001, OLS with robust SE; p < 0.001,
χ2 test). Using only the Oxford sub-sample (n = 83), we find a treatment difference of about 32 percentage
points (p = 0.022, OLS with robust SE; p = 0.023, χ2 test).
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3.3 Shifting Beliefs About the Distribution of Reports Gˆ
Our next set of treatments is designed to test predictions concerning the effects of a shift
in subjects’ beliefs about the distribution of reports, i.e., Gˆ. There are three other studies
testing the effect of beliefs on reporting (Rauhut 2013, Diekmann et al. 2015 and Ga¨chter and
Schulz 2016a). These studies affect beliefs by showing to subjects the actual past behavior
of participants. Diekmann et al. (2015) and Ga¨chter and Schulz (2016a) find no effect and
Rauhut (2013) finds a positive effect. Rauhut (2013), however, compares subjects who have
initially too high beliefs that are then updated downwards to subjects who have initially too
low beliefs that are updated upwards. The treatment is thus not assigned fully randomly.
We use an alternative and complementary method. Our strategy to shift beliefs is based
on an anchoring procedure (Tversky and Kahneman 1974): we ask subjects to think about
the behavior of hypothetical participants in the F LOW experiment and we anchor them to
think about participants who reported the high state more or less often. The advantage of
our design is that we do not need to sample selectively from the distribution of actual past
behavior of other subjects. This could be problematic because, if the past behavior is highly
selected but presented as if representative, it could be judged as implicitly deceiving subjects
and could confound results of an experimental study on deception. We are not aware of other
studies that have used anchoring to affect beliefs before.
In our setup, subjects are asked to read a brief description of a “potential” experiment
which follows the instructions used in the F LOW experiment, i.e., 90 percent probability
of the low payment and 10 percent probability of the high payment. Subjects also have
on their desk the tray with chips and envelope that subjects in the F LOW experiment
had used. Subjects are then asked to “imagine” two “possible outcomes” of the potential
experiment. There are two between-subject treatments, varying the outcomes subjects are
asked to imagine. In treatment G LOW the outcomes have 20 percent and 30 percent of
hypothetical participants reporting to have drawn a 10, while in treatment G HIGH these
shares are 70 percent and 80 percent. Subjects are then asked a few questions about these
outcomes.26 Subjects are then told that the experiment has actually been run in the same
26Subjects are first asked to compute the truthful chance of drawing a 10 in the potential experiment. For
each of the imagined outcomes, they are then asked to estimate how many of the hypothetical participants
who report a 10 have truly drawn a 10 as well as questions about what could motivate someone who has drawn
a 4 to report either truthfully or untruthfully. Subjects are then asked to rate the satisfaction of someone who
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laboratory in the previous year and they are asked to estimate the fraction of participants in
the actual experiment who have reported a 10. Subjects are paid £3 if their estimate is correct
(within an error margin of ±3 percentage points). This mechanism is very simple and easier
to explain and understand than proper scoring rules. It elicits in an incentive-compatible
way the mode (or more precisely, the mid-point of the 6-percentage point interval with the
highest likelihood) of a subject’s distribution of estimates. We use subjects’ estimates to check
whether our anchoring manipulation is successful in shifting subjects’ beliefs.27
Finally, after answering a few additional socio-demographic questions, subjects are told
that they will be paid an additional amount of money on top of their earnings from the belief
elicitation. To determine how much money they are paid, subjects are asked to take part in
the F LOW experiment themselves. The procedure is identical to the description of F LOW
in the previous section. The experiments were conducted in Nottingham between March and
May 2016 with a total of 340 subjects (173 in G LOW, 167 in G HIGH).
3.4 Results
We start by showing the effect of the anchors on subjects’ beliefs.
Finding 6 The anchors significantly shift beliefs. Estimates of the fraction of participants
reporting a 10 are more than 20 percentage points higher in G HIGH than G LOW.
Figure 4 shows the distributions of estimates of the proportion of reported 10s made by
subjects across the two treatments. The distribution of the G HIGH treatment is strongly
shifted to the right relative to G LOW, and practically first-order stochastically dominates
it, in line with Definition 2. On average, subjects in G LOW believe that 41 percent of
participants in the F LOW experiment have reported a 10. In G HIGH the average belief is
62 percent (p < 0.001, OLS with robust SE; p < 0.001, Wilcoxon rank-sum test).
reports either a 4 or a 10 in the potential experiment. Finally subjects are asked to estimate which of the two
imaginary outcomes shown to them they think is “more realistic”. Note that we did not ask subjects to guess
or interpret the purpose of the experiment, but rather to reflect on participants’ motives and satisfaction with
various hypothetical behaviors undertaken in the experiment.
27For many distributions mode and mean are actually tightly linked. To illustrate this point, we have run
the following simulation assuming that beliefs are distributed according to the very flexible beta distribution.
We have generated 100000 pairs of beta distributions with randomly drawn α and β and compared the modes
and means of the two distributions in each pair. In over 97 percent of cases where a mode exists and where
one distribution has a higher mode than the other one, the higher-mode distribution has also a higher mean.
This means that if our elicitation of the belief mode finds a difference between treatments, then it is highly
likely that the two treatments also have different belief means.
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Figure 4: Distribution of beliefs about proportion of reported 10s
Having established that our manipulation is successful in shifting beliefs about reports
in the expected direction, our next step is to examine the effects of this shift in beliefs on
subjects’ actual reporting behavior.
Finding 7 The fraction of subjects reporting a 10 is not significantly different between G HIGH
and G LOW, i.e., we cannot reject the null hypothesis of gˆ-invariance. The point estimate is
in the direction of aversion.
Figure 5 shows the share of subjects reporting a 10 across the two treatments. Recall that
in both treatments the true probability of drawing a 10 is 10 percent (this is indicated by the
dashed line in the figure). We observe 55 percent of subjects reporting a 10 in G LOW, and
49 percent in G HIGH. This difference is not significant (p = 0.285, OLS with robust SE; p=
0.311, 2SLS regressing report on belief with treatment as instrument for belief; p = 0.284, χ2
test). Taken together, our study and the previous literature provide converging evidence that
manipulating beliefs about others’ reports has a limited impact on reporting.
One word of caution is warranted. Even though the point estimate of the effect of the
Gˆ treatments is quite close to zero, we cannot reject (small) positive or negative effects of a
change in beliefs. A power analysis shows that we can only detect treatment differences of 15
percentage points or larger at the 5% level and with 80% power, but we are not sufficiently
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powered to detect small differences like that observed in Figure 5. This may raise the concern
that our rejection of many models, in particular the social comparisons models, which all
predict affinity, is driven by a lack of power. However, these models typically predict quite
large responses to shifts in Gˆ. For example, a simple, calibrated version of the Conformity
in LC model implies that 21 percent of subjects should increase their reports across our Gˆ
treatments, which we do have power to detect. In fact, our data show that (in net) 6 percent
of subjects decrease their report.28
Figure 5: Effect of shifting beliefs about the distribution of reports
3.5 Changing the Observability of States
A final set of treatments tests whether observability of the subject’s true state by the exper-
imenter affects reporting behavior, in line with Definition 3. The experiments use a setup
similar to the one described above. Subjects are invited to the lab to fill in a questionnaire
and are paid based on a random draw that they perform privately. There are two between-
subject treatments. Differently from the previous experiments, in both treatments the draw
is performed out of a 10-state uniform distribution. In our UNOBSERVABLE treatment, the
draw is performed using the same procedures described for the previous experiments: subjects
28The 95 percent confidence interval of the difference between the share of high reports across our Gˆ treat-
ments is from 0.049 to -0.165. We focus on the Conformity in LC model as it provides a baseline utility function
for modeling social comparisons and cleanly demonstrates the fact that we should expect to see large shifts in
our Gˆ treatments. For details of this calibration see Appendix H.1.
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draw a chip at random out of an envelope, report the outcome on a payment sheet, and are
paid based on this report. Thus, in this treatment the experimenter cannot observe the true
state of a subject and cannot tell for any individual subject whether they lie or tell the truth.
In our OBSERVABLE treatment we maintain this key feature of the FFH paradigm, but
make subjects’ true state observable to the experimenter. In order to do so, the procedure
of the OBSERVABLE treatment differs from the UNOBSERVABLE treatment in two ways.
First, the draw is performed using the computer instead of the physical medium of our other
experiments (the chips and the envelope).29 Second, we introduce a payment procedure that
makes it impossible for the experimenter to link a report to an individual subject. Before the
start of the experiment the experimenter places an envelope containing 10 coins of £1 each on
each subject’s desk. Subjects are told to sit “wherever they want” and sit down unsupervised.
The experimenter does thus not known which subject is at which desk. After the computerized
draw, instead of writing the number on their chip on the payment sheet, subjects are told to
take as many coins from the envelope as the number of their chip. Subjects then leave the lab
without signing any receipt for the money taken or meeting the experimenter again. At the end
of the experiment, the experimenter counts the number of coins left by subjects on each desk
to reconstruct their “report” and compares it to the true state drawn on the corresponding
computer without being able to link any report to the identity of a subject.30 We ran these
experiments at the University of Nottingham with 288 subjects (155 in UNOBSERVABLE;
133 in OBSERVABLE). Experiments were conducted between May and October 2015.
29The computerized program simulates the process of drawing a chip from an envelope. Subjects first see on
their screen a computerized envelope containing 50 chips numbered between 1 and 10. Subjects have to click
a button to start the draw. The chips are then shuﬄed in the envelope for a few seconds and then one chip at
random falls out of the envelope. Subjects are told that the number of that chip corresponds to their payment
amount. For comparability, the computer is also used in the UNOBSERVABLE treatment where subjects use
it to get precise information on how to perform the (physical) draw.
30Had we only introduced observability of states without the double-blind payment procedure, we would
have deviated from the FFH paradigm whereby an individual cannot be caught lying. This could confound
the results because additional concerns may have come to the fore in subjects’ mind. For instance, they may
have become concerned with material punishment for misreporting their draw (e.g. exclusion from future
experiments). As a robustness check, we invited an additional 69 subjects to participate in a version of
the OBSERVABLE treatment that did not use the double-blind payment procedure. The share of subjects
misreporting their draw is lower when we do not use the double-blind payment procedure though this effect is
not significant.
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3.6 Results
Figure 6 shows the distribution of reports in the UNOBSERVABLE and OBSERVABLE
treatments. The dashed line in the figure indicates that in both treatments the truthful
probability of drawing each state is 10 percent.
Finding 8 Introducing observability has a strong and significant effect on the distribution of
reports.
Figure 6: Effect of changing the observability of states
Reports in the UNOBSERVABLE treatment are considerably higher than in the OB-
SERVABLE treatment (p < 0.001 OLS with robust SE; p < 0.001 Kolmogorov-Smirnov test;
p < 0.001, Wilcoxon rank-sum test; see Kajackaite and Gneezy (2017) for a similar result).
This result also demonstrates that it would be misleading to rely on evidence from set-
tings in which the true state is observable by the researcher if one is actually interested in
understanding a setting in which the true state is truly unobservable.
We can also use the OBSERVABLE treatment to examine our prediction about the ex-
istence of downward lying when the state is observable (Definition 4). Importantly, we may
not have the same result in a setting where the true state is unobservable (see Table 1).
Finding 9 There is no downward lying when the true state is observable.
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Figure 7 shows a scatter plot of subjects’ reports and true draws in the OBSERVABLE
treatment. The size of the bubbles reflects the underlying number of observations. No subject
reported a number lower than their true draw, i.e. lied downwards. About 60 percent of the
subjects who lie report the highest possible number, the remaining 40 percent of liars report
non-maximal numbers.
Figure 7: Reports and true draws in OBSERVABLE
4 Relating Theory to Data
In this section, we compare the predictions derived in Section 2 and Appendix B with our
experimental results and show that only two closely-related models are able to explain the
data. We then discuss a simple, parameterized utility function for one of the surviving models
which is able to quantitatively reproduce the data from the meta study as well as those from
our experiments.
4.1 Overall Result of the Falsification Exercise
Recall that our four empirical tests, in addition to the meta study, concern (i) how the
distribution of true states affects one’s report (we find drawing in); (ii) how the belief about
the reports of other subjects influences one’s report (we find gˆ-invariance); (iii) whether the
observability of the true state affects one’s report (we find it does); (iv) whether some subjects
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will lie downwards if the true state is observable (we find they do not). Taking all evidence
together we find the following:
Finding 10 Only the Reputation for Honesty + LC and the LC-Reputation models cannot
be falsified by our data.
Table 1 summarizes the predictions of all models. The two models that cannot be falsified
by our data, Reputation for Honesty + LC and LC-Reputation, combine a preference for
being honest with a preference for being seen as honest. In Reputation for Honesty + LC,
individuals care about lying costs and about the probability of being a liar given their report.
In LC-Reputation, individuals care about lying costs and about what an audience observing
the report deduces about their lying cost parameter θLC .
All other models fail at least one of the four tests. Looking at Table 1, one can discern
certain patterns. The LC model, which is most widely used in the literature, fails two tests,
predicting f -invariance and o-invariance. The Conformity in LC model, which is our preferred
way to model the effect of descriptive norms, fails three tests, predicting drawing out (when
the equilibrium is unique), affinity and o-invariance. All other social comparisons models also
predict affinity and o-invariance. Moreover, as we discuss in Appendix C, several popular
models, like the standard model and models that assume that subjects only care about their
reputation for having been honest, cannot even explain the findings of the meta study (and
also fail our new tests).
We find no significant effect of a change in beliefs, i.e., gˆ-invariance. As we discussed
in Section 3.4, our study is sufficiently powered to detect treatment differences implied by
reasonably parametrized versions of the social comparison models, e.g., Conformity in LC. We
cannot, however, rule out (small) positive or negative effects of a change in beliefs. Regardless
of whether our Gˆ treatments have enough power or not, even if we interpreted our data on
this test as inconclusive and thus disregard the gˆ-invariance result, we can still reject all the
social comparisons models because they fail at least one other experimental test.
Importantly, non-uniqueness of equilibria does not affect our overall falsification. Recall
that the first and third test might not work when there is more than one equilibrium. All
those models that fail the first or third test and could feature multiple equilibria also fail
additional tests. Similarly, the models that our data cannot falsify are consistent with the
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data when the equilibrium is unique.
4.2 A Calibrated Utility Function
In order to demonstrate how one of the non-falsified models, the Reputation for Honesty +
LC model (Section 2.2.3), can quantitatively match both the data from the meta study and
from our new experiments, we calibrate a simple, linear functional form. Our calibration is
not intended to suggest that the functional form presented here, along with our choice of
H, best matches the data. Instead, we view this as a demonstration that even quite simple
and tractable assumptions generate equilibria that allow us to capture many of the important
features of the data. Enriching the model further will only improve the fit. We suggest the
following utility function which we call “Calibrated Reputation for Honesty + LC”:
φ(r, c(r, ω),Λ(r); θRH) = r − cIω 6=r − θRHΛ(r)
As before, r is the report, ω the true state and Λ(r) the fraction of liars at r. c is a fixed
cost of lying and Iω 6=r is an indicator function of whether an individual lied. We suppose all
individuals experience the same fixed cost of lying (this utility function is thus a limit case of
the Reputation for Honesty + LC model). The individual-specific weight on reputation, θRH ,
is drawn from a uniform distribution on [0, κRH ]. The average θRH is thus κRH/2. Additional
details of the calibration are in Appendix H.2.31
We calibrate the model to match the leading example in the literature, a simple die-roll
setting, i.e., a uniform distribution F over six possible states with payoffs ranging from 1 to
6, where the audience cannot observe the state. We set c = 3 and κ = 12. We find that
in the equilibrium, no individual lies down. Moreover, Λ(ri) = 0 for i ≤ 4, Λ(r5) ≈ 0.15
and Λ(r6) ≈ 0.37. We find a reporting distribution similar to that found in our meta study:
g(r1) ≈ 0.07, g(r2) ≈ 0.13, g(r3) ≈ 0.17, g(r4) ≈ 0.17, g(r5) ≈ 0.20 and g(r6) ≈ 0.27. Figure
8 compares the predicted reporting distribution of this calibrated model to the data. The fit
is quite good, in particular given the simple functional form, and the model matches all four
31In concurrent work, Khalmetski and Sliwka (2016) and Gneezy et al. (2018) discuss another limit case of
the Reputation for Honesty + LC model, where all individuals face the same reputational cost, but vary in
the LC component of utility. Such utility functions can also be calibrated to match both the meta study data
and our new experiments.
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findings of the meta study.
It also matches up with our experimental findings. In a setting where the state is observ-
able, the model predicts no downward lying, as in our data (this is true for all Reputation for
Honesty + LC utility functions), and much more truth-telling. Under observability, all liars
report the maximal report, similar to our data.
Figure 8: Calibrated Reputation for Honesty + LC
The model also generates the large amount of drawing in we observe. We consider two
states like in our F treatments, and in order to keep the payoff scale the same as the previous
calibration, we suppose they pay 1 and 6. When f(ω1) = 0.4, the equilibrium features no lying
down and so Λ(r1) = 0. Moreover, Λ(r6) ≈ 0.28 and the share of low reports is g(r1) ≈ 0.16.
When f(ω1) = 0.9, we find two equilibria. One of the equilibria features no lying down, and
in this case Λ(r6) ≈ 0.69 and g(r1) ≈ 0.68. The other equilibrium features lying down; here
Λ(r1) ≈ 0.10, Λ(r6) ≈ 0.91 and g(r1) ≈ 0.80. Thus, in the last equilibrium, approximately
8 out of every 10 individuals who draw the high state give the low report. For comparison,
our experiments yield g(r1) = 0.13 and g(r1) = 0.55, respectively. Regardless of which of
these two equilibria is selected, we observe significant amounts of drawing in. Moreover, the
model can generate almost any behavior in our Gˆ treatments, because those treatments do
not pin down the belief about H (and thus Λ(r), on which utility in the model depends).
Depending on the new beliefs, aversion, gˆ-invariance or affinity could result; as the new belief
could either imply a positive, no, or negative change in the gap between Λ(r6) and Λ(r1) (see
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the Reputation for Honesty + LC part of the proof of Proposition 2 for details).
Both components of the utility function are important. In Figure 8, we also plot the
predicted reporting distributions for the utility function when we shut down the LC or the
RH part. The Only-RH model is far away from the data. The Only-LC model is closer, but
this model does not generate drawing in or o-shift.32
5 Conclusion
Our paper attempts to understand the constituent mechanisms that drive lying aversion.
Drawing on the extensive experimental literature following the FFH paradigm, we establish
some “stylized” findings within the literature, demonstrating that even in one-shot anonymous
interactions with experimenters, many subjects do not lie maximally. Our new experimental
results, combined with our theoretical predictions, demonstrate that a preference for being
seen as honest and a preference for being honest are the main motivations for truth-telling.
While we focus on a situation of individual decision making, the utility functions we consider
should be present in all situations that involve the reporting of private information, e.g.,
sender-receiver games, and would there form the basis for the strategic interaction.33
Three concurrent papers also present models that incorporate a desire to appear honest
in the utility function. The utility functions proposed by Khalmetski and Sliwka (2016) and
Gneezy et al. (2018) are similar in spirit to our Reputation for Honesty + LC model. Both
papers combine a desire to appear honest with a desire to be honest. Khalmetski and Sliwka
(2016) show that a calibrated version of their model reproduces the data patterns observed in
the FFH paradigm. Similar to two of our new tests, Gneezy et al. (2018) present experiments
that manipulate the true distribution of the states as well as the observability of the state,
with similar results to our tests. Taken together, the results of these two studies are in line
with the two non-falsified models we propose that also combine lying costs and reputational
costs. In another concurrent paper, Dufwenberg and Dufwenberg (2018) present a different,
32In the Only-LC model, individuals who draw ω3 are indifferent between reporting r3 and r6. We suppose
for the figure that they say r3. Shifting these to r6 only worsens the fit.
33Focusing more narrowly on experiments, our insights also do not just pertain to setups similar to Fis-
chbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi (2013). The matrix task of Mazar et al. (2008), described in the introduction, and
other real-effort reporting tasks add ambiguity about the true proportion of correct answers in the population
but once our models are adjusted to take the ambiguity into account, they can be directly applied to the Mazar
et al. (2008) setting.
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more nuanced formalization of the desire to appear honest, in particular they assume that
individuals care about the beliefs that an audience has about the degree of over-reporting
(rather than the simple chance of being a liar). Dufwenberg and Dufwenberg (2018) show
that this model can explain the results of the original Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi (2013)
setup (six-sided die roll). Future research could investigate whether reputational concerns
regarding honesty are more often captured by the assumptions in the models of Khalmetski
and Sliwka (2016), Gneezy et al. (2018) and our paper or by the Dufwenberg and Dufwenberg
(2018) assumption of perceived cheating aversion.
What lessons can we draw for policy? The size and robustness of the effect we document
suggest that mechanisms that rely on voluntary truth-telling by some participants could be
very successful. They could be easier or cheaper to implement and they could achieve outcomes
that are impossible to achieve if incentive compatibility is required. Moreover, if the social
planner wants to increase truth-telling in the population, our preferred model suggests that
lying costs and concerns for reputation are important. Thus, whatever created the lying costs
in the first place, e.g., education or a Hippocratic oath-type professional norm, is effective and
should be strengthened. In addition, one should try to make it harder to lie while keeping a
good reputation, e.g., via transparency, naming-and-shaming or reputation systems (e.g., Bø
et al. 2015).
There are at least four potential caveats for these policy implications. First, we would
not normally base recommendations on a single lab experiment. Given that our meta study
provides very strong, large-scale evidence, however, we feel confident that truth-telling is a
robust phenomenon. Second, lab experiments are not ideal to pin down the precise value of
policy-relevant parameters. We would thus not put much emphasis on the exact value of, say,
the average amount of lying, which we measure as 0.234. However, it is clear that, whatever
the exact value is, it is far away from 1. Thirdly, none of our results suggests that all people in
all circumstances will shy away from lying maximally. Any mechanism that relies on voluntary
truth-telling will need to be robust to some participants acting rationally and robust to self-
selection of rational participants into the mechanism. Finally, the FFH paradigm does not
capture several aspects that could affect reporting. Subjects have to report and they have to
report a single number. This excludes lies by omission or vagueness (Serra-Garcia et al. 2011).
From the viewpoint of the subject, there is also little ambiguity about whether they lied or
41
not. In reality a narrative for reporting a higher state while still maintaining a self-image of
honesty might be easier to generate (Tirole et al. 2017, Mazar et al. 2008).
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Online Appendices
This document contains the online appendices for the paper “Preferences for truth-telling”
by Johannes Abeler, Daniele Nosenzo and Collin Raymond.
• Appendix A contains further results of the meta study.
• Appendix B presents and derives predictions for those models listed in Table 1 of the
main body of the paper that were not discussed in the body of the paper.
• Appendix C discusses some prominent models that are discussed in the literature but
that cannot explain the findings of the meta study and are thus not discussed in the
main body of the paper.
• Appendix D contains the proofs for the predictions of the models presented in Section
2 in the main body of the paper.
• Appendix E explores how predictions would change if we altered the assumptions re-
garding the distribution H of individual-level parameters ~θ.
• Appendix F presents two additional sets of experiments that we conducted to test spe-
cific predictions of some of the models considered in the paper.
• Appendix G contains the instructions for the lab experiments.
• Appendix H explains the details of the calibrations in Section 4 in the body of the paper.
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A Further Results of the Meta Study
In this appendix, we discuss additional design details and results of the meta study including
hypotheses tests. Table A.1 provides descriptive statistics of the independent variables. Figure
A.1 marks all countries in which experiments were conducted. The world-wide coverage is
quite good, except for Africa and the Middle East.
A.1 Design
We searched in different ways for studies to include in the meta study, using Google Scholar
for direct search of all keywords used in the early papers in the literature and to trace who
cited those early papers, New Economic Papers (NEP) alerts and emails to professional email
lists. We include all studies using the FFH paradigm, i.e., in which subjects conduct a random
draw and then report their outcome of the draw, i.e., their state. This excludes sender-receiver
games as studied in Gneezy (2005) and the many subsequent papers which use this paradigm
or promise games as in Charness and Dufwenberg (2006). We require that the true state is
unknown to the experimenter but that the experimenter knows the distribution of the random
draw. The first requirement excludes studies in which the experimenter assigns the state to
the subjects (e.g., Gibson et al. 2013) or learns the state (e.g., Gneezy et al. 2013). The second
requirement excludes the many papers which use the matrix task introduced by Mazar et al.
(2008) and comparable real-effort reporting tasks, e.g., Ruedy and Schweitzer (2010). We
do include studies in which subjects report whether their prediction of a random draw was
correct or not (as in Jiang 2013). Moreover, we require that the payoff from reporting is
independent of the actions of other subjects. This excludes games like Conrads et al. (2014)
or d’Adda et al. (2014). We do allow that reporting has an effect on other subjects. We need
to know the expected payoff level, i.e., the nominal reward and the likelihood that a subject
actually receives this nominal reward. If the payoff is non-monetary, we translate the payoff
as accurately as possible into a monetary equivalent. We further require that the expected
payoff level is not constant, in particular not always zero, i.e., making different reports has
to lead to different consequences. We exclude studies in which subjects could self-select into
the reporting experiment after learning about the rules of the experiment. This excludes
the earliest examples of this class of experiments, Batson et al. (1997) and Batson et al.
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(1999). Finally, we exclude random draws with non-symmetric distributions, except if the
draw has only two potential states. We exclude such distributions since the average report
for asymmetric distributions with many states is difficult to compare to the average report of
symmetric distributions. This only excludes Cojoc and Stoian (2014), a treatment of Gneezy
et al. (2018) and two of our treatments reported in this paper.34
A.2 Influence of Treatment Variables
In this section, we further explore the effect of variables that differ between treatments and
test the statistical significance of those effects. For such treatment-level variables, we use
two complementary identification strategies. First, we can assume that the error term is
independent of the explanatory variables once we control for all observable variables. This
conditional-independence assumption allows us to interpret the regression coefficients as the
causal effects of the explanatory variables. While the conditional-independence assumption
is usually regarded as a quite strong assumption, it is less strong in our setting for several
reasons. Economics laboratory experiments are highly standardized and lab experiments are
run with very abstract framing, usually eschewing any context and just describing the rules
of the games. Both of these arguments mean that the importance of omitted variables is
likely to be limited. Moreover, researchers usually select the design of their experiments with
regard to the research question they are interested in and not with regard to characteristics of
the local subject pool. Reverse causality is thus also unlikely. Results are reported in Table
A.2, columns 1 and 2. We include all explanatory variables that vary across more than one
treatment.35
The second identification strategy we employ makes use of the random assignment of
subjects to treatments within study (and the few within-subject experiments). As long as we
control for study fixed effects and as long as treatments within a study only differ along one
dimension, this eliminates all omitted variables. This is thus a very clean form of identification.
The specifications with study fixed effects are in Table A.2, columns 3 to 8 (in column 9, we
also report the within-study difference for students vs. non-students even though being a
34We adjust the distribution of standardized reports of experiments with asymmetric distributions and two
states such that the average standardized report is comparable to the one of symmetric distributions.
35We restrict explanatory variables in this way since otherwise any treatment fixed effect could be an ex-
planatory variable. Given that we include 429 treatments this would become unwieldy.
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student is not randomly allocated).
Table A.1: Meta study: descriptive statistics
Mean # Subjects
Treatment-level variables
Maximal payoff from misreporting (in 2015 USD) 4.480 44390
1 if student subjects 0.577 44390
1 if repeated 0.244 44390
1 if online/telephone 0.273 44390
1 if control rolls suggested 0.283 44390
1 if reporting about state of mind 0.167 44390
1 if info about behavior of other subjects available 0.011 44390
1 if report reduces payoff of another subject 0.032 44390
Year experiment conducted 2013.437 44390
Author affiliation
1 if economics 0.758 44390
1 if psychology 0.212 44390
1 if sociology 0.030 44390
Method of randomization
1 if coin toss 0.408 44390
1 if die roll 0.529 44390
1 if draw from urn 0.050 44390
True distribution
1 if two outcomes non-uniform 0.122 44390
1 if two outcomes uniform 0.358 44390
1 if other uniform 0.370 44390
1 if bell shaped 0.150 44390
Individual-level variables
1 if female 0.478 22944
Age 29.652 16205
Field of study
1 if economics/management student 0.242 5284
1 if psychology student 0.027 5284
1 if other student 0.731 5284
# Decisions 270616
# Subjects 44390
# Treatments 429
# Studies 90
Notes: The means are computed on subject level. The maximal payoff refers to the maximal nominal
payoff times the probability a subject is actually paid and is converted using PPP.
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Figure A.1: Average report by country
Notes: The figure depicts the average standardized report per country. The darker the color, the
higher the average report. For exact country averages see Figure A.4.
The two specifications could yield different estimates for three reasons: (i) cleaner iden-
tification in the within-study specification, (ii) publication bias, and (iii) treatment effect
heterogeneity. First, if there are important omitted variables in the between-study specifi-
cation, the estimated coefficients will be biased. Omitted variables are not an issue for the
within-study specification. Second, we would expect that studies that do not find a significant
treatment effect are less likely to get published and are thus less likely to be included in our
meta study. This will bias upwards the coefficient in the within-study specification. The
between-studies specification suffers much less from this publication bias as we collect infor-
mation about variables which the original authors did not use for their publication decision.
If publication bias is important, then our between-study specification should give a better
estimate of the true coefficient than the within-study specification. Third, the within-study
estimates only use data from studies that vary the parameter of interest directly, thus restrict-
ing the sample considerably. If there is treatment effect heterogeneity, we would expect the
within-study estimate to differ from the between-study estimate. For example, the incentive
level could have a stronger effect for student samples than for non-student samples. We find
that treatment effect heterogeneity could indeed explain the difference between within-study
and between-study coefficients.36 If one is only interested in the average treatment effect,
36Take the incentive level coefficient as example. The between-study coefficient is -0.005 (see below for details,
based on 429 treatments) and the within-study coefficient is 0.003 (based on 94 treatments). To test whether
treatment effect heterogeneity could explain this difference, we take the entire sample, draw 94 treatments at
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the between-study specification is thus preferable as it reports the average effect of a larger
sample. Taken together, since we do not know with certainty how important the three reasons
are, we can only say that both estimates are informative. We thus report results of regres-
sions using both identification strategies. It turns out that in Table A.2, only one coefficient
out of six is different from zero and has an opposite sign in the between- and within-study
regressions.
In the regressions, we cluster standard errors on each subject, thus treating repeated
decisions by the same subject as dependent but treating the decisions by different subjects
as independent. This is the usual assumption for experiments that study individual decision
making. This assumption is also made in basically all studies we include in the meta study.37
In the regressions relying on conditional independence, we also report a specification in column
2 which clusters on study to allow for dependencies within study. Independent of clustering,
we weight one decision as one observation in all regressions.38
random and run the between-study specification on this subsample. We repeat this process 10000 times. We
find that 28 percent of the between-study coefficients are larger than 0.003.
37In two studies, Diekmann et al. (2015) and Rauhut (2013), subjects are shown the reports of other subjects
in their matching group before making a decision. For these studies we cluster on matching group rather than
on individual.
38If we weight by subject, results are very similar. Only the overall average standardized report is then 0.321
instead of 0.234.
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Incentive level: Figure 1 showed that the level of incentives has only a very small
effect on the standardized report. The corresponding regressions are in Table A.2, columns
1 and 2. An increase of the potential payoff by 1 USD changes the standardized report
by -0.005. In column 3, we only use within-study variation for identification. We restrict
the sample to those studies which vary the payoff level between treatments. A couple of
studies vary payoff level and another variable independently. In the regression, we control
for those other variables and mark this as “Additional controls: Yes” in the table. If we
cannot properly control for within-study variation, we exclude the affected treatments (we do
the same in columns 4–9). The resulting coefficient of 0.003 is very similar to the coefficient
derived under the conditional-independence assumption. Even though the coefficients are very
small, given our large sample size, both are significantly different from zero. Taken together,
this provides converging evidence that the average amount of lying does not change much if
stakes are increased. This result is further corroborated by Figure A.2. This figure shows
the distribution of reports for experiments using a uniform distribution with six states (this
represents about a third of the data set). We collapse treatments by the potential payoff
from misreporting and show the distributions for the four quartiles (weighted by number
of subjects). The line marked by “1” is the distribution of the treatments with the lowest
payoffs while the line marked “4” represents the treatments with the highest payoffs. Overall,
distributions do not differ systematically by payoff level. In almost all cases, higher states are
reported more often than lower states, and the second highest state is always reported with
more than 1/6 probability. Overall, neither the average report nor the reporting pattern is
affected by the payoff level.
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Figure A.2: Distribution of reports by incentive level
Notes: The figure depicts the distribution of reports for treatments that use a uniform distribution
with six states and linear payoff increases. Treatments are collapsed into quartiles by the level of the
maximal payoff from misreporting. The line marked by “1” is the distribution of the treatments with
the lowest payoffs while the line marked “4” represents the treatments with the highest payoffs. The
dashed line indicates the truthful distribution at 1/6.
Repetition: The regressions in Table A.2, columns 1 and 2, show that experiments
with repeated reports induce on average markedly lower reports than one-shot experiments.
There are no studies which compare one-shot with repeated implementations directly. We
can still use within-study variation to estimate the effect of repetition by comparing reports
in early vs. late rounds. Figure A.3 plots the average standardized report by treatment and
round. One-shot treatments are shown as round 1. Visually, there is no strong trend over
rounds. Results of the corresponding regression analysis are reported in Table A.3, column
1. We control for treatment fixed effects and thus restrict the sample to repeated studies,
as only they have within-treatment variation in rounds. For those studies, round has a very
small, though significantly positive effect. Subjects in repeated experiments thus start lower
than subjects in one-shot experiments and then slowly gravitate towards the level of one-shot
behavior. This pattern contrasts strongly with, e.g., public goods games experiments in which
a strong convergence over time to the standard prediction can be observed (e.g., Herrmann
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et al. 2008).
Taken together, this shows that the overall low reports are robust to learning and experi-
ence. Moreover, this corroborates our theoretical approach to model each reporting decision
as separate and independent.
Figure A.3: Average standardized report by round
Notes: The figure plots standardized report over the rounds in the experiment. Standardized report is
on the y-axis. A value of 0 means that subjects realize as much payoff as a group of subjects who all
tell the truth. A value of 1 means that subjects all report the state that yields the highest payoff. The
round of the experiment is on the x-axis. One-shot experiments are shown as round 1. Each bubble
represents the average standardized report of one treatment in a given round and the size of a bubble
is proportional to the number of subjects in that treatment.
Reporting channel: While most experiments were conducted in a laboratory, about a
third of experiments were conducted remotely via telephone or an online survey. Since the
experimenter controls the entire environment of the lab, subjects might fear to be observed,
say, by secret cameras. Such an observation is impossible if reports are done by telephone
or an online survey since the (physical) random draw is done remotely and thus entirely
unobservable. The channel of reporting could also have a direct effect on reporting. We find
that reports done remotely do not differ from reports in the lab.
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Control rolls suggested: In about one in five experiments the experimenter suggested
explicitly that subjects use the randomization device (most often a die) several times in a
row. We find that suggesting control rolls increases reports significantly (columns 1 and 6).39
Reporting about state of mind: Following Jiang (2013) and Greene and Paxton
(2009), quite a few studies ask subjects to privately make a prediction about the outcome of
a random draw. The random draw is usually implemented on a computer and the outcome
is known to the experimenter. The report consists of the subject claiming whether their
prediction was correct or not. The overall structure is very similar to a standard coin-flip
experiment: whether the report is truthful cannot be judged individually by the experimenter,
but the experimenter knows the true distribution of states. The only difference is thus whether
the subject makes a report about a state of mind or a physical state of the world. The between-
study results in column 1 show that reporting about a state of mind leads to significantly
higher reports. The one study which tested this difference directly (Kajackaite and Gneezy
2017) also finds that reports about a state of mind are significantly higher (column 7).
Information about others’ behavior: In a few experiments, subjects were given in-
formation about the past behavior of other subjects in similar experiments. This does not
affect the average report significantly, except in column 2.
From whom payoff is taken: In most experiments, subjects take money from the
experimenter or the laboratory if they report higher states. In some treatments, subjects’
reports instead reduces the payoff of another subject, i.e., the total amount of payoff allocated
to two subjects is fixed and the report decides how much of that fixed amount goes to the
reporting subject. Columns 1 and 9 indicate that this leads to a significant reduction in
reports.
Subject pool: Student samples report significantly higher than samples taken from
the general population. Since the latter samples are likely to also include some current
students and many subjects who used to be students, these regressions likely underestimate
39This effect could be because subjects report the highest state of all rolls they did, even though they were
instructed that only the very first roll counted for the report (Shalvi et al. 2011, Ga¨chter and Schulz 2016c).
Similarly, the control rolls could provide an excuse or narrative for the subject to report a higher state without
feeling too bad about it. Obviously, even if experimenters did not suggest to roll several times, subjects could
have rolled several times and report the highest state anyway (or not roll at all and just report whatever they
wanted). Perhaps subjects did not have the idea to roll several times. Or the effect is more subtle, i.e., for a
valid narrative one needs an external person to suggest the control rolls.
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the difference between students and non-students. Students and non-students differ in many
respects. We show below that the student effect is partly due to age. In addition, cognitive
skills, socio-economic background, current income, etc. could all be part of it.
Year of experiment: Reports have decreased slowly over time but this effect is very
small, given that the earliest experiments were conducted in 2005.
Author affiliation: Studies conducted by economists yield slightly higher reports than
studies conducted by psychologists. The differences to sociologists’ experiments are not sig-
nificant.
Randomization method: Reports do not differ significantly when a die roll or a coin
toss is used. Studies using a draw from an urn yield lower reports.
True distribution: Reports for different uniform distributions do not differ significantly
(see also Figure A.7). Compared to uniform distributions, asymmetric distributions have
higher reports and bell-shaped distributions have lower reports.
Country: Behavior is surprisingly robust across countries. Figure A.4 plots average
standardized reports by country. The country average is marked by a cross. Some of the
cross-country variation comes from studies that run the same design across different countries
while some of the variation is coming from researchers using convenience samples of subjects
in different countries. For those countries for which we have a decent amount of data, the
average standardized report varies only little across countries, from about 0.1 to about 0.5.
Adding country fixed effects to the regression in Column 1 of Table A.2 increases the adjusted
R2 from 0.368 to 0.455. For detailed analyses of what drives cross-country differences, see,
e.g., Pascual-Ezama et al. (2015), Hugh-Jones (2015), Mann et al. (2016) or Ga¨chter and
Schulz (2016c).
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Figure A.4: Average standardized report by country
Notes: The figure plots standardized report against country. Standardized report is on the y-axis. A
value of 0 means that subjects realize as much payoff as a group of subjects who all tell the truth.
A value of 1 means that subjects all report the state that yields the highest payoff. Each bubble
represents the average standardized report of one treatment and the size of a bubble is proportional
to the number of subjects in that treatment. The cross is the average per country.
A.3 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
So far, we have focused on variables that differed only on treatment level. For a subset of
studies we also have data on individual-level variables, namely gender, age and field of study.
Gender: Figure A.5 shows the effect of gender on reports. The majority of treatments is
below the 45° line, indicating that female subjects report lower numbers than male subjects.
However, there are also many treatments in which women report higher numbers than men.
We test the significance of this effect by regressing the report on a gender dummy and con-
trolling for treatment fixed effects. We thus only use within-treatment variation. The results
are presented in Table A.3, column 2: women’s standardized report is on average 0.058 lower
than men’s. This effect is highly significant. Figure A.6 shows the distribution by gender of
all treatments that use a uniform distribution with six states for which we have gender data.
Men are generally less likely to report lower states and more likely to report higher states.
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Figure A.5: Average standardized report by gender
Notes: The figure plots the average standardized report of male subjects (x-axis) vs. the average
standardized report by female subjects (y-axis). A standardized report of 0 means that subjects
realize as much payoff as a group of subjects who all tell the truth. A value of 1 means that subjects
all report the state that yields the highest payoff. Data is restricted to those treatments where male
and female subjects participated. The size of a bubble is proportional to the number of subjects in
that treatment.
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Figure A.6: Distribution of reports by gender
Notes: The figure depicts the distribution of reports for treatments that use a uniform distribution with
six states and linear payoff increases, collapsed by gender. The line marked “F” is the distribution of
female subjects and the line marked “M” is the distribution of male subjects. The dashed line indicates
the truthful distribution at 1/6.
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Table A.3: Regressions of individual-level variables
Dependent variable: Standardized report
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Round 0.001**
(0.000)
1 if female -0.058***
(0.009)
Age -0.002*** -0.004
(0.001) (0.003)
Age squared 0.000
(0.000)
1 if economics/management student 0.005
(0.022)
1 if psychology student -0.062
(0.078)
Treatment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Decisions 73582 88503 39828 39828 8335
# Subjects 4862 22172 15472 15472 4655
# Treatments 43 239 144 144 52
# Studies 11 47 33 33 9
# Clusters 4806 22116 15472 15472 4655
Notes: OLS regressions. Robust standard errors clustered on individual subjects are in parentheses.
The sample in each specification is restricted to those treatments in which the independent variable(s)
vary. Significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Age: Older subjects tend to report lower numbers. This effect is significant in a linear
regression but not significant when we add age squared (Table A.3, columns 3 and 4).
Field of study: While students in general make higher reports than non-students, we do
not find an effect of field of study (Table A.3, column 5).
A.4 Further Robustness Checks
Other uniform distributions: In Figure 2, we showed for uniform distributions with two
and six states that the distribution of reports is increasing and has support on more than
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one state (it actually has almost always full support). This finding generalizes to uniform
distributions with different number of states. Figure A.7 demonstrates that the distribution
of reports is actually quite similar for experiments with different numbers of states. We
observe over-reporting of non-maximal states for the six- and 10-state distributions. The
general pattern of reporting across the four distributions in the graph suggests that we should
expect such over-reporting to occur for any uniform distribution with more than three states.
Figure A.7: Distribution of reports (uniform true distributions)
Notes: The figure depicts the difference between the actual and the truthful distribution of reports for
treatments that use a uniform true distribution and linear payoff increases. Treatments are collapsed
by the number of states, 2, 3, 6, or 10. The dashed line at 0 indicates the truthful distribution. The
size of a bubble is proportional to the number of subjects in the treatments with a given number of
states.
Individual-level analysis: Up to here, we have shown that reporting is far from the
standard rational prediction of a standardized report of +1 in the entire sample and in all
sub-groups defined by observable characteristics, e.g., gender. However, maybe there is a
sub-group, which we cannot identify by observable variables, which does behave according to
the standard prediction. For this we would need to identify for each individual whether they
lied or not, which is not possible for the one-shot experiments. However, if we aggregate the
many reports of an individual subject in repeated experiments, we can test for each individual
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subject whether their sequence of reports could be generated by truth-telling. In particular,
it is increasingly unlikely to repeatedly draw the highest-payoff state. Note that we depart for
this analysis from our usual approach of treating each decision as separate and independent.
For example, if subjects care about being perceived as truthful, the predicted behavior depends
on whether subjects and the audience player treat each decision separately or not. In Figure
A.8 we focus on experiments in which subjects repeatedly report the state they drew of a
uniform distribution with two states and add up the number of times a subject reported the
high-payoff state. To make experiments with different numbers of rounds comparable, we
plot the share of the potential high-payoff reports on the x-axis and the difference between
the observed distribution and the truthful binomial distribution on the y-axis. Reporting
the highest-payoff state in each round is the standard rational prediction. This reporting
pattern could have resulted from truth-telling only with a minuscule chance of 1/210 to 1/240.
As one can see in the figure, more subjects always report the high-payoff state than would
be expected under full truth-telling. However, the overall share of subjects at this point is
surprisingly small. Only 3.6 percent of subjects always report the high-payoff state and only
6.7 percent report it more than 80 percent of the time (the size of the bubbles is proportional
to the number of subjects making the respective report). Overall, this suggests that also
individually, people are far from the standard prediction.
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Figure A.8: Distribution of sum of reports (repeated reports of 2-state distributions)
Notes: The figure displays the distribution of the sum of standardized reports in experiments in which
subjects repeatedly report the state of a uniform distribution with two states. Each line represents
one treatment. The share of the potential high-payoff reports is on the x-axis. On the y-axis is the
difference between the actual and the truthful probability mass function. The size of a bubble is
proportional to the number of subjects in a given treatment at this share of high-payoff reports.
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A.5 List of Studies Included in the Meta Study
Table A.4: List of studies included in the meta study
Study # treatments # subjects Country Randomization method True distribution
this study * 7 1124 United Kingdom multiple multiple
Abeler et al. (2014) * 4 1102 Germany coin toss multiple
Abeler (2015) * 1 60 China draw from urn 1D10
Abeler and Nosenzo (2015) * 9 507 Germany draw from urn 1D10
Amir et al. (2016) * 11 403 Israel coin flip 20D2
Antony et al. (2016) * 2 200 Germany die roll 1D6
Arbel et al. (2014) * 2 399 Israel die roll 1D6
Ariely et al. (2014) 1 188 Germany die roll 1D6
Aydogan et al. (forthcoming) 2 120 Germany coin toss 2D2
Banerjee et al. (2016) * 16 672 India die roll 1D6
Barfort et al. (2015) 1 862 Denmark die roll asy. 1D2
Basic et al. (2016) * 3 272 Germany die roll 1D6
Beck et al. (2016) * 6 128 Germany die roll 1D6
Blanco and Ca´rdenas (2015) 2 103 Colombia die roll 1D6
Braun and Hornuf (2015) 7 342 Germany die roll 1D2
Bryan et al. (2013) * 3 269 USA coin toss 1D2
Bucciol and Piovesan (2011) * 2 182 Italy coin toss 1D2
Cadsby et al. (2016) 1 90 China die roll 1D6
Cappelen et al. (2016) * 2 1473 Tanzania coin toss 6D2
Charness et al. (2017) 4 338 Spain die roll 1D10
Chytilova and Korbel (2014) * 1 117 Czech Republic die roll 1D6
Clot et al. (2014) * 2 98 Madagascar die roll 1D6
Cohn et al. (2014) * 8 563 coin toss 1D2
Cohn et al. (2015) * 4 375 Switzerland coin toss 1D2
Cohn and Mare´chal (forthcoming) 1 162 Switzerland coin toss 1D2
Cohn et al. (2016) 4 468 Switzerland coin toss 1D2
Conrads et al. (2013) * 4 554 Germany die roll 1D6
Conrads and Lotz (2015) * 4 246 Germany coin toss 4D2
Conrads et al. (2017) 1 114 Germany die roll 1D2
Dai et al. (forthcoming) 2 384 France die roll 1D3
Dato and Nieken (2015) 1 288 Germany die roll 1D6
Dieckmann et al. (forthcoming) 5 1015 multiple (5) coin toss 1D2
Diekmann et al. (2015) * 4 466 Switzerland die roll 1D6
Di Falco et al. (2016) 1 1080 Tanzania coin toss 1D2
Djawadi and Fahr (2015) 1 252 Germany draw from urn asy. 1D2
Drupp et al. (2016) 4 170 Germany coin toss 4D2
Duch and Solaz 3 3400 multiple (3) die roll 1D6
Effron et al. (2015) * 8 2151 USA coin toss 1D2
Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi (2013) * 5 979 Switzerland die roll 1D6
Foerster et al. (2013) * 1 28 Germany die roll 12D8
Fosgaard (2013) * 1 505 Denmark die roll 2D6
Fosgaard et al. (2013) * 4 209 Denmark coin toss 1D2
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Study # treatments # subjects Country Randomization method True distribution
Ga¨chter and Schulz (2016b) * 23 2568 multiple (23) die roll 1D6
Ga¨chter and Schulz (2016a) * 4 262 United Kingdom die roll 1D6
Garbarino et al. (2016) 3 978 USA coin toss multiple
Gino and Ariely (2012) 8 304 USA die roll 1D6
Gneezy et al. (2018) 2 207 Germany draw from urn multiple
Grigorieff and Roth (2016) * 2 1511 USA coin toss 4D2
Halevy et al. (2014) * 1 51 Netherlands die roll 1D6
Hanna and Wang (forthcoming) 2 826 India die roll 1D6
Heldring (2016) * 1 415 Rwanda coin toss 30D2
Hilbig and Hessler (2013) * 6 765 Germany die roll asy. 1D2
Hilbig and Zettler (2015) * 6 342 Germany multiple asy. 1D2
Houser et al. (2012) 3 740 Germany coin toss 1D2
Houser et al. (2016) * 2 72 USA coin toss asy. 1D2
Hruschka et al. (2014) 8 223 multiple (6) die roll 1D2
Hugh-Jones (2015) * 30 1390 multiple (15) coin toss 1D2
Jacobsen and Piovesan (2016) 3 148 Denmark die roll 1D6
Jiang (2013) * 6 39 Netherlands die roll 1D2
Jiang (2015) * 4 224 multiple (4) die roll 1D2
Kajackaite and Gneezy (2017) 17 1303 multiple (2) multiple multiple
Kroher and Wolbring (2015) * 9 384 Germany die roll 1D6
Lowes et al. (forthcoming) 4 499 DR Congo die roll 30D2
Maggiani and Montinari (forthcoming) 2 192 France die roll 1D2
Mann et al. (2016) 10 2179 multiple (5) die roll 1D2
Meub et al. (2015) 2 94 Germany die roll 1D2
Muehlheusser et al. (2015) * 1 108 Germany die roll 1D6
Mun˜oz-Izquierdo et al. (2014) * 3 270 Spain coin toss 1D2
Pascual-Ezama et al. (2015) * 48 1440 multiple (16) coin toss 1D2
Ploner and Regner (2013) * 6 316 Germany die roll 1D2
Potters and Stoop (2016) * 6 102 Netherlands draw from urn 1D2
Rauhut (2013) * 3 240 Switzerland die roll 1D6
Ruﬄe and Tobol (2014) * 1 427 Israel die roll 1D6
Ruﬄe and Tobol (forthcoming) * 1 156 Israel die roll 1D6
Schindler and Pfattheicher (2017) * 2 300 USA coin toss 1D2
Shalvi et al. (2011) * 2 129 USA die roll 1D6
Shalvi (2012) 2 178 Netherlands coin flip 20D2
Shalvi et al. (2012) * 4 144 Israel die roll 1D6
Shalvi and Leiser (2013) * 2 126 Israel die roll 1D6
Shalvi and De Dreu (2014) * 8 120 Netherlands coin toss 1D2
Shen et al. (2016) 1 205 Singapore die roll 1D6
Suri et al. (2011) 3 674 multiple (2) die roll multiple
Thielmann et al. (forthcoming) * 1 152 Germany coin toss asy. 1D2
Utikal and Fischbacher (2013) 2 31 Germany die roll 1D6
Sˇkoda (2013) 3 90 Czech Republic die roll 1D6
Waubert De Puiseau and Glo¨ckner (2012) 4 416 Germany coin toss 5D2
Weisel and Shalvi (2015) * 9 178 multiple (2) die roll asy. 1D2
Wibral et al. (2012) 2 91 Germany die roll 1D6
Zettler et al. (2015) * 1 134 Germany coin toss asy. 1D2
Zimerman et al. (2014) * 1 189 Israel coin toss 1D2
Notes: Studies for which we obtained the full raw data are marked by *. 1DX refers to a uniform distribution
with X outcomes. A coin flip would thus be 1D2. ND2 refers to the distribution of the sum of N uniform
random draws with two outcomes. Asymmetric 1D2 refers to distributions with two outcomes for which the
two outcomes are not equally likely.
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B Additional Models
In this section we discuss the remaining models listed in Table 1. Proofs are provided imme-
diately after the relevant result. To prove predictions, we first consider binary states, then
generalize to n states. Some proofs refer to the proof of Proposition 2 which provides analog
results for the LC, the Conformity in LC and the Reputation for Honesty + LC models. Those
proofs can be found in Appendix D. Our results also rely on Lemma 1 in Appendix D which
states that the results on observability and lying down do not depend on the number of states
n.
B.1 Inequality Aversion
This model captures the widely discussed notion that individuals care about how their mone-
tary payoff compares to the payoff of others as in, e.g., Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000). In our formal model we will build off the intuition of the latter, although
similar results hold for a model in line with the former. We suppose that individuals care not
just about their own payoff, but also the average payoff (and so our solution concept is the
standard Bayes Nash Equilibrium).40 Formally, utility is
φ(r, ς(r − r¯); θIA)
where r¯ is the mean report. ς is a function that maps the difference between an individual’s
payoff and the average payoff to a utility cost. It has a minimum when r− r¯ is 0 and is strictly
increasing in the absolute distance from 0 of its argument. The only element of ~θ that affects
utility is the scalar θIA which governs the weight that an individual applies to inequality
aversion. We suppose that φ is strictly increasing in its first argument and decreasing in
its second (strictly so when θIA>0), i.e., individuals like money and dislike inequality, and is
(weakly) decreasing in θIA; and that the cross partial of φ with respect to the second argument
and θIA is strictly negative, while other cross partials are 0. An equilibrium will exist because
of the continuity of φ and ς and the fact that r¯ is continuous in the distribution of reports.
40This model can also capture a notion of a preference for conformity in actions. In this model individuals
may gain utility from how closely their action matches others’ actions. Because, in this model, an action
directly maps to a monetary payoff, caring about the average action of others is the same as caring about the
average payoff of others.
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Because of the dependence of any given individual’s optimal report on others’ reports, there
may be multiple equilibria. For example, if all individuals face a sufficiently strong cost of
deviation from the mean report, then for any report r, everyone reporting r is an equilibrium.
Proposition 3 Suppose individuals have Inequality Aversion utility. For arbitrary n, we have
f -invariance, depending on parameters, we may have affinity, aversion or gˆ-invariance, we
have o-invariance and lying down when the state is unobserved or observed. For n = 2, the
Inequality Aversion model exhibits affinity.
Proof: We first consider n = 2. We will refer to the component of utility coming from
inequality aversion as the inequality aversion cost. Observe that utility does not depend
directly on the drawn state ω.
Claim 1: Fixing an equilibrium, either all types report r1, all types report r2 or there exists
one unique type that is indifferent between r1 and r2 and all types higher than that report r1,
and all others report r2.
Consider the case where some individuals give either report. Then by continuity there
must be at least one type, θ¯IA, which is indifferent between the two reports. Analogous
reasoning to the proof of the LC model-part of Proposition 2 (Appendix D) demonstrates
that this type must be unique. By assumption ∂2φ∂ς∂θ < 0 and
∂2φ
∂r∂θ = 0. Therefore, since
φ(r2, ς(r2 − r¯); θ¯IA)− φ(r1, ς(r1 − r¯); θ¯IA) = 0, then for all θIA > θ¯IA, φ(r2, ς(r2 − r¯); θ¯IA)−
φ(r1, ς(r1 − r¯); θ¯IA) < 0 and for all θIA < θ¯IA, φ(r2, ς(r2 − r¯); θ¯IA)− φ(r1, ς(r1 − r¯); θ¯IA) > 0.
Thus the type must be unique.
Claim 2: An equilibrium exists.
An equilibrium will exist because of the continuity of φ and ς and the property that r¯ is
continuous in the threshold types (where the threshold is in θIA). However, the equilibrium
may not be unique.
Claim 3: We observe f -invariance.
By Claim 1, the indifferent type (if there is one) must be 0-mass. Since all other individuals
have a strict preference, and utility does not depend on the drawn state (and hence does not
depend on F ), the distribution of reports does not depend on F . Thus the set of equilibria
will not change with F .
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Claim 4: We observe affinity.
Although there may be multiple equilibria, because G enters in the the utility function
directly (because G has a one-to-one mapping with r¯) we can still make predictions regarding
the effect of Gˆ. ς has a minimum when r = r¯. Observe that r1 ≤ r¯ ≤ r2. Thus, when r¯
increases, |r1 − r¯| increases and |r2 − r¯| decreases. Thus ς(r1 − r¯) must rise, and ς(r2 − r¯)
must fall. Therefore, for all individuals the utility of reporting r2 increases, and the utility of
reporting r1 decreases, and so more individuals report r2.
Claim 5: The model exihibits o-invariance and will exhibit downwards lying regardless of
observability.
The distribution of reports will not depend on observability of the state since utility
does not depend on any inference of others and so the set of equilibria will not change with
observability. Moreover, in any equilibrium with full support on the reporting distribution, we
must have some individuals lying down. Since individuals’ utility only depends on their report
and not their drawn state, generically individuals (other than the zero mass of individuals who
are indifferent between reports) with the same parameter θIA must take the same action. Since
we have full support in the reporting distribution, there is some interval of types [θˆIA, θ˜IA]
that strictly prefer to report r1 over all other reports. Because F features full support, at
least some individuals who have θIA ∈ [θˆIA, θ˜IA] must have drawn ω > ω1.
Turning to n states, observe that the reasoning for the f -invariance result is exactly the
same (because the set of indifferent types is measure 0, and utility does not depend on the
drawn state).
Claim 6: Depending on parameters, we may have affinity, aversion or gˆ-invariance.
We’ve already presented an example of affinity for n = 2. We now present an example of
aversion.
Suppose n = 3, and r1 = ω1 = 0, r2 = ω2 = 1, r3 = ω3 = 2. Suppose that utility is equal
to r−θIAς(r− r¯). We now construct a cost function that is a continuous approximation of the
following function: ς(r− r¯) = 0 for |r− r¯| ≤ 0.6, ς(r− r¯) = 3 otherwise. Thus, we set ς(0) = 0.
Then ς increases (in a continuous fashion) so that for a very small δ, when |r − r¯| = 0.6− δ,
ς(r − r¯) =  (for a very small ). At that point ς increases to 3 at |r − r¯| = 0.6, and then ς
asymptotes to 3+  as |r− r¯| → ∞. Moreover, suppose that as a limit case 10% of individuals
have θIA = 0.5, and the rest have θIA = 1. Suppose GˆA is such that r¯ = 0.2. For small enough
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 and δ, the former type of individuals reports r3 = 2, the latter type reports r1 = 0 (since
reporting r1 = 0 gives a utility of approximately 0, reporting r2 = 1 gives approximately
1 − 3θIA, and reporting r3 = 2 gives approximately 2 − 3θIA). Now if we shift the beliefs
about the reporting distribution so that GˆB induces r¯ = 0.5, then the former type reports
r2 = 1 and the latter type reports r2 = 1 as well (since reporting r1 = 0 gives approximately
0, reporting r2 = 1 gives approximately 1, and reporting r3 = 2 gives approximately 2−3θIA).
This implies aversion. By continuity, we can also demonstrate gˆ-invariance. 
B.2 Inequality Aversion + LC
We extend the simple inequality aversion model we developed in Section B.1, so that indi-
viduals additionally care about the cost of lying (for an early version of such a model, see
Hurkens and Kartik 2009). As solution concept we again consider the standard Bayes Nash
Equilibrium because utility only depends on the action profile of the individual and the rest
of the population. Formally, utility is
φ(r, ς(r − r¯), c(r, ω); θIA, θLC)
where r¯ is the mean report. The function ς has the same properties as in the Inequality
Aversion model. The function c has the same properties as in the LC model. The only
elements of ~θ that affect utility are the scalars θIA and θLC which govern the weight that
an individual applies to inequality aversion and lying costs. We suppose that φ is strictly
increasing in its first argument, decreasing in its second (strictly so when θIA > 0), decreasing
in its third (strictly so when θLC > 0), and is (weakly) decreasing in θIA and θLC . Moreover,
as before, the partial of φ with respect to ς and θIA is strictly negative and the partial with
respect to c and θLC is strictly negative, while other cross partials are 0. As in the Inequality
Aversion model, an equilibrium will exist because of the continuity of φ, c and ς and the
property that r¯ is continuous in the threshold types, but because of the dependence of utility
on others’ reports, there may be multiple equilibria.
Proposition 4 Suppose individuals have Inequality Aversion + LC utility. For arbitrary n,
depending on parameters, we may have drawing in, drawing out or f -invariance, we may have
affinity, aversion or gˆ-invariance, we have o-invariance and, depending on parameters, we may
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have lying down or not when the state is unobserved or observed. For n = 2, the Inequality
Aversion + LC model exhibits drawing in when the equilibrium is unique and affinity.
Proof: We first consider n = 2.
We can define a “threshold function” for each state τωi(θIA, θLC), which, given the equilib-
rium and an individual’s given type, gives the utility of reporting rj 6=i versus ri, conditional
on having drawn ωi. These are continuous functions. If τ is less than or equal to 0, the
individual will report their state, otherwise they will lie.
Claim 1: Fixing θIA and an equilibrium, φ(r2, ς(r2 − r¯), c(r2, ω1); θIA, θLC)− φ(r1, ς(r1 −
r¯), c(r1, ω1); θIA, θLC) is decreasing in θLC .
The monetary difference between reporting r1 or r2 is independent of θLC as is the in-
equality aversion cost. But the lying cost part does depend on it: Since c(r2, ω1) > c(r1, ω1),
∂φ
∂c < 0,
∂2φ
∂r∂θLC
= 0 and ∂2φ
∂c∂θLC
< 0, the result follows.
The analogous claim holds for those individuals who drew ω2.
Claim 2: Fixing θLC and an equilibrium, φ(r2, ς(r2 − r¯), c(r2, ω1); θIA, θLC)− φ(r1, ς(r1 −
r¯), c(r1, ω1); θIA, θLC) is either monotonically increasing or monotonically decreasing in θIA.
The reasoning is exactly analogous to Claim 1, except that whether we have increasing or
decreasing depends on whether ς(r1 − r¯) or ς(r2 − r¯) is larger.
Claim 3: Fixing θLC and an equilibrium, τωi(θIA, θLC) is equal to 0 for at most one value
of θIA. Similarly fixing θIA, τωi(θIA, θLC) is equal to 0 for at most one value of θLC .
This is immediately implied by the preceding claims.
We can think of the equilibrium as now being characterized by a set of combinations of
θLCs and θIAs, which conditional on a drawn state imply that decision makers with those
parameters are indifferent between the two reports (τωi(θIA, θLC)=0). We can think of this
set as being a function in the space θIA × θLC ; or graphically, a curve in two-dimensional
Euclidean space. The LC portion of costs never depends on the distribution of responses,
however the rest of the function can.
Because the LC portion of the cost function doesn’t depend on the reports of others, we
can also think of an equilibrium as the fixed point of the function ζ(r¯) which maps from an
aggregate average report to the optimal aggregate average report (given F and H). More
precisely, ζ is a function that gives the optimal aggregate average report if there exists one in
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the allowed range of r¯ (i.e. r1 to rn); gives rn if the threshold is above the range; and gives r1
if the threshold is below the range. This ensures ζ maps from [r1, rn] to itself. It also implies
that, with a unique equilibrium, the graph of ζ must cross the 45-degree line from above to
below.
Claim 4: An equilibrium exists.
An equilibrium will exist because of the continuity of φ, c, and ς and the property that r¯
is continuous in the threshold types.
Claim 5: Fixing a r¯, any individual who draws ω1 and reports r2 would also report r2 if
they drew ω2.
Observe that the utility gap between the two reports if ω1 is drawn is
φ(r2, ς(r2 − r¯), c(r2, ω1); θIA, θLC) − φ(r1, ς(r1 − r¯), c(r1, ω1); θIA, θLC). The gap if ω2 is
drawn is φ(r2, ς(r2−r¯), c(r2, ω2); θIA, θLC)−φ(r1, ς(r1−r¯), c(r1, ω2); θIA, θLC). By construction
the latter utility gap is larger than the former.
Claim 6: We observe drawing in.
Suppose the equilibrium is unique and that f(ω2) increases while fixing strategies. Con-
sider what happens to ζ(r¯). There are more individuals drawing the high state, and fewer
drawing the low state. Since individuals are more likely to report high after having drawn
the high state than the low state by Claim 5 (since the set of individuals who draw ω2 and
report r2 is a superset of those who would report r2 if they drew ω1), this implies an increase
in the optimal aggregate report r¯ (i.e., ζ(r¯)). This implies that ς(r2 − r¯) gets smaller and
ς(r1− r¯) gets larger, and so r2 becomes relatively more attractive to all individuals. This also
increases ζ(r¯). Thus, the increase in f(ω2) shifts ζ up and so the equilibrium level of r¯ in-
creases. Whenever r¯ increases, reporting r2 becomes relatively more attractive (since ς(r1− r¯)
increases and ς(r2 − r¯) falls, causing drawing in.
Although the equilibrium may not be unique, because G enters in the utility function
directly (through its one-to-one mapping with r¯) we can still make predictions regarding the
effect of Gˆ.
Claim 7: We observe affinity.
If gˆ(r2) increases, then the beliefs about r¯ increases. This implies that ς(r2−r¯) gets smaller
and ς(r1 − r¯) gets larger, and so r2 becomes relatively more attractive to all individuals.
Claim 8: The model exihibits o-invariance and may exhibit downwards lying or not re-
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gardless of observability.
Because this model nests the standard Inequality Aversion model, if individuals dislike
being too far ahead of others, they may lie down. But the model also nests the LC model
where individuals will never lie down. Moreover, as in the LC model and the Inequality
Aversion model individually, the distribution of reports does not depend on observability.
Now we turn to n states.
Claim 9: Depending on parameters, we may have drawing in, drawing out or f -invariance.
For n = 2, we have shown that drawing in will occur. We now provide an example for n = 3
that yields drawing out. Consider the limiting case where the vast majority of individuals
have just LC utility and some individuals have utility that takes into account only inequality
aversion costs, where the inequality aversion cost is a function of the absolute distance between
an individual’s report and the average report. Moreover, suppose the parameters of the LC
costs (for all individuals) are such that individuals who care only about LC costs are willing
to lie up two states, but no one is willing to lie up one state (e.g., because of fixed costs).
In contrast, we suppose that the inequality aversion costs are large enough so that those
individuals simply want to match as closely as possible the average report.
Thus, all individuals with only LC costs who drew ω1 will report r3 regardless of what
others do. Individuals with only LC costs who drew ω2 (ω3 respectively) will report r2 (r3
respectively). Suppose that we have a distribution where f(ω1) is close to 1; then r¯ is closer
to r3 than r2 regardless of what the inequality averse individuals do, and so those individuals
face a relatively strong incentive to lie up all the way to the highest state r3. Now suppose
we shift much of the weight of F from ω1 to ω2. Now those individuals facing only LC costs
who previously drew ω1 but now draw ω2 will report r2 instead of r3. This can shift r¯ closer
to r2 than r3 (regardless of what the inequality averse individuals do), and so now inequality
averse individuals will report r2. Thus, we get drawing out. By continuity, we can also have
f -invariance.
Claim 10: Depending on parameters, we may have affinity, aversion or gˆ-invariance.
Since this model nests the Inequality Aversion model as a limit case, and since that model
can generate affinity, aversion or gˆ-invariance, this model can too. 
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B.3 Censored Conformity in LC
This section presents a variation of the Conformity in LC model. One could imagine that
an individual does not normalize their lying cost by the average lying cost in society (as in
Conformity in LC), but only by the lying costs incurred by individuals who “could have”
lied profitably, i.e., those who did not receive the maximal draw. As in the Conformity in
LC model, utilities thus depend on the profile of joint state-report combinations across other
individuals, and so we solve for the Bayes Nash Equilibrium.
In this model, as in Conformity in LC, individuals will not want to lie downwards. We
denote, supressing extraneous notation, the average lying costs of all those who do not draw
the maximal state as c¯ω 6=ωn . The utility function is then:
φ(r, η(c(r, ω), c¯ω 6=ωn); θCCLC)
where η is the normalized cost function and has the same properties as in the Conformity
in LC model. φ is strictly increasing in the first argument, falling in the second (strictly when
θCCLC > 0), and (weakly) falling in θCCLC . Last, the cross partial of φ with respect to η and
θCCLC is strictly negative, while other cross partials are 0. An equilibrium will exist because
of the continuity of φ, η and c (and the continuity of c¯ω 6=ωn in the proportion of liars), but
because of the dependence of utility on others’ joint state-report combinations, it may not be
unique.
Proposition 5 Suppose individuals have Censored Conformity in LC utility. For arbitrary
n, depending on parameters, we may have drawing in, drawing out or f -invariance, we may
have affinity, aversion or gˆ-invariance, we have o-invariance and no lying down when the
state is unobserved or observed. For n = 2, we have f -invariance and affinity.
Proof: We first consider n = 2.
Claim 1: No individual lies down.
In doing so they would pay a weakly higher lying cost and receive a lower monetary payoff
than if they told the truth.
Claim 2: Fixing an equilibrium, conditional on drawing ω1 either all types report r1, all
types report r2 or there exists one unique type that is indifferent between r1 and r2 and all
types higher than that report r1, and all others report r2.
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Observe that since no one lies down, the fraction of individuals who lie among those who
could lie is simply the excess number of r2 reports compared to ω2 draws, divided by the
number of individuals drawing ω1: g(r2)−f(ω2)f(ω1) . The actual lying cost, conditional on those
that could have lied, is proportional to this (for n = 2), a proportionality we can directly
model as part of φ. In the case that some types give one report and others the other, by
continuity there must be a type that conditional on drawing ω1 is indifferent between the two
reports. This type θ¯CCLC satisfies:
φ(r2, η(c(r2, ω1),
g(r2)− f(ω2)
f(ω1)
); θ¯CCLC) = φ(r1, η(c(r1, ω1),
g(r2)− f(ω2)
f(ω1)
); θ¯CCLC)
This threshold is unique for the analogous reasons to the LC and Conformity in LC models.
We can rewrite the indifference condition as
φ(r2, η(c(r2, ω1), H(θ¯CCLC)); θ¯CCLC) = φ(r1, η(c(r1, ω1), H(θ¯CCLC)); θ¯CCLC)
By construction H(θ¯CCLC) is the fraction of subjects who would report r2 if they drew ω1.
And so we have H(θ¯CCLC) = Prob(θ < θ¯CCLC) = f(ω1)f(ω1)Prob(θ < θ¯
CCLC) = g(r2)−f(ω2)f(ω1) .
Claim 3: An equilibrium exists.
An equilibrium will exist given the continuity of φ and η and the property that the pro-
portion of liars is continuous in the cutoff θ¯CCLC
Claim 4: The model exhibits f -invariance.
The indifference condition in Claim 2 does not depend on F and we obtain f -invariance.
Claim 5: The model exhibits affinity.
As in the standard Conformity in LC model, the equilibrium reporting distribution may
not be unique. We can still make predictions regarding the effect of Gˆ since no one lies down.
Suppose we fix F and gˆ(r2) increases. Then there must be more liars who drew ω1 and said
r2 and so the second argument of the utility function must increase. Thus, the cost of lying
goes down. Previously indifferent type must strictly prefer to lie, which yields affinity.
Claim 6: The model exihibits o-invariance and no downwards lying regardless of observ-
ability.
Since no part of the utility function depends on observability, making the state observ-
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able does not change behavior. Individuals will not lie down for the same reason as in the
Conformity in LC model.
We now turn to n > 2.
Claim 7: Depending on parameters, we may have drawing in, drawing out or f -invariance.
Observe that the example of drawing in provided in Claim 12 of the Conformity in LC
model proof (Proposition 2 in Appendix D) relied on the aggregate lying costs going up for
those individuals who could lie. This implies that it works just as well in this model. We could
reverse the example to obtain drawing in. By continuity, we can also generate f -invariance.
Claim 8: Depending on parameters, we may have affinity, aversion or gˆ-invariance.
We demonstrated affinity already. The example for aversion provided in Claim 13 of the
Conformity in LC model works here as well. By continuity, we can also generate gˆ-invariance.

B.4 Reputation for Being Not Greedy
Individuals often want to signal to the audience about a particular characteristic they pos-
sess. We use as an inspiration the motivations provided in Be´nabou and Tirole (2006) and
Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi (2013), and model an individual as wanting to signal to the
audience that they are not greedy, i.e., they place a relatively low value on money compared
to reputation. Thus, an individual’s utility will depend on the audience’s beliefs about their
type, the scalar θRNG (the only element of ~θ that affects utility), which is unobserved by
the audience. However, the belief can be conditioned on the report r itself. Because utility
depends on the audience’s beliefs, we must use the psychological game theory framework of
Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009) to analyze the game. Since the audience player understands
the equilibrium strategies of all types, and correctly utilizes Bayesian updating, we can simply
describe their belief as E(θRNG|r). Given this, utility is:
φ(r, E(θRNG|r); θRNG)
We assume φ is increasing in the first element, i.e., individuals like money; but the partial of
φ with respect to the first element is equal to 0 when θRNG = κRNG, and otherwise strictly
positive for θRNG < κRNG. φ is also increasing in the second element, i.e., individuals like
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the audience to have a high belief about their θRNG; specifically the partial of φ with respect
to the second element is 0 when θRNG = 0 and is strictly positive for θRNG > 0. The cross
partial of φ with respect to the first element and θRNG is strictly negative. This captures the
property that individuals face both a higher benefit, and a higher marginal benefit, of the
monetary payoff when θRNG is smaller. Moreover, the cross partial of φ with respect to the
second element and θRNG is strictly positive. This captures the property that individuals with
higher θRNGs have both a higher benefit, and a higher marginal benefit, of being perceived as
having a higher expected θRNG. Other cross partials are 0. Intuitively our assumptions are
tantamount to supposing that less “greedy” individuals also care more about being thought
of as less greedy. Equilibrium will exist because of the continuity of φ and the expectations
operator, but may not be unique.
Proposition 6 Suppose individuals have Reputation for Being Not Greedy utility. For arbi-
trary n, we have f -invariance, depending on parameters, we may have affinity, aversion or
gˆ-invariance, we have o-invariance and lying down when the state is unobserved or observed.
Proof: We first consider n = 2.
Claim 1: Fixing an equilibrium, either all types report r1, all types report r2 or there exists
one unique type that is indifferent between r1 and r2 and all types higher than that report r1,
and all others report r2.
Consider the case where some individuals give either report. Then by continuity there must
be at least one type, θ¯RNG, which is indifferent between the two reports: φ(r2, E(θRNG|r2); θ¯RNG)−
φ(r1, E(θRNG|r1); θ¯RNG) = 0. With full support on G this implies that E(θRNG|r2) <
E(θRNG|r1). If not, then reporting r2 gives higher utility and so all types give report r2, a con-
tradiction. Then for all θRNG > θ¯RNG, φ(r2, E(θRNG|r2); θRNG)−φ(r1, E(θRNG|r1); θRNG) <
0 and for all θRNG < θ¯RNG, φ(r2, E(θRNG|r2); θRNG) − φ(r1, E(θRNG|r1); θRNG) > 0 by our
assumptions on the cross partials.
Claim 2: An equilibrium exists.
This is by standard continuity arguments.
Claim 3: We have f -invariance.
Observe that utility does not depend directly on the drawn state ω. With reasoning
analogous to that given in the Inequality Aversion model the reporting strategy thus also
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does not depend on ω for all but a 0-mass of individuals (those who are indifferent). Even
though there can be multiple equilibria, this implies that the distribution of reports does not
depend on F and so the set of equilibria will not change with F .
Claim 4: Depending on parameters, we may have affinity, aversion or gˆ-invariance.
The uniqueness of the equilibrium depends on H — because the construction of the indif-
ferent type depends on the relationship between the expectation of θRNG, conditional on it
being above the indifferent type, and the expectation of θRNG, conditional on it being below
the indifferent type. The actual shape of H can be such that there are multiple equilibria
or a unique equilibrium. Importantly though, recall that conditional on a particular equilib-
rium there is one unique indifferent type. The reason why we may get affinity, aversion or
gˆ-invariance is that a shift in Gˆ could be rationalized by different shifts in H that could lead
to either affinity or aversion. We provide an example.
Suppose the support for θRNG is [0, 1], that utility from report r is θRNGE[θRNG|r] + (1−
θRNG)r and there are binary states/reports (with payoffs of r2 = 1 and r1 = 0). As claimed
above, it is easy to verify that, in any equilibrium with full support, there is a single unique
indifferent type that satisfies θRNGE[θRNG|0] = θRNGE[θRNG|1] + (1 − θRNG) or θRNG(1 +
E[θRNG|0] − E[θRNG|1]) = 1. Moreover, also as claimed above, E[θRNG|0] − E[θRNG|1] > 0
in any equilibrium with full support.
Now, we show that we can either have affinity or aversion. Suppose that gˆ(r2) increases.
This implies there is a larger mass of individuals below the threshold than previously. This
could be rationalized by different shifts in H which induce different reactions. For example,
individuals could be less likely to draw a value just above the threshold, and more likely to
draw values far below the threshold. This implies that the value of θRNG, conditional on
reporting r1 = 0, has gone up, and the value of θRNG, conditional on reporting r2 = 1, has
gone down, implying that 1 + E[θRNG|0] − E[θRNG|1] has increased. Thus, the indifferent
type must fall.
However, another way to rationalize the shift in behavior is there are fewer individuals
with very high types (θRNG close to 1), and many more individuals with types just below the
threshold. This implies that the value of θRNG, conditional on reporting r1 = 0, has gone
down, and the value of θRNG, conditional on reporting r2 = 1, has gone up, implying that
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1 + E[θRNG|0] − E[θRNG|1] has decreased, thus the indifferent type must increase.41 Thus,
observing a higher gˆ(r2) could either increase or decrease the threshold. By continuity, we
can also generate gˆ-invariance.
Claim 5: The model exihibits o-invariance and will exhibit downwards lying regardless of
observability.
Some individuals will lie downwards in an equilibrium with full support since if a given
type (other than the indifferent type, which has 0 mass) prefers to report r1, conditional on
drawing ω1, the same type would want to report r1, conditional on drawing ω2. Although
reports are used to infer something about the individuals, it is not the probability of being a
liar (i.e. something that depends on the drawn state). Thus observing the state, as well as the
report, will not actually assist the audience player with inferring the type of the individual,
and again not change the set of possible equilibria and the predictions regarding downward
lying is the same under observability.
The previous predictions do not depend on the number of states, so they also apply for
arbitrary n states. 
B.5 LC-Reputation
Rather than caring about the reputation of having reported truthfully conditional on their
report, individuals may instead want to cultivate a reputation as a person who has high lying
costs, i.e., they like the audience to have a high belief about their θLC . Such a model is
similar to the one discussed in Frankel and Kartik (2016). It is also similar in spirit, although
in an entirely different domain, to the models of fairness by Levine (1998), Be´nabou and Tirole
(2006), Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008), Andreoni and Bernheim (2009), Tadelis (2011), and
Grossman (2015). In those models individuals like to be perceived as fair as well as actually
having preferences for fairness. Thus, an individual’s utility will depend on the audience
player’s beliefs about their lying cost type, the scalar θLC , which is unobserved. However,
the belief can be conditioned on the report r itself. Because utility depends on the audience’s
beliefs, we use the psychological game theory framework of Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009)
to analyze the game. Since the audience understands the equilibrium strategies of all types,
and correctly utilizes Bayesian updating, we can simply describe their belief as E(θLC |r).
41For similar reasons, 1 + E[θRNG|0]− E[θRNG|1] may be non-monotone in the threshold type.
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Utility is
φ(r, c(r, ω), E[θLC |r]; θLC , θRep) = u(r)− θLCc(r, ω) + θRepυ(E[θLC |r])
The only elements of ~θ that affect utility are θLC and θRep. u(r) is strictly inreasing in r. c and
θLC have the same interpretation as in the LC model, and the assumptions regarding them are
the same. θRep represents the weight that any given individual places on the audience’s belief
about θLC . υ is strictly increasing in its argument. The interpretation is that individuals
have a positive utility from others believing that they have high lying costs. An equilibrium
will exist because of the continuity of φ, c and the expectations operator, but may not be
unique because of the dependence of utility on others’ strategies (via the audience’s beliefs).
Proposition 7 Suppose individuals have LC-Reputation utility. For arbitrary n, depending
on parameters, we may have drawing in, drawing out or f -invariance, we may have affinity,
aversion or gˆ-invariance, we have o-shift and, depending on parameters, we may have lying
down or not when the state is unobserved or observed. For n = 2, the LC-Reputation model
predicts drawing in.
Proof: We first consider n = 2.
Claim 1: E[θLC |r1] ≥ E[θLC |r2] for all equilibria with full support.
To see this, suppose not. Then r2 has both a (strictly) higher reputation and (strictly)
higher monetary payoff. Fix a value of θRep. All those who drew ω2 will report r2. Ob-
serve that by reasoning analogous to the LC model itself, fixing θRep and an equilibrium,
φ(r2, c(r2, ω1), E[θLC |r2]; θLC , θRep)−φ(r1, c(r1, ω1), E[θLC |r1]; θLC , θRep) is decreasing in θLC .
Thus, of those who drew ω1, there will be a threshold type and all types with a higher
θLC will report r1, all those with a lower type will report r2. But this immediately im-
plies that E[θLC |r1, θRep] ≥ E[θLC |r2, θRep] and so, averaging over values of θRep, we obtain
E[θLC |r1] ≥ E[θLC |r2].
Claim 2: Fixing θLC and an equilibrium, φ(r2, c(r2, ω1), E[θLC |r2]; θLC , θRep)−φ(r1, c(r1, ω1), E[θLC |r1]; θLC , θRep)
is decreasing in θRep.
This is immediately implied by the fact that the reputation is worse at r2 (as shown in
Claim 1), ∂φ
∂E[θLC ] > 0,
∂2φ
∂E[θLC ]∂θRep > 0 and the other cross partials with respect to θ
Rep are
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0 (by our assumption of additive separability).
As in the Reputation for Honesty + LC model (see proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix
D), we can construct a “threshold function” for each state τωi(θLC , θRep) which, given the
equilibrium and an individual’s type, gives the utility of reporting rj 6=i versus ri, conditional
on having drawn ωi.
Claim 3: Fixing θLC and an equilibrium, τωi(θLC , θRep) is equal to 0 for at most one value
of θRep. Similarly fixing θRep, τωi(θLC , θRep) is equal to 0 for at most one value of θLC .
This is immediately implied by the preceding claims.
If τ is less than or equal to 0, the individual will report their state, otherwise they will
lie. So, we can think of the equilibrium as being characterized by a set of combinations of
θLCs and θReps so that the threshold function equals 0. Thus the threshold diagram looks
qualitatively similar to Figure D.1 (including the linear threshold functions).
We can characterize the equilibrium in terms of the intercepts of the threshold func-
tion. Observe that given H and a utility function, E[θLC |ri] is characterized by the function
τωi(θLC , θRep) = 0. Since the τωi(θLC , θRep) = 0 equations are always linear in θLC and θRep
they can be characterized by its θLC intercept and its θRep intercept denoted θωiLC,T and θ
ωi
Rep,T .
Moreover, since the LC portion of costs never depends on the distribution of responses, the
θωiLC,T intercept (i.e. the threshold value of θ
ωi
LC,T when θRep = 0) must always be the same.
Therefore, we can think of each of the threshold “lines” (one for each drawn state) as being
characterized by a single intercept: θωiRep,T . The thresholds θ
ωi
Rep,T (one for each state), along
with H, induce a conditional (on each state) probability of giving either report. These, in
conjunction with F , define the estimated value of θLC at either report (as well as G).
To solve for an equilibrium we can consider a function ζ(θω1Rep,T , θ
ω2
Rep,T ) which maps from
the thresholds that everyone is using into best response thresholds. The fixed points of this
function will characterize our equilibria. However, observe that because we are looking at
the θRep intercepts, the LC costs are 0. Thus, the actual drawn state does not enter the
utility function, and so players must behave the same regardless of which state they drew;
so θω1Rep,T = θ
ω2
Rep,T . Thus, our problem reduces to a single dimension; and we can consider a
function ζ(θRep,T ), and its fixed points characterize the equilibria. Thus, ζ is a function that
gives the optimal threshold if there exists one in the allowed range of θRep; gives κRep if the
threshold is above the range; and gives 0 if the threshold is below the range. This ensures ζ
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maps from [0, κRep] to itself. Moreover, if there is a unique equilibrium, the graph of ζ must
cross the 45-degree line from above to below.
Claim 4: An equilibrium exists.
Given our continuity assumptions, the threshold functions will be continuous in the condi-
tional expectations of θLC , and the conditional expectations will be continuous in the thresh-
old functions, so an equilibrium will exist. However, the equilibrium may not necessarily be
unique.
Claim 5: We observe drawing in.
Suppose there is a unique equilibrium. Recall that E[θLC |r1] ≥ E[θLC |r2]. Moreover,
observe that fixing θRep, E[θLC |r2, ω2, θRep] ≥ E[θLC |r2, ω1,θRep], since only those with low
θLC will lie from ω1 to r2. Thus the following is true averaging over θRep: E[θLC |r2, ω2] ≥
E[θLC |r2, ω1]. Analogous reasoning leads to E[θLC |r1, ω1] ≥ E[θLC |r1, ω2]. Now suppose that
f(ω2) increases. Fixing the input threshold θRep,T , this implies that the fraction of individuals,
conditional on reporting r2, who drew ω2, must increase. Similarly, the fraction of individuals,
conditional on reporting r1, who drew ω2, must increase. This increases the expected θLC at
r2 and decreases it at r1. This makes r2 relatively more attractive to individuals (compared
to r1). Thus the optimal threshold θRep (generated by ζ) must rise and we get drawing in.
Claim 6: Depending on parameters, we may observe affinity, aversion or gˆ-invariance.
Because the threshold characteristics look qualitatively similar to Figure D.1 we can again
see how a shift in gˆ(r2) can cause either affinity, aversion or gˆ-invariance even when the
equilibrium reporting distribution is unique. Consider the threshold θRep,T . It is defined as the
solution to the equation u(r2)+θRepυ(E[θLC |r2]) = u(r1)+θRepυ(E[θLC |r1]) or u(r2)−u(r1) =
θRep(υ(E[θLC |r1])− υ(E[θLC |r2])).
The Gˆ treatments do not pin down the new belief about H that subjects hold. Depending
on the H, we could get affinity or aversion. In particular, suppose we move from GˆA (associ-
ated with HA) to GˆB and that there are two Hs (HB and H˜B) that rationalize GˆB. It can
be the case that under HB the value υ(E[θLC |r1])−υ(E[θLC |r2]) is larger than under HA. In
contrast, under H˜B the difference is smaller than under HA. Then we get aversion if subjects
believe the new H is the former, and aversion if the latter.
Formally, we show that two different changes in the exogenous distribution H can both
lead to an increase in gˆB(r2) (relative to gˆA(r2)). Then we show that they have the opposite
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implications for υ(E[θLC |r1])− υ(E[θLC |r2]). As in the Reputation for Honesty + LC model
two different shifts of probability mass in H could lead to an increase in gˆB(r2) (relative to
gˆA(r2)). The first shifts mass from above τ(ω1) to below it (without altering the relative
weights above and below τ(ω2)). This, fixing the thresholds, doesn’t change the reporting
of individuals who drew ω2, but leads to a higher mass of individuals drawing ω1 reporting
r2. Since E[θLC |r2, ω2] ≥ E[θLC |r2, ω1] and E[θLC |r1, ω1] ≥ E[θLC |r1, ω2] this decreases
both E[θLC |r2] and E[θLC |r1], as well as increasing g(r2). Recall our fixed point operator
that defines the threshold which characterizes the equilibrium: ζ(θRep,T ). Recall that this,
taking as an input everyone else’s threshold, returns the optimal threshold. If υ(E[θLC |r1])−
υ(E[θLC |r2]) increases, this makes the high report less attractive, and so ζ decreases, reducing
the equilibrium level of θRep,T .42 This reduction will cause aversion. Thus, in order to generate
aversion we need that υ(E[θLC |r1])−υ(E[θLC |r2]) increases in response to this shift in weight,
and as in the Reputation for Honesty + LC model a simple restriction on the derivative of υ
at E[θLC |r1] and E[θLC |r2] will suffice.
The second shift moves mass from below τ(ω2) to above it (without altering the relative
weights above and below τ(ω1)). Fixing the thresholds, this doesn’t change the reporting
of individuals who drew ω1, but leads to a higher mass of individuals drawing ω2 reporting
r2. This increases the expected value of θLC at both reports. If υ(E[θLC |r1])− υ(E[θLC |r2])
decreases, this makes the high report more attractive, and so ζ increases. This increases the
equilibrium level of θRep,T , and causes affinity. Similarly to before, in order to generate affinity
we need that υ(E[θLC |r1])− υ(E[θLC |r2]) decreases in response to this shift in weight. This
again occurs with a simple restriction on the derivative of υ, as in the Reputation for Honesty
+ LC. Thus, we can get both affinity and aversion (and by continuity gˆ-invariance).
Claim 7: The model exhibits o-shift and can exhibit downwards lying or not regardless of
observability.
Individuals’ behavior should change if the state is observed. But this is for a very different
reason compared to the Reputation for Honesty + LC model. In that model, behavior changes
because the probability of being a liar would either be 0 or 1. In the LC-Reputation model
observing both the state and the report can give a more precise estimate of θLC , as it can be
42An equilibrium threshold must fall in this situation (see the Reputation for Honesty + LC model for details
of why).
88
estimated using both ω and r, rather than just r.
Given the similarity to the Reputation for Honesty + LC model, it is clear why lying down-
wards may occur when states are not observed (and so solely private information). However,
lying downwards may still occur in equilibrium when states are observed. This is because
the inference is not done on the probability of being a liar, as in the Reputation for Honesty
+ LC model, but on θLC . It is possible to have a countersignalling equilibrium where the
highest and lowest θLC types pool on truth-telling and middle θLC types lie down. Of course,
if individuals care vary little about their reputation, then we will never observe lying down.
We now turn to n states.
Claim 8: Depending on parameters, we may have drawing in, drawing out or f -invariance.
We have shown drawing in for n = 2. We now provide an example for drawing out
analogous to that for the Reputation for Honesty + LC model. Suppose that n = 3. More-
over, suppose that the LC part of the utility function is such that individuals only lie one
state/report up. Now, move from FA to FB by keeping fA(ω1) constant and shifting weight
from ω2 to ω3. This has two effects. First, fixing strategies, it makes reporting r3 more
attractive (since some of the individuals drawing ω3 will still report r3) and so increases the
estimated value of θLC at r3. Second, by the same reasoning, it makes the middle state
less attractive. Thus, individuals who draw the lowest state will find reporting the middle
state less attractive, and more will simply report the truth which implies drawing out. By
continuity, the model can also generate f -invariance.
We know we have ambiguous predictions regarding shifts in Gˆ for even two states, and
this carries over to n states. 
B.6 Guilt Aversion
Guilt aversion (Charness and Dufwenberg 2006; Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2007, 2009) posits
that people like to live up to others’ expectations so as to avoid guilt. In applying guilt aversion
to our setting, we assume that subjects experience guilt (and so lower utility) to the extent
that they believe they disappointed the audience player (i.e., report more than expected), for
example, the experimenter. Because beliefs are correct in equilibrium, the audience expects
the report to be the average report induced by the equilibrium G, which we denote r¯ (each
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equilibrium will have an associated r¯). To keep notation simple, we suppress the fact that r¯
is an equilibrium object that depends on F and H and the selected equilibrium.43 Because
individuals’ utility depends on the beliefs of the audience, this model explicitly uses the tools
of psychological game theory (Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2007, 2009). Utility is:
φ(r, γ(r − r¯); θGA)
where γ is a function that maps the difference between any given individual’s report and
the average report to a utility cost. Given an equilibrium and associated r¯, if r ≤ r¯, then
γ(r− r¯) = 0. If r > r¯, then γ(r− r¯) is strictly increasing in r− r¯. The only element of ~θ that
affects utility is the scalar θGA which governs the weight that an individual applies to guilt.
We suppose that φ is strictly increasing in its first argument, decreasing in its second (strictly
so when θGA>0), (weakly) decreasing in θGA, and the cross partial of the second argument
and θGA is strictly negative, while other cross partials are 0.
Equilibrium existence follows from the continuity of φ and γ and r¯. However, there may
be multiple equilibria. For example, if the audience expects that the only report given is the
maximal report, then players do not believe that the audience will be disappointed when the
maximal report is made. Thus no one feels guilt when making the maximal report, and so
everyone makes that report. This forms an equilibrium. In contrast, if the audience expects
that the only report given is the minimal report, then the audience will be disappointed when
any other report is made. So long as individuals experience enough guilt, it can also be an
equilibrium for everyone to then make the minimal report. However, as we formalize below,
the set of equilibria doesn’t shift with F .44
Proposition 8 Suppose individuals have Guilt Aversion utility. For arbitrary n, we have
f -invariance, depending on parameters, we may have affinity, aversion or gˆ-invariance, we
43One might argue that guilt aversion is not appropriate for this subject-experimenter interaction (or more
generally, subject-audience interaction). We still include it in our list of models since it has been widely applied
and we want our study to be able to link to that literature. Moreover, in almost a dozen experiments surveyed
in the meta study (Appendix A), a higher report reduces the payoff of another subject (and not the budget of
the experimenter). In those treatments, guilt aversion could well be applied to the subject-subject interaction.
Average behavior in these treatments is not very far away from behavior in subject-experimenter treatments
(see Table A.2), so it could well be that similar motives play a role in the subject-experimenter interaction.
44Surprisingly, in our simple environment with our particular modeling assumptions, guilt aversion turns
out to predict the same as the inequality aversion model, albeit for very different underlying reasons. The
assumption about utilities when r ≤ r¯ is different but this does not affect the predictions.
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have o-invariance and lying down when the state is unobserved or observed. For n = 2, we
have affinity.
Proof: We first consider n = 2.
First, observe that utility does not depend directly on the drawn state ω.
Claim 1: Fixing an equilibrium, either all types report r1, all types report r2 or there exists
one unique type that is indifferent between r1 and r2 and all types higher than that report r1,
and all others report r2.
Consider the case where some individuals give either report. Then by continuity there
must be a unique type, θ¯GA, which is indifferent between the two reports. Analogous to the
previous proofs this type must be unique.
Claim 2: An equilibrium exists.
This is by standard continuity arguments.
Claim 3: We observe f -invariance.
By Claim 1, if we have a unique indifferent type, then it must be 0-mass. Since all other
individuals have strict preferences, and utility does not depend on the drawn state (and hence
does not depend on F ), the distribution of reports does not depend on F . Thus the set of
equilibria will not change with F .
Although there may be multiple equilibria, we can still make predictions regarding the
effect of Gˆ.
Claim 4:We observe affinity.
γ has a minimum when r = r¯. Suppose gˆ(r2) increases and so the induced r¯ increases.
Observe that r1 ≤ r¯ ≤ r2. Thus, when r¯ increases, |r1 − r¯| increases and |r2 − r¯| decreases.
So, γ(r2 − r¯) decreases, while γ(r1 − r¯) remains the same (and equal to 0). So the utility
from reporting r2 has increased, and the utility of reporting r1 stays the same for any given
individual. Therefore, more individuals will choose to report r2. Intuitively, if players believe
that there is a higher average report, then they will also believe that the audience will be less
disappointed by a higher report.
Claim 5: The model exihibits o-invariance and will exhibit downwards lying regardless of
observability.
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The distribution of reports will not depend on observability of the state since utility
does not depend on any inference of others and so the set of equilibria will not change with
observability. However, because individuals are concerned about disappointing the audience,
they may lie down (in order to avoid guilt). In fact, in any equilibrium with full support on the
reporting distribution, we must have some individuals lying down. Since individuals’ utility
only depends on their report and not their drawn state, generically individuals (other than the
zero mass of individuals who are indifferent between reports) with the same parameter θGA
must take the same action. Since we have full support in the reporting distribution, there
is some interval of types [θˆGA, θ˜GA] that strictly prefer to report r1 over all other reports.
Because F features full support, at least some individuals who have θGA ∈ [θˆGA, θ˜GA] must
have drawn ω > ω1.
Turning to n states, observe that the reasoning for the f -invariance result is exactly the
same (because the set of indifferent types is measure 0, and utility does not depend on the
drawn state).
Claim 6: Depending on parameters, we may have affinity, aversion or gˆ-invariance.
We’ve already presented an example of affinity for n = 2. We now present an example of
aversion. Suppose n = 3, and r1 = ω1 = 0, r2 = ω2 = 1, r3 = ω3 = 2.
Suppose that utility is equal to r − θGAγ(r − r¯). We now construct a cost function that
is a continuous and strictly increasing approximation of the following function: γ(r − r¯) = 0
for r − r¯ ≤ 0.6, γ(r − r¯) = 3 otherwise. Thus, we set γ(0) = 0. Then γ increases (in a
continuous fashion) so that for a very small δ, when r − r¯ = 0.6 − δ, γ(r − r¯) =  (for a
very small ). At that point ς increases to 3 at r − r¯ = 0.6, and then ς asymptotes to 3 + 
as r − r¯ → ∞. Moreover, suppose that as a limit case 10% of individuals have θGA = 0.5,
and the rest have θGA = 1. Suppose GˆA is such that r¯ = 0.2. For small enough  and δ
the former type of individuals reports r3 = 2, the latter type reports r1 = 0 (since reporting
r1 = 0 gives an utility of approximately 0, reporting r2 = 1 gives approximately 1 − 3θGA,
and reporting r3 = 2 gives approximately 2 − 3θGA). Now if we shift the beliefs about the
reporting distribution so that GˆB implies that r¯ = 0.5, then the former type reports r2 = 1
and the latter type reports r2 = 1 as well (since reporting r1 = 0 gives approximately 0,
reporting r2 = 1 gives approximately 1, and reporting r3 = 2 gives approximately 2− 3θGA).
So we have aversion. By continuity, we can also have gˆ-invariance. 
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B.7 Choice Error
One potential explanation for the observed pattern of non-maximal reports is that individuals’
utility function only incorporates material payoffs, but individuals simply make mistakes
when choosing, and so sometimes do not actually make the utility-maximizing report. The
related Luce (1959) and McFadden et al. (1973) models of discrete choice with errors are very
common specifications. This supposes that individuals have a standard utility function, but
make errors when taking their action. Specifically, the utility of report r is φ(r) where φ is
a positive function strictly increasing in r, i.e., every individual prefers to make the highest
report. However, individuals do not always choose the utility maximizing report. Instead,
the probability of choosing report ri is e
φ(ri)θ
CE∑n
j=1 e
φ(rj)θCE
. θCE is a parameter that governs the
amount of “randomness” for a given individual. As θCE goes to infinity, the individual always
chooses the utility maximizing report. As θCE goes to 0, reports are made with uniform
chance.45
Proposition 9 Suppose individuals’ choices follow the Choice Error model. For arbitrary n,
we have f -invariance, gˆ-invariance, o-invariance and lying down when the state is unobserved
or observed.
Proof: Observe that the chosen report does not depend on the drawn state, others’ reports,
or observability for any n, and we thus obtain f−, gˆ− and o−invariance. Moreover, all
individuals, conditional on a type, have the same distribution of reports regardless of the
drawn state, so we observe lying down.
B.8 Ko˝szegi-Rabin + LC
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) suggest a widely used model of expectations-based reference-
dependence in which the recent rational expectations serve as the reference point. We can
combine the intuition of the Ko˝szegi-Rabin model with the lying cost model. Garbarino et al.
(2016), in a concurrent paper, suggest and test a related model. We suppose that individuals
45To bring this model in line with our general theoretical framework outlined in Section 2, which is based
on error-free utility maximization, one could interpret the choice error as coming from a shock to φ(r) which
makes a subject prefer a particular non-maximal report. This shock would be distributed such that the choice
probabilities are as in the formula in the text.
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face lying costs and experience gain-loss utility both over monetary outcomes, and over the
lying costs (possibly to different degrees). As before we will denote the cost of reporting r if
ω is the state as c(r, ω) which has the same properties as described under LC. The utility of
reporting r if ω is the state is then
φ(r, ω, a; θLC , θLAweight, θLAmoney, θLAcost) = φˆ(r, c(r, ω); θLC) +
θLAweight[∑k θLAmoneyI|(u(r)−u(a(ωk)))|f(ωk)+∑k θLAcostI|(c(a(ωk), ωk)−c(a(ω), ω))|f(ωk)]
Four elements of ~θ affect utility in this model. θLC parameterizes the cost of lying.
θLAweight parametrizes the weight on gain-loss utility, and θLAmoney and θLAcost represent
the separate gain-loss parameters for money and lying costs. θLAmoneyI and θLAcostI are indi-
cator functions that take on values of 1 if the argument inside the attached absolute value is
positive, and θLAmoney or θLAcost respectively otherwise.
φˆ takes on all the attributes that φ does in the LC model, and c has the exact same
properties. a(ωk) is the action that an individual expected to take, conditional on drawing
ωk. Our solution concept is the preferred personal equilibrium notion introduced in Ko˝szegi
and Rabin (2006). A personal equilibrium a is a mapping such that if a maps ωˆ to rˆ, then the
argmax of φ(r, ωˆ, a; θLC , θLAweight, θLAmoney, θLAcost) is rˆ. A personal equilibrium will exist for
the reasons outlined in Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) and Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007). As pointed
out by those papers, there may be multiple personal equilibria mappings a. However, there
will generically be a unique preferred personal equilibrium, i.e., an equilibrium mapping a that
gives the highest utility, among all possible equilibrium as for any given value of θLAmoney and
θLAcost. We will suppose, in line with Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) and Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007),
that individuals choose the preferred personal equilibrium. Then the aggregate distribution
of reports is simply the set of reports generated by the distribution of states and as that each
individual uses.
Proposition 10 Suppose individuals have Ko˝szegi-Rabin + LC utility. For arbitrary n, de-
pending on parameters, we may have drawing in, drawing out or f -invariance, we have gˆ-
invariance, o-invariance and no lying down when the state is unobserved or observed.
Proof: We first consider n = 2.
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Claim 1: No individual lies down in any personal equilibria.
Doing so would incur lying costs and reduce monetary payoffs as well as weakly increase
loss utility (decrease gain utility).
Claim 2: Conditional on a personal equilibrium, either all types report r1, all types report
r2 or there exists a unique type that is indifferent between r1 and r2 and all types higher than
that report r1, and all others report r2.
The existence and uniqueness follow from the same reasoning as in the LC model.
Claim 3: A preferred personal equilibrium exists.
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) footnote 13 (p. 1145) shows this must be true.
Claim 4: Depending on parameters, we may have drawing in, drawing out or f -invariance.
For example, suppose as a limit case that an individual exhibits only gain-loss utility in
the monetary dimension, but not in the lying cost dimension. Then an increase in f(ω2) will
increase expectations of monetary payoff, and so, conditional on drawing ω1, an individual
will be more likely to report r2. In contrast, if an individual exhibits gain-loss utility only in
the cost dimension, but not in the monetary dimension, the opposite intuition will be true.
By continuity, we can generate f -invariance.
Claim 4: The model exibits gˆ-invariance.
Any individual’s strategy, fixing F , will not depend on the distribution of reports in the
population: the set of equilibrium mappings is constant in G. Intuitively, it is the case
that an individual’s expectations of their draw, and their report, depends only on F , not on
G. Moreover, any individual’s expectations only depend on their draw, and the equilibrium
mapping a, but neither of these depends on G. Thus a itself cannot depend on G and thus
not on Gˆ. We thus obtain gˆ-invariance.
Claim 5: The model exihibits o-invariance and no downwards lying regardless of observ-
ability.
As in the LC model observability will not affect reports.
The ambiguous results on shifts in f clearly must hold for n states if it holds for two. The
result on gˆ-invariance also does not depend on the number of states. 
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C Models that do not Match the Findings of the Meta Study
C.1 Standard Model and Lexicographic Lying Costs
The typical assumption in economics is that in anonymous, one-shot interactions, individuals
will simply maximize material payoffs, so utility is only a function of r:
φ(r)
where utility is (strictly) increasing in r. This model cannot explain the findings of the
meta study.46
Proposition 11 Suppose individuals have standard utility. Then all individuals give the
highest report.
Proof: Since individuals maximizing utility implies maximizing the report, all individuals
always give the highest report.
This proposition contradicts Finding 2 of the meta study. Several papers (e.g., Demichelis
and Weibull 2008, Ellingsen and O¨stling 2010, Kartik et al. 2014b) assume that individuals
have weak (or lexicographic) preferences for truth-telling, i.e., individuals care about r and
receive an additional small utility ε > 0 when they report truthfully. Since reports in our
setup always yield different monetary payoffs, this model makes the same predictions as the
standard model.
C.2 Reputation for Honesty
Many authors have found it plausible that individuals care about some kind of reputation
that is linked to the belief of the audience player about whether the individual reported
truthfully, where the audience can only observe the report but not the true state. Individuals
suffer a disutility from the stigma of being perceived as a liar. One might imagine that
46Moreover, the standard model predicts f -invariance, gˆ-invariance, o-invariance, and no lying down when
the state is unobserved or observed.
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this “stigmatization aversion” is the sole reason motivating an aversion to lying. Thus, this
type of model is like the Reputation for Honesty + LC model described in the body of the
paper, but where θLC is always 0. Therefore, an aversion to lying is motivated solely by
concerns about the beliefs of the audience. As before, because the audience’s beliefs enter
the utility of subjects, understanding such a model requires using the framework of Battigalli
and Dufwenberg (2009). Dufwenberg and Dufwenberg (2018) introduce a similar model, but
where others’ beliefs about the degree of over-reporting matter for utility.
We find that such a model cannot explain the findings of the meta study. Formally, we
suppose that in a Reputation for Honesty model individuals’ utility is
φ(r,Λ(r); θRH)
Λ(r) is the fraction of liars and, as in the Reputation for Honesty + LC model, is the audience
player’s belief about whether an individual reporting r is a liar. The only element of ~θ that
affects utility is the scalar θRH which governs the weight that an individual applies to the
stigma of being perceived as a liar. We assume φ is strictly increasing in its first argument
and decreasing in the second argument; strictly when θRH > 0. These assumptions capture
the property that individuals prefer a higher monetary payoff but dislike being thought of as a
liar. Moreover, we suppose that φ is (weakly) decreasing in θRH fixing the first two arguments,
and that the cross partial of φ with respect to Λ(r) and θRH is strictly negative, while other
cross partials are 0. An equilibrium will exist because of standard continuity arguments, but
because of the dependence of utility on other’s strategies (via the audience’s beliefs) it may
not be unique.
One can show that with two states the fraction of liars at the high report is Λ(r2) =
H(θ¯RH)f(ω1)
H(θ¯RH)f(ω1)+H(θ¯RH)[1−f(ω1)] = f(ω1). Similarly, we can show that Λ(r1) = f(ω2). This implies
directly that if f(ω1) ≤ f(ω2) then in an equilibrium with full support the fraction of liars at
r2 would be weakly smaller than the fraction of liars at r1. And so by saying r2, individuals
would receive both a higher monetary payoff and a weakly lower reputational cost. Thus, all
individuals should say r2 and there cannot be an equilibrium with full support, contradicting
Finding 2 (when restricted to binary states) of the meta study. This result generalizes to a
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setting with many states as we show in the proof.47
Proposition 12 Suppose individuals have Reputation for Honesty utility and F is uniform.
Then all individuals give the same report.
Proof: We first show the result for binary states and then generalize to an arbitrary number
of states. Observe that utility does not depend directly on the drawn state ω.
Claim 1: Fixing an equilibrium, either all types report r1, all types report r2 or there exists
one unique type that is indifferent between r1 and r2 and all types higher than that report r1,
and all others report r2.
The reasoning is analogous to that provided for the Inequality Aversion model.
The optimal report of an individual does not depend on ω (other than for the 0-mass of
indifferent individuals)
Claim 2: An equilibrium exists.
An equilibrium will exist given the continuity of φ and the fact that Λ is continuous in
the cutoff θ¯RH (although it may be a corner equilibrium without full support on all reports).
By Claim 1, conditional on drawing a particular state, individuals will follow a threshold
rule — people with θRH ≥ θ¯RH will give one report, and everyone else a different report.
Suppose we have an equilibrium where a positive measure of individuals with state ω1 report
r1. This means that there exists a set of θRHs with positive measure that strictly prefer
reporting r1 conditional on drawing ω1. Thus the exact same set of θRHs strictly prefer
reporting r1 conditional on drawing ω2 (since the set of indifferent types must have 0 mass).
Since the threshold is independent of the drawn state for all but a 0-mass of individuals
it follows that
Λ(r2) =
H(θ¯RH)f(ω1)
H(θ¯RH)f(ω1) +H(θ¯RH)[1− f(ω1)]
= f(ω1)
Thus the probability of a report of r2 being made by a liar is equal to the probability of having
drawn ω1. Similarly,
Λ(r1) =
(1−H(θ¯RH))f(ω2)
(1−H(θ¯RH))f(ω2) + (1−H(θ¯RH))[1− f(ω2)]
= f(ω2) = 1− f(ω1)
47Moreover, the Reputation for Honesty model predicts (for n = 2) drawing in, gˆ-invariance, o-shift, lying
down when the state is unobserved, and no lying down when the state is observed.
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Thus the probability of a report of r1 being made by a liar is equal to the probability of having
drawn ω2.
Claim 3: The equilibrium is unique.
Because there must be only a single indifferent type the equilibrium is unique.
Claim 4: With a uniform distribution we cannot have an equilibrium with full support.
If f(ω1) ≤ 1 − f(ω1) then the equilibrium will not have full support, i.e., not all re-
ports occur with positive probability, since φ(r1, 1 − f(ω1); θ¯RH) < φ(r2, 1 − f(ω1); θ¯RH) <
φ(r2, f(ω1); θ¯RH) for any possible threshold. In other words, the utility from giving the low
report must be lower than the utility of reporting the high report for any threshold.
We now turn to considering n states.
First, observe that fixing an equilibrium for any pair of states n,m there will be a unique
threshold value θ¯RHn,m for the same reasoning as in Claim 1. Similarly, by continuity an equi-
librium must exist.
Consider two states, ω < ω′ along with corresponding reports r < r′ and suppose an
equilibrium exists where g(r) > 0 and g(r′) > 0. In this, denote Θr as the set of types willing
to report r. Observe that the proportion of liars at r is then

Θr h(θ
RH)dθRH − f(ω) Θr h(θRH)dθRH
Θr h(θ
RH)dθRH = 1− f(ω = r)
By analogous reasoning, the proportion of liars at r′ = ω′ is 1− f(ω′ = r′).
Claim 5: With a uniform distribution we cannot have an equilibrium with full support.
Whenever there is an ω < ω′ such that f(ω) ≤ f(ω′) this means that the proportion of
liars is smaller at r′. Thus the reputation cost is lower, and the monetary payoff is higher, so
no one will report r. Thus, with a uniform distribution, all individuals will make the same
report. Because the off-equilibrium beliefs are not restricted, this may not be the highest
report (i.e., everyone may report r1 in equilibrium). This may be, e.g., because the off-
equilibrium beliefs imply that the subject must be a liar if they make any other report, an
increase in the monetary payoff is not enough to compensate for the decreased reputation.
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C.3 Audit Model
The Audit model builds on the intuition of the Reputation for Honesty model but with a
twist. Individuals’ utility depends on the beliefs of the audience about whether they are a
liar or not, but only in the circumstance that they actually lied up. The model captures the
intuition of audits: individuals fear to be “found out” as liars. The probability of being found
out depends on the report. Individuals who give a report where there are many liars are
more likely to be found out as a liar. This may be a concern about an actual audit or, our
preferred interpretation, a more metaphorical audit: individuals care about the belief of the
audience player about whether they reported truthfully – but only if they lied up. If they
were honest or lied down, they have a “clean conscience”, even though they won’t be able
to prove their honesty by showing their true state. If the audit is an actual concern about
the researcher, then one can alleviate such concerns, e.g., by conducting the experiment over
the phone. Our meta study, however, finds no difference in behavior when the experiment is
conducted remotely (see Table A.2). Townsend (1979) discusses wanting to avoid detection,
which could be motivated by not wanting to be in a category which is likely populated by many
liars. Kajackaite and Gneezy (2017) also discuss such an intuition for lying aversion. Because
utility (potentially) depends on the audience player’s belief we again use the framework of
Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009). Moreover, because the audience’s beliefs in equilibrium
must be correct, we can represent them as Λ(r).
Using the audit intuition, individuals are “investigated” with a probability that is increas-
ing in the audience’s belief that they lied, which in equilibrium, is equal to Λ(r), i.e., the
proportion of liars that report the same r as the individual. If an individual is investigated,
and discovered to have been lying upwards they face a utility cost (we suppose here that it
is a fixed cost, but with binary states it is equivalent to supposing the cost depends on the
size of the lie). Individuals face no cost if they are discovered to have lied downwards or have
been honest. Individuals’ utility function is
φ(r, Ir>ωΛ(r); θAud)
where Ir>ω is an indicator function which equals 1 if the individual lied upwards, and
0 if the individual did not lie upwards. Λ(r) is the fraction of liars at r, which is in turn
the posterior belief of the audience about the probability the individual has lied. The only
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element of ~θ that affects utility is θAud which governs the weight that an individual applies to
the reputational cost. We assume that φ is strictly increasing in the first argument, decreasing
in the second argument, strictly so if θAud > 0, and (weakly) decreasing in θAud. Similarly to
previous models, the cross partial of the second argument and θAud is strictly negative, while
other cross partials are 0. An equilibrium will exist because of standard continuity arguments,
but because of the dependence of utility on others’ strategies (via the audience’s beliefs) it
may not be unique.
The model fails to capture the findings of the meta study because under some circum-
stances it predicts that only one report is made with positive probability in equilibrium,
contradicting Finding 2.48
Proposition 13 Suppose individuals have Audit utility. Then there exists a distribution in
F that induces a G in which only one state is reported.
Proof: Fix the value of the parameters of the Audit model and suppose there are only two
states/reports. For any value of θAud ≤ κAud there exists some finite fraction of liars at r2,
Λ∗(θAud)(r2), such that the value of being thought of as telling the truth and receiving r1 is
equal to the value of receiving r2 and being thought of as a liar with probability Λ∗(θ
Aud)(r2):
φ(r1, 0; θAud) = φ(r2,Λ∗(θ
Aud)(r2); θAud). κAud is finite and so consider the fraction of liars
at r2 that would make the highest type indifferent between both reports: Λ∗(κ
Aud)
2 . Now, let
f(ω1) go to zero. There exists some f∗ such that for all f(ω1) < f∗, even if everyone who
draws the low state says the high state, Λ(r2) < Λ∗(κ
Aud)(r2). This implies that all individuals
will find it optimal to report the higher state. 
48Moreover, the Audit model predicts (for n = 2) drawing in, aversion, o-shift, and no lying down when the
state is unobserved or observed.
101
D Proofs for Results in Section 2 of the Main Paper
Proof of Proposition 1: There exists a parameterization of the LC model, the Conformity in
LC model, the Reputation for Honesty + LC model and of all other models listed in Appendix B
(i.e., Inequality Aversion; Inequality Aversion + LC; Censored Conformity in LC; Reputation
for Being Not Greedy; LC-Reputation; Guilt Aversion; Choice Error; and Ko˝szegi and Rabin
+ LC) which can explain Findings 1–4 for any number of states n and for any F ∈ F .
We first prove the proposition for the LC model.
LC Model: We will parameterize the LC model with the following function: r − CIr 6=ω −
(θLC+)(r−ω)2. r is the payoff from the report, C is a fixed cost of lying, Ir 6=ω is an indicator
function that takes on the value 0 if r = ω and 1 otherwise,  is a positive constant, and θLC
is the individual’s aversion to lying. Thus, this functional form captures both a fixed and
convex cost of lying. We prove the results in a series of steps.
We will first suppose that individuals can lie to any real value, rather than only integer
values. As we will show, the results will not change when we consider the discrete (integer-
valued) case.
Claim 1: Regardless of the number of states or the distribution F over them, for any given
state ω there exists a cutoff type θ˜LC(ω) so that for all θLC > θ˜LC(ω) individuals will not lie.
Moreover, there exists an  such that for any ω, θ˜LC(ω) > 
For an individual who draws a given ω, the utility of not lying is ω. If they lie, their
optimal report is r∗ = ω + 12(θLC+) . This gives utility of ω +
1
4(θLC+) − C. Notice that
∂(ω+ 1
4(θLC+)
−C)
∂θLC
< 0. Moreover, as θLC goes to ∞, the maximum utility from lying goes to
ω−C, which is strictly less than the utility from not lying. Thus for a large enough κLC , there
must exist a θ˜LC(ω). Moreover, observe that the conditions just described do not depend on
ω, immediately implying the existence of .
Claim 2: The model generates Finding 1 and Finding 2.
By Claim 1, the fraction of truth-tellers at each state ω is strictly bounded away from
0. This proves that G will have positive support on all reports (implying Finding 2). It also
proves that the average payoff must be bounded away from the maximal payoff (Finding 1).
Moreover, if individuals cannot choose any report, but only integers, then the optimal utility
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from lying must be bounded above by ω + 14(θLC+) − C. Thus, the results carry over since
the result about the maximum utility obtained when θLC goes to ∞ still holds.
Moving on to proving that the model generates the other two findings, we explicitly
suppose reports must take on the values r1, ..., rn. Given a distribution over θLC and a draw
ω = ρm, we can consider the induced distribution over reports rm, rm+1, ...(as individuals
do not lie down in the LC model). Define g(%|ρ) as the probability, conditional on drawing
ρ, that % is the optimal report when n = ∞. For any finite n, define the probability that
an individual reports r, conditional on drawing ρm, as g˜n(r|ρm) (notice g˜∞(r|ρm) = g(r|ρ)).
The probability that any given report r is given is simply the sum of all the conditional
probabilities over all states lower than r: g(r) =∑ρ=rρ=r1 g˜n(r|ρ).
Claim 3: Suppose n =∞. Consider two individuals who draw two different states; ρ and
ρ′. The probability of wanting to report ρ + k, conditional on drawing ρ, is the same as the
probability of wanting to report ρ′ + k, conditional on drawing ρ′: g(ρ+ k|ρ) = g(ρ′ + k|ρ′)
Observe that an individual who draws ρ will prefer ρ+ k1 to ρ+ k2 if and only if ρ+ k1−
CIk1 6=0− (θLC + )(k1)2 ≥ ρ+ k2−CIk2 6=0− (θLC + )(k2)2 or k1−CIk1 6=0− (θLC + )(k1)2 ≥
k2 − CIk2 6=0 − (θLC + )(k2)2. Moroever, an individual who draws ρ′ will prefer ρ′ + k1 to
ρ′ + k2 if and only if ρ′ + k1 −CIk1 6=0 − (θLC + )(k1)2 ≥ ρ′ + k2 −CIk2 6=0 − (θLC + )(k2)2 or
k1 −CIk1 6=0 − (θLC + )(k1)2 ≥ k2 −CIk2 6=0 − (θLC + )(k2)2. Thus, g(ρ+ k|ρ) = g(ρ′ + k|ρ′).
Claim 3 is not necessarily true when n is finite. The next claim considers what happens
for finite n. In doing so, we first want to highlight a useful fact. In the case where n is finite,
suppose ρ′ > ρ. If ρ+ k > rn and so an individual drawing ω = ρ can’t report k levels higher
(since this would exceed the highest available report), then they also can’t report k levels
higher when drawing ρ′ since ρ′ + k > rn.
Claim 4: Suppose ρ + k > rn and there are individuals who draw ρ who would want to
report ρ + k if n = ∞. In this case, these individuals (i) report rn or (ii) tell the truth.
Moreover, suppose an individual of a given type draws ρ and wants to report ρ+k but cannot,
and ends up telling the truth. If the same individual draws ρ′ > ρ and wants to report ρ′ + k
but cannot, they will also end up telling the truth.
We prove the first part of the claim in two steps. First, we want to establish that this
individual who wants to report ρ + k > rn must find that reporting rn gives a higher utility
than any other report r > ρ (recall that individuals will never report below their draw ρ). To
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do so, we simply show that utility, conditional on reporting more than ρ, is falling the farther
the report is from the optimal, but unavailable, report. Observe that the second derivative of
the utility function for all r > ρ is −2(θLC + ). This is strictly negative. Suppose the optimal
report is r∗, and |rˆ − r∗| ≥ |r − r∗|, where both rˆ and r are larger than ρ. Then utility from
report r is larger than the utility of reporting rˆ. In other words, the utility for an individual is
lower the farther a given report is from the optimal report. Then suppose the highest report
that is possible is rn < ∞, and r∗ > rn. Then, if an individual lies, they will report rn. Of
course, it may be optimal also not to lie, in which case ρ must give maximal utility.
We prove the second part of the claim now. To do this, we suppose that, above rn, reports
could (if they were allowed) take on any value (not just the integers). Suppose an individual
of a given type draws ρ and wants to report r∗ = ρ + k but cannot, and ends up telling the
truth. From Claim 3, this indiviudal would want to report r∗ = ρ′ + k if they drew ρ′. Given
an optimal report r∗(ρ) (it is a function of the drawn state, and we surpress the dependence
on the individual’s type) not equal to the drawn state, we know that the utility from reporting
r is r−C − (θLC + )(r− r∗(ρ) + 12(θLC+))2. Denote the difference between any given report
r and the optimum report as d(r, ρ) = r − r∗(ρ).
From the previous paragraph we know that this individual will either report rn or ρ when
drawing ρ. ρ is reported if and only if rn−C− (θLC + )(d(rn, ρ) + 12(θLC+))2 ≤ ρ. Moreover,
observe that d(rn, ρ) is negative, and the derivative of the utility function with respect to d,
so long as it is negative, is positive.
If the same individual draws ρ′ > ρ we know that this individual will either report rn or
ρ′ when drawing ρ′. d(rn, ρ′) is negative and it is more negative than d(rn, ρ): d(rn, ρ′) ≤
d(rn, ρ) ≤ 0. This implies that the utility of reporting rn, having drawn ρ′, rn − C − (θLC +
)(d(rn, ρ′) + 12(θLC+))
2 must be less than the utility of reporting rn, having drawn ρ, rn −
C − (θLC + )(d(rn, ρ) + 12(θLC+))2. Moreover, the utility of reporting ρ′, having drawn ρ′, is
larger than the utility of reporting ρ, having drawn ρ. Thus ρ′ ≥ rn−C−(θLC +)(d(rn, ρ′)+
1
2(θLC+))
2, and so this individual will want to report the truth.
Claim 5: The probability, conditional on drawing ρ, of telling the truth (i.e. reporting the
drawn state), is increasing in ρ.
To see this, consider the same individual who could have either drawn ρ or ρ′ > ρ. There
are two cases. First, suppose that for this individual the optimum, when n =∞, after drawing
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ρ is to say ρ+k. Moreover, ρ+k < rn. In this case, the individual actually reports ρ+k. We
showed above (Claim 3) that the individual would then like to report ρ′ + k when drawing
ρ′. If they are able to do so, then they will. But it is possible that ρ′ + k > rn. Therefore,
the unconstrained optimal report is not available. As shown in Claim 4, such individuals may
report rn, but may also report ρ′. Thus aggregating across individuals, in this case we observe
a higher chance of reporting ρ′, conditional on drawing ρ′ than reporting ρ, conditional on
drawing ρ.
In the second case, suppose the optimum ρ+k is greater than rn. Then, as we have shown
in the paragraph previous to the statement of Claim 5, there is a higher chance of telling the
truth conditional on drawing ρ′ > ρ (relative to drawing ρ).
The preceding two paragraphs imply that the outflow of individuals (i.e. individuals who
drew a state but do not give the corresponding report) is decreasing in the state ρ, conditional
on having drawn that state. Thus, if there is the same chance of drawing any given state, the
outflows must be decreasing in ρ.
Claim 6: The probability, conditional on drawing a state lower than r, that r is the optimal
report, is increasing in r.
Another way of stating Claim 6 is that conditional on drawing a state ω ≤ r, the fraction
of individuals who find r the optimal report is increasing in r. To see this, first consider some
r < rn. For any individual giving a report r who is lying, it has to be the case that they drew
ρ and r = ρ+k was the optimal report to give. We have previously shown (Claim 3) that this
implies that this same individual would report r−1 if they drew ρ−1. If ρ−1 ≥ ω1 then this
happens. But if ρ− 1 < ω1 then there are no individuals who could have drawn ρ− 1, and so
the set of people lying to r−1 must be smaller than the set of people lying to r, when r < rn.
Observe that this reasoning is also true for individuals who lie to rn, conditional on those
individuals having rn as the optimal report even if it were possible to report rn+ 1. However,
there are also individuals who are lying to rn because they cannot report any higher than rn.
Thus, the number of people lying at rn is larger than at rn−1. This implies that so long as
there was the same chance of drawing all states, the inflows of individuals (i.e. individuals
who give a report but did not draw the corresponding state) is increasing in the state ρ.
Claim 7: The model generates Finding 3.
Since for uniform distributions outflows are decreasing in the state (and corresponding
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report) but inflows are increasing, g(r) must be increasing (Finding 3).
Last we need to show that some state, other than the highest, is over-reported for all
allowable distributions with more than 3 states (Finding 4).
Claim 8: Over-reporting occurs for the second highest state when F is uniform.
First, calibrate the model so that no individuals are willing to report more than two
states/reports higher than what they drew. This means we find values of C and  so that the
individuals with the lowest costs of lying are willing to lie up 2, but not 3 reports. In other
words, C and  have values so that ρ+ 2−C − 4 > ρ and ρ+ 3−C − 9 < ρ or 2 > C + 4
and 3 < C + 9. Individuals who drew ωj will thus report either ωj , ωj+1 or ωj+2. Moreover,
individuals who desire to report ωj+2, but cannot (i.e. those individuals who drew ωn or
ωn−1), simply do not lie (because of the fixed cost). With more than 3 states and a uniform
distribution, the second highest state must be over-reported. To see this, observe that the
only people who may report the highest and second highest states are individuals who drew
one of the top four states. Moreover, g(rn|ωn−1) = g˜(rn|ωn−1) since those that drew ωn−1
and would like to report rn+1, but obviously cannot, end up reporting rn−1. This reasoning
extends, so that g(rn|ωn−1) = g(rn−1|ωn−2) = g(rn−2|ωn−3) = g˜(rn−1|ωn−2) = g˜(rn−2|ωn−3).
Moreover g(rn|ωn−2) = g(rn−1|ωn−3) = g˜(rn|ωn−2) = g˜(rn−1|ωn−3). Thus the inflows to rn−1
are 1n g¯(rn−1|ωn−2)+ 1ng(rn−1|ωn−3). By construction the outflows from ωn−1 are 1ng(rn|ωn−1).
This implies that the outflows are smaller than the inflows, so the state must be overreported.
Claim 9: Over-reporting occurs for the second highest state for any distribution in F .
Finally, consider any distribution in F with 3 or more states. Then the inflows to ωn−1 are
f(ωn−2)g¯(rn−1|ωn−2) + f(ωn−3)g(rn−1|ωn−3) and the outflows are f(ωn−1)g(rn|ωn−1). Since
f(ωn−1) ≤ f(ωn−2) the inflows must exceed the outflows.
The series of claims thus proves the LC model can match Findings 1–4 of the meta study.
We next turn to the models that limit to the LC model: The Reputation for Honesty + LC
model, the LC-Reputation model, the Conformity in LC model, the Inequality Aversion + LC
model, the Censored Conformity in LC model and the Ko˝szegi-Rabin+LC model (for details
of these models, see Section 2 and Appendix B). Because of our construction of these models,
they do not formally nest the LC model. Instead, they limit to the LC model in various ways.
The Reputation for Honesty + LC model, the LC-Reputation model, the Inequality Aversion
+ LC model and the Ko˝szegi-Rabin + LC model limit to the LC model as the distribution on
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the θ 6= θLC converges to 0. For these models, it is clear that as the other cost components
become negligible, behavior will be almost entirely governed by the LC cost component. The
Conformity in LC and Censored Conformity in LC models limit to the LC model as η becomes
a function that does not depend on its second argument. Again, this implies that individuals’
cost of lying no longer depends on others’ actions, giving us behavior arbitrarily close to the
LC model. Thus, they can also explain Findings 1–4.
We now turn to the remaining models.
The Inequality Aversion Model (see Appendix B.1): Suppose as a limiting case,
we have 60% of individuals who simply maximize monetary payoff and 40% who experience
an infinite loss of utility if they are above the mean report, but no loss if they are below.
Then for any number of reports/states there exists an equilibrium where 60% of individuals
report rn, and 40% report rn−1.
We show that this is an equilibrium in two steps. First, in any equilibrium the former type
of individuals always give the highest report. Second, in the equilibrium we are constructing,
observe that the mean report lies between rn−1 and rn. Thus, the second type of player
experiences an infinite loss of utility if they give report rn, but experience utility r if they
given any report r < rn, and so they report rn−1.
We show that this equilibrium has the desired properties. More than one report is given
with positive probability, the average payoff is bounded away from the maximum payoff, and
the histogram is (weakly) increasing. With any uniform F with more than 3 states, a non-
maximal report (the second highest report) is made more often than its true likelihood. The
equilibrium reporting distribution doesn’t depend on F , and any other allowable F places
lower weight on the second highest state than a uniform distribution and so we also have
over-reporting for all F ∈ F with more than 3 states. Of course there are also other potential
equilibria, but we just focus on the one with desired properties. Thus, this distribution of
reports matches Findings 1–4.
The Reputation for Being Not Greedy Model (see Appendix B.4): To prove that
the model can match the findings, assume that φ(r) = θRNGE[θRNG|r] + (1− θRNG)r and a
distribution of θRNG where in the limit there are two types. The first type has θRNG = 0, thus
cares nothing at all for reputation and only about material payoffs. They always report rn.
The second type has θRNG = −12 +
√
5
2 . We propose an equilibrium where this type reports
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rn−1. For any individual of the second type in this equilibrium the utility from reporting the
highest report is 0 + (1 − θRNGHigh )rn = (1 − θRNGHigh )rn, the utility of the second highest report
is θRNGHigh θRNGHigh + (1 − θRNGHigh )rn−1. Setting these equal and solving the quadratic equation
0 = (θRNGHigh )2 + θRNGHigh − 1 gives θRNG = −12 +
√
5
2 . Thus the high types are indifferent between
reporting rn and rn−1 and we assume they report rn−1. Thus, this is an equilibrium. Suppose
the type that doesn’t care at all about reputation composes 60% of the population, and the
rest is the higher type. As described for the Inequality Aversion model above, this distribution
of reports matches Findings 1–4.
The Guilt Aversion Model (see Appendix B.6): To see that a model of guilt aversion
can match the meta-study findings, we do a construction analogous to the Inequality Aversion
model. Suppose as a limiting case that 60% of individuals simply maximize monetary payoff.
The remaining 40% of individuals experience an infinite loss of utility if they disappoint the
audience player. Then for any number of reports/states there exists an equilibrium where
60% of individuals report rn and 40% report rn−1. We show that this is an equilibrium in
two steps. First, in any equilibrium the former type of individuals always give the highest
report. Second, in the equilibrium we are constructing, observe that the audience expects a
report between rn−1 and rn. Thus, the second type of player experiences an infinite loss of
utility if they give report rn, but experiences utility r if they given any report r < rn, and so
they report rn−1. As described above, this distribution of reports matches Findings 1–4.
The Choice Error Model (see Appendix B.7): Since φ is always finite, so long at
θCE < ∞ the Choice Error model predicts that more than one report is made with positive
probability and that the payoffs are bounded away from the maximum payoff. Moreover g is
strictly increasing by construction. The last thing to prove is that we get over-reporting of a
non-maximal report when n > 3. We will construct a φ so that the second highest state is
always reported with probability more than 1n which will satisfy this condition. To simplify
matters, assume a limit case: that all individuals have the same type θCE = 1. We denote
φˆ(r) = eθCEφ(r). Let φˆ(r1)→ 0 and allow for φˆ(r2) to be any particular value. We construct
our result inductively showing that we can generate over-reporting of a non-maximal report
for any n ≥ 3. If we have three outcomes, then we need: φˆ(r2)
φˆ(r1)+φˆ(r2)+φˆ(r3)
> 13 ⇐⇒ 3φˆ(r2) >
φˆ(r1)+ φˆ(r2)+ φˆ(r3) ⇐⇒ 2φˆ(r2) > φˆ(r3). We can choose any value of φˆ(r3) that satisfies this
bound (and is greater than φˆ(r2)). If we consider instead four reports, then it must be that
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φˆ(r3)
φˆ(r1)+φˆ(r2)+φˆ(r3)+φˆ(r4)
> 14 , or 4φˆ(r3) > φˆ(r1) + φˆ(r2) + φˆ(r3) + φˆ(r4) = φˆ(r2) + φˆ(r3) + φˆ(r4),
or 3φˆ(r3)− φˆ(r2) > φˆ(r4). We then choose a value of φˆ(r4) that satisfies this constraint, and
is greater than φˆ(r3). One can iterate the bounds inductively so that for the nth report, we
can choose a φˆ(rn) such that (n− 1)φˆ(rn−1)−∑n−2j=1 φˆ(rj) > φˆ(rn) > φˆ(rn−1). Observe that
the reporting distribution generated in our construction doesn’t depend on F , and any other
allowable F places lower weight on the second highest state than a uniform distribution and
so we have over-reporting for all F ∈ F with more than 3 states. 
Proof of Proposition 2:
• Suppose individuals have LC utility. For an arbitrary number of states n, we have f -
invariance, gˆ-invariance, o-invariance and no lying down when the state is unobserved
or observed.
• Suppose individuals have Conformity in LC utility. For arbitrary n, depending on pa-
rameters, we may have drawing in, drawing out or f -invariance, we may have affinity,
aversion or gˆ-invariance, we have o-invariance and no lying down when the state is
unobserved or observed. For n = 2, we have drawing out when the equilibrium is unique
and we have affinity.
• Suppose individuals have Reputation for Honesty + LC utility. For arbitrary n, depend-
ing on parameters, we may have drawing in, drawing out or f -invariance, we may have
affinity, aversion or gˆ-invariance, we have o-shift, depending on parameters, we may
have lying down or not when the state is unobserved, and we have no lying down when
the state is observed. For n = 2, we have drawing in when the equilibrium is unique.
We first prove an initial lemma.
Lemma 1 For all models, the results regarding o-shift/o-invariance and regarding lying down
do not depend on the number of states.
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Proof of Lemma 1: For models that have o-shift, the shift occurs because if the audience
player has information about the state, it changes their beliefs about the subject and this
affects the subject’s utility. This occurs regardless of the number of states. For models that
have o-invariance, the audience’s knowledge of the state does not change a player’s utility.
This again is unrelated to the number of states.
For models that can feature lying downward, there are three cases. First, in the Inequality
Aversion, Guilt Aversion, and Choice Error model, the report does not depend on the true
state and since there is full support on states and reports, we always have downwards lying
irrespective of the number of states.
Second, in the Reputation for Honesty + LC, LC-Reputation and Inequality Aversion +
LC models, there could be downwards lying or not for n = 2 and thus also for n > 2.
Third, for the remaining model that features lying down (Reputation for Not Being
Greedy), utility depends on the audience’s beliefs and lying down occurs because it can help
shift these beliefs. Regardless of whether the state is observed or not, there is an incentive to
possibly lie down for any number of states.
For models that do not feature lying downward (i.e., LC, Conformity in LC, Censored
Conformity in LC, and Ko˝szegi-Rabin + LC), this happens because lying down triggers a
weakly higher lying cost and leads to a lower monetary payoff relative to truth-telling. This
is independent of the number of states and observability. 
When proving our results regarding the comparative statics of shifts in F and Gˆ, we will
prove results for an equivalent, but simpler to work with, formulation of the shifts. Rather than
focusing on shifts of first order stochastic dominance which maintains the same set of support,
we focus on shifts where we move weight from a single lower state to a single higher state.
For example, when considering changes in F from a distribution FA to another distribution
FB, we suppose that fA(ωi) = fB(ωi) for all i = 1, 2, ..., j − 1, j + 1, ..., k − 1, k + 1, ..., n,
fB(ωk) = fA(ωk) + , and fB(ωj) = fA(ωj) −  for some 0 <  < fA(ωj). Any shift of
this kind induces first order stochastic dominance. Moreover, by the definition of first order
stochastic dominance we can decompose any shift in first order stochastic dominance on a
finite distribution into a finite number of these shifts. This works analogously for shifts in Gˆ.
Thus we get the following (equivalent) reformulations of our definitions:
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Definition 1’ Consider two pairs of distributions: FA, GA and FB, GB where Gj is the
reporting distribution associated with F j, and they all have full support. Suppose further that
fA(ωi) = fB(ωi) for all i = 1, 2, ..., j − 1, j + 1, ..., k − 1, k + 1, ..., n, fB(ωk) = fA(ωk) + ,
and fB(ωj) = fA(ωj) −  for some 0 <  < fA(ωj). A model exhibits drawing in/drawing
out/f-invariance if 1− gB(r1)
fB(ω1) is larger than/smaller than/the same as 1−
gA(r1)
fA(ω1) .
Definition 2’ Fix a distribution over states F and consider two pairs of distributions GˆA, GA
and GˆB, GB, where Gj is the reporting distribution induced by F and by the belief that others
will report according to Gˆj. Moreover, suppose that all exhibit full support and that gˆA(ri) =
gˆB(ri) for all i = 1, 2, ..., j − 1, j + 1, ..., k − 1, k + 1, ..., n, gˆB(rk) = gˆA(rk) + , and gˆB(rj) =
gˆA(rj)−  for some 0 <  < gˆA(rj). A model exhibits affinity/aversion/gˆ-invariance if gB(rn)
is larger than/smaller than/the same as gA(rn).
To prove the rest of the results we first prove the results for binary states/reports. We do
this because it allows for development of the intuitions underlying the proofs. We then prove
the results for an arbitrary number of states/reports. We consider each model in turn.
LC model: First we consider n = 2.
Claim 1: No individual lies down.
In doing so they would pay a weakly higher lying cost and receive a lower monetary payoff
than if they told the truth.
Claim 2: Conditional on drawing ω1 either all types report r1, all types report r2 or there
exists a unique type that is indifferent between r1 and r2 and all types higher than that report
r1, and all others report r2.
We show that if neither of the first two cases holds there needs to be a unique cutoff type.
Suppose that some individuals drawing ω1 report r1 and others report r2. By continuity of
the utility function there must be a type (cutoff type) θ¯LC , such that φ(r1, c(r1, ω1); θ¯LC) =
φ(r2, c(r2, ω1); θ¯LC). We can show this cutoff type will be unique. By construction ∂
2φ
∂c∂θ < 0 and
∂2φ
∂r∂θ = 0. Therefore, since φ(r2, c(r2, ω1); θ¯LC) − φ(r1, c(r1, ω1); θ¯LC) = 0, then for all θLC >
θ¯LC , φ(r2, c(r2, ω1); θ¯LC)−φ(r1, c(r1, ω1); θ¯LC) < 0 and for all θLC < θ¯LC , φ(r2, c(r2, ω1); θ¯LC)−
φ(r1, c(r1, ω1); θ¯LC) > 0. Therefore, individuals with θLC < θ¯LC who draw ω1 will report r2.
Individuals with θLC > θ¯LC who draw ω1 will report r1.
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Claim 3: The model exibits f -invariance.
Given Claim 2, and the fact that no one would lie down (Claim 1), we can calculate our
test statistic: 1− g(r1)f(ω1) = 1−
(1−H(θ¯LC))f(ω1)
f(ω1) = 1− (1−H(θ¯LC)) = H(θ¯LC). This condition
does not depend on F .
Claim 4: The model exibits gˆ-invariance.
The fact that an individual’s utility does not depend on G in any way allows us to imme-
diately observe that it exhibits gˆ-invariance.
Claim 5: The model exihibits o-invariance and no downwards lying regardless of observ-
ability.
The lying costs in this model are internal costs and they do not depend on the inference
others are making about any given person. Thus, individuals do not care whether their state
was observed.
We next consider n states. We can generalize our results easily.
Observe that for each pair ri, rj of potential reports there is a state-conditional threshold
such that an individual with that threshold would be indifferent between that pair of reports
(such thresholds only exist where both reports ri and rj are both weakly larger than ω,
since no individuals lie down): denote it θ¯LCri,rj,ω: φ(ri, c(ri, ω); θ¯
LC
ri,rj,ω) = φ(rj , c(rj , ω); θ¯
LC
ri,rj,ω).
Clearly this is unique and does not depend on F as before. Denote θ¯LCω = minrj θ¯LCr=ω,rj,ω. This
is the highest type that will be willing to lie, and in fact this type will be indifferent between
telling the truth and lying (since it is the minimum of all the thresholds between reporting
the drawn state and reporting some other state). All lower types will lie to some other state.
Since no individuals lie down, then the probability of an individual giving the lowest report
is g(r1) = H(θ¯LCω1 )f(ω1). Thus, shifting the distribution above the lowest outcome doesn’t
change the conditional probability of someone reporting the lowest outcome. Thus we get
f -invariance. Since the thresholds do not depend on G shifts in Gˆ have no effect and so we
get gˆ-invariance.
Conformity in LC model: We first consider n = 2.
Claim 6: No individual lies down
In doing so they would pay a weakly higher lying cost and receive a lower monetary payoff
than if they told the truth.
Claim 7: Fixing an equilibrium, conditional on drawing ω1 either all types report r1, all
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types report r2 or there exists a unique type that is indifferent between r1 and r2 and all types
higher than that report r1, and all others report r2.
In the case that some types drawing ω1 give one report and others the other, by continuity
there must be a type that conditional on drawing ω1 is indifferent between the two reports, and
so satisfies the condition φ(r1, η(0, c¯); θ¯CLC) = φ(r2, η(c, c¯); θ¯CLC) where c denotes the cost
of lying to report r2 (given that ω1 was drawn). If no such type exists, then all indviduals
would give the same report. As with the LC model, this type will be unique for the exact
same reasoning (since fixing the equilibrium c¯, this model is the LC model). Of course, this
threshold may shift across different equilibria.
Claim 8: An equilibrium exists.
An equilibrium will exist given the continuity of φ and η and the fact that c¯ is continuous
in the cutoff θ¯CLC .
However, it may not be unique. Intuitively this is true because individuals’ lying behaviors
are complements. To find the set of equilibria consider the function ζ(θ¯CLC), which maps from
Θ to Θ: this will be the function whose fixed points will characterize the equilibria. Given
a threshold θ¯CLC that all other individuals are using, ζ(θ¯CLC) is a function that gives the
optimal threshold if there exists one in the allowed range of θCLC ; it returns κCLC (the upper
bound of the distribution of types) if the threshold is above the range; and gives 0 (the lower
bound of the distribution of types) if the threshold is below the range. This ensures ζ maps
from [0, κCLC ] to itself. It also implies, with a unique equilibrium, the graph of ζ must cross
the 45-degree line from above to below. Finding the fixed point(s) of ζ(θ¯CLC) characterizes
the equilibrium.
Claim 9: The model exhibits drawing out.
Suppose that the equilibrium is unique. Now let f(ω1) fall. For any θ¯CLC as f(ω1) falls
c¯ must fall. Thus ζ(θ¯CLC) must fall for all θ¯CLC . Thus the fixed point (which we supposed
was unique) must fall. Intuitively, the indifferent type must fall as well since lying becomes
more costly. So fewer people who draw ω1 report r2. Thus we observe drawing out.
Claim 10: The model exhibits affinity.
Since G enters in the utility function directly (because no one lies down and there are two
states and G has thus a one-to-one mapping with c¯) we can still make predictions regarding
the effect of Gˆ even though we may not have a unique equilibrium. To see that we observe
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affinity, notice that fixing F , increasing gˆ(r2) implies that the individual believes that there
are more liars. Thus the costs of lying fall, and so more individuals are willing to lie.
Claim 11: The model exihibits o-invariance and no downwards lying regardless of observ-
ability.
As with the LC model, our interpretation of these costs as internal costs means that they
do not depend on the inference others are making about any given person. Thus, individuals
do not care whether their state was observed. Thus the set of possible equilibria is not affected
by observability of the true state, and the prediction regarding lying downwards is the same
for observable or unobservable states.
We now turn to n states.
As mentioned for the binary world, fixing the level of lying in society, the model behaves
exactly like an LC model, where among the individuals who drew ω there will be a set of
thresholds that denote which state they should report. Since all types have zero measure,
this implies that conditional on a value of c¯, generically individuals have a unique best action
(conditional on any drawn state). Thus, we can think of the equilibrium as simply finding a
fixed point in the aggregate level of lying: ζ(c¯), which maps from the aggregate level of lying
to itself. Because of continuity an equilibrium will always exist.
Claim 12: Depending on parameters, we may observe drawing in, drawing out or f-
invariance.
We construct an example to demonstrate drawing in (since we have already shown drawing
out for n = 2). Suppose n = 4. Since no one lies down, no one drawing the highest state lies.
Moreover, suppose that the cost structure has two properties: (i) individuals, if they lie, lie up
at most one report, and (ii) the cost of lying up one state is increasing in the drawn state. Key
to the example is that there is a negligable mass of individuals who draw ω2 who are near the
threshold type (below which they report r3, above which they report r2). Instead, almost all
individuals who draw ω2 and lie have a strong preference for lying (i.e. the utility they obtain
from reporting r3 is much larger than the utility they obtain from reporting r2). To obtain
FB from FA, fix fA(ω1) and fA(ω4) and shift weight from ω2 to ω3. Shifting individuals to
ω3 increases their costs of lying (and reduces the benefits), but if their preference for lying up
was strong enough at ω2, then almost all of the individuals who now draw ω3 (instead of ω2)
will continue to want to lie. Thus, c¯ will increase. But this means that conditional on drawing
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ω1, individuals are more likely to lie, exhibiting drawing in, opposite to the prediction of the
two state/report case. By continuity, it is also possible to generate f -invariance.
Claim 13: Depending on parameters, we may observe affinity, aversion or gˆ-invariance.
We have shown affinity for n = 2. We now demonstrate an example for aversion. Suppose
that the shift in Gˆ induces a belief that c¯ has increased (as it does in the binary case). We
show that even if c¯ has risen we may observe aversion. Let n = 3. First, suppose as a
limit case all individuals are of the same type and utility is equal to u(r) − η(c, c¯). Suppose
u(r1) = 0, u(r2) = 2 and u(r3) = 4, and that the cost function is such that individuals
drawing ω2 and ω3 never want to lie. But c(r2, ω1) = 0.2 and c(r3, ω1) = 0.4. First, consider
an equilibrium where η(0.2, c¯) = 1 and η(0.4, c¯) = 2.8. All individuals drawing ω1 report
r3. Now suppose the average cost of lying rises to c¯′ and at the new value η(0.2, c¯′) = 0.2
and η(0.4, c¯′) = 2.4. Now all individuals drawing ω1 report r2. Conversely, this also means
that if c¯ falls we can either observe more reporting or less reporting of the highest report.
Thus, regardless of the shift in beliefs about c¯ we may observe either affinity or aversion. By
continuity, it is also possible to generate gˆ-invariance.
Reputation for Honesty + LC: We first consider n = 2.
Claim 14: In any equilibrium, r2 has to have more liars.
Suppose no one lies down. Then clearly r2 has more liars. Now suppose people do lie
down, and r2 has fewer liars than r1. In this case, consider the individuals whose state is ω2.
They would obtain a better reputation, lower lying costs and a higher monetary payoff, by
simply reporting r2. So, no one would lie down – a contradiction. Thus, r2 must have more
liars.
Claim 15: Fixing θLC and an equilibrium, φ(r2, c(r2, ω1),Λ(r2); θLC , θRH)−φ(r1, c(r1, ω1),Λ(r1); θLC , θRH)
is falling in θRH .
This is immediately implied by the fact that Λ(r2) > Λ(r1) (as shown in Claim 14), ∂φ∂Λ < 0,
∂2φ
∂r∂θRH
= 0 and ∂2φ
∂Λ∂θRH < 0 (by our assumption of additive separability).
Similarly, fixing θRH and an equilibrium, φ(r2, c(r2, ω1),Λ(r2); θLC , θRH)−φ(r1, c(r1, ω1),Λ(r1); θLC , θRH)
is decreasing in θLC . We can make the analogous statements about what happens conditioning
instead on ω2 being drawn.
We can define a “threshold function” for each state τωi(θLC , θRH), which, given the equilib-
rium and an individual’s given type, gives the utility of reporting ri 6=j versus ri, conditional
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on having drawn ωi. These are continuous functions. If τ is less than or equal to 0, the
individual will report their state, otherwise they will lie.
Claim 16: Fixing θLC and an equilibrium, τωi(θLC , θRH) is equal to 0 for at most one
value of θRH . Similarly fixing θRH , τωi(θLC , θRH) is equal to 0 for at most one value of θLC .
This is immediately implied by the preceding claims.
Thus, we can think of the set of indifferent individuals, i.e. the set of points where
τωi(θLC , θRH) = 0, as a function in the space θLC × θRH ; or graphically, given that utility is
linear in both θRH and θLC , a line in two-dimensional Euclidean space (see Figure D.1).
Figure D.1: Thresholds for Reputation for Honesty + LC Model
θLC
τω1=0
τω2=0 draw ω2, 
report r1
draw ω2, 
report r2
draw ω1, 
report r1
draw ω1, 
report r2
0
0 θω1 RH,T = θω2 RH,T
θω1 LC,T
θω2 LC,T
θRH
We know that fixing θRH , as θLC increases, individuals’ relative value of reporting what
they drew increases.
Claim 17: If an individual draws ω1 and reports r2 then an individual with the same
preference parameters, but with a draw ω2, must also report r2. Moreover, if an individual
draws ω2 and reports r1 then an individual with the same preference parameters, but with a
draw ω1 must also report r1.
This is because saying r2 gives the same reputational value and the same monetary payoff
to both individuals but the individual who drew ω1 pays an LC cost (analogous reasoning
works for the second statment).
We can characterize the equilibrium in terms of the intercepts of the threshold function,
rather than the probability of being a liar. Observe that given H and a utility function, the
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probability that, conditional on drawing a particular state, an individual lies is characterized
by τωi(θLC , θRH) = 0. Since the threshold functions τωi(θLC , θRH) = 0 are always linear in
θLC and θRH they can be characterized by their θLC intercept and their θRH intercept, denoted
θωiLC,T and θ
ωi
RH,T . Moreover, since the LC portion of costs never depends on the distribution of
responses, the θωiLC,T intercept (i.e. the threshold value of θ
ωi
LC,T when θRH = 0) must always
be the same. Therefore, we can think of each of the threshold “lines” (one for each drawn
state) as being characterized by a single intercept: θωiRH,T . The thresholds θ
ωi
RH,T (one for each
state), along with H, induce a conditional (on each state) probability of giving either report.
These, in conjunction with F , define the probability of being a liar at either report (as well
as G).
Thus, in order to solve for an equilibrium we can consider a function ζ(θω1RH,T , θ
ω2
RH,T ), which
maps from the thresholds that everyone is using into best-response thresholds. This function’s
fixed points will characterize equilibria. Because we are looking at the θRH intercepts, the LC
costs are 0. Thus, the actual drawn state does not enter the utility function, and so players
must behave the same regardless of which state they drew; so θω1RH,T = θ
ω2
RH,T . Thus, our
problem reduces to a single dimension; and we can consider the function ζ(θRH,T ) and find
its fixed point. More precisely, ζ is a function that gives the optimal threshold if there exists
one in the allowed range of θRH ; gives κRH if the threshold is above the range; and gives 0
if the threshold is below the range. This ensures ζ maps from [0, κRH ] to itself. Moreover,
if there is a unique equilibrium, the graph of ζ must cross the 45-degree line from above to
below.
Claim 18: An equilibrium exists.
An equilibrium will exist given the continuity of φ and the fact that Λ is continuous in
the threshold sets.
However, the equilibrium reporting distribution is not necessarily unique. Recall that the
threshold θRH,T is defined as the solution to the equation u(r2) − θRHυ(Λ(r2)) = u(r1) −
θRHυ(Λ(r1)) or u(r2)− u(r1) = θRH(υ(Λ(r2))− υ(Λ(r1))). This describes an individual with
θLC = 0 and a θRH = θ¯RH so that the individual is indifferent between reporting r1 or
r2. If θRH = 0 the RHS of this equation is equal to 0. Thus, a sufficient condition for a
unique equilibrium is that the RHS is monotonically increasing in θRH,T (i.e. the value of
θRH that solves the indifference equation). Unfortunately we cannot guarantee this. As θRH,T
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increases, the probability, conditional on drawing ω1, of reporting r1 increases. Similarly, the
probability, conditional on drawing ω2, of reporting r1 increases. Thus, at r1 (and similarly
r2) there are both more truth-tellers and more liars, making the change in the difference
υ(Λ(r2))− υ(Λ(r1)) ambiguous.
Claim 19: We observe drawing in.
Suppose there is a unique equilibrium and that f(ω2) increases. Fixing the input threshold
θRH,T , by Claim 17 the proportion of truth-tellers must increase at r2. Similarly, the propor-
tion of truth-tellers at r1 must fall. This makes r2 relatively more attractive to individuals
(compared to r1). Thus the optimal threshold θRH (generated by ζ) must rise and we get
drawing in.
Claim 20: The model exihibits o-shift and no downwards lying under observability, but
may exhibit downwards or not without observability.
Observability will matter as long as some individuals care about the reputation costs.
In particular, reputational concerns will imply that individuals would only state the truth
or the highest report with observability. We will observe no lying downwards at all under
observability of the state by the audience since doing so would incur an LC cost and a
reputational cost. Without observability of the state, we may either have lying downwards
or not – in the limit if individuals only have LC concerns, then they would never lie down,
but in the opposite direction, in the limit if individuals only have reputational concerns then
individuals’ actions will generically not depend on the drawn state, but only their type, causing
lying down..
Claim 21: Depending on parameters, we may observe affinity, aversion or gˆ-invariance.
Even if the equilibrium of the reporting distribution is unique, we could observe either
aversion, affinity or gˆ-invariance. To see the intuition, note that the Gˆ treatments do not pin
down the new belief about H that subjects hold. Depending on the H, we could get affinity
or aversion. In particular, suppose we move from GˆA (associated with HA) to GˆB (where
there are two Hs that rationalize GˆB). Imagine that under HB υ(Λ(r2))− υ(Λ(r1)) increases
compared to the difference under HA, while υ(Λ(r2))−υ(Λ(r1)) decreases under H˜Bcompared
to HA. Then we get aversion if subjects believe the new distribution over types is HB, and
we get affinity if subjects believe the new distribution over types is H˜B.
Formally, we show that two different changes in the exogenous distribution H can both
118
lead to an increase in gˆ(r2). Then we show that they have the opposite implications for
υ(Λ(r2))− υ(Λ(r1)). From Figure D.1 we can see that two different shifts of probability mass
in H could lead to an increase in gˆB(r2) (relative to gˆA(r2)). The first shifts mass from above
τ(ω1) to below it (without altering the relative weights above and below τ(ω2)) in Figure
D.1. This, fixing the thresholds, doesn’t change the reporting of individuals who drew ω2, but
leads to a higher mass of individuals drawing ω1 to report r2. This increases g(r2) but also
increases the number of liars at both r2 and r1. Recall our fixed point operator that defines the
threshold which characterizes the equilibrium: ζ(θRH,T ). Recall that this, taking as an input
everyone else’s threshold, returns the optimal threshold. If υ(Λ(r2))−υ(Λ(r1)) increases, this
makes the high report less attractive, and so ζ decreases, reducing the equilibrium level of
θRH,T .49 This reduction will cause aversion. Thus, in order to generate aversion we need that
υ(Λ(r2)) − υ(Λ(r1)) increases in response to this shift in weight. This can be accomplished
simply by ensuring that υ′(Λ(r2)) (the derivative of υ) is sufficiently larger than υ′(Λ(r1)).
The second shift moves mass from below τ(ω2) to above it (without altering the relative
weights above and below τ(ω1)). Fixing the thresholds, this doesn’t change the reporting of
individuals who drew ω1, but leads to a higher mass of individuals drawing ω2 to report r2.
This increases g(r2) but also decreases the number of liars at both r2 and r1. If υ(Λ(r2)) −
υ(Λ(r1)) decreases, this makes the high report more attractive, and so ζ increases. This
increases the equilibrium level of θRH,T , and causes affinity. Similarly to before, in order
to generate affinity we need that υ(Λ(r2)) − υ(Λ(r1)) decreases in response to this shift in
weight. This can be accomplished simply by ensuring that υ′(Λ(r2)) is sufficiently larger than
υ′(Λ(r1)).
Thus, we can get both affinity and aversion (and by continuity gˆ-invariance) when υ′(Λ(r2))
is sufficiently larger than υ′(Λ(r1)). Of course, we could get both affinity and aversion but
associated with the opposite shifts in weight if we supposed that υ′(Λ(r2)) is sufficiently
smaller than υ′(Λ(r1)). However, since there are more liars at the high report, a sufficiently
convex υ will naturally generate the result that υ′(Λ(r2)) is sufficiently larger than υ′(Λ(r1)),
which is what we focus on here. Another sufficient condition is that Λ(r2) responds more to
49An equilibrium threshold must fall in this situation. In the case of uniqueness, for any non-trivial param-
eterization (where at least some types are sometimes willing to lie) we know ζ(0) > 0 (since if no one lies
upwards, then it is optimal to best respond by lying upwards). This implies the equilibrium threshold must
fall.
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the shifts in probability weight than Λ(r1).
We now turn to n states.
Claim 22: Depending on parameters, we may observe drawing in, drawing out or f -
invariance.
We provide an example of drawing out (since we have shown drawing in for n = 2).
Suppose that n = 3. Moreover, suppose that individuals only lie one state/report up. Now,
move from FA to FB by keeping fA(ω1) constant and shifting weight from ω2 to ω3. This
has two effects. First, fixing strategies, it makes reporting r3 more attractive (since some of
the individuals drawing ω3 will still report r3). Second, by the same reasoning, it makes the
middle state less attractive. Thus, individuals who draw the lowest state will find reporting
the middle state less attractive, and more individuals will simply report the truth. This
implies drawing out.
For the Reputation for Honesty + LC model we have ambiguous predictions regarding
shifts in Gˆ even for two states, and this carries over to n states. 
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E The Role of Distributional Assumptions
In the body of the paper we suppose that an individual’s type is private information, and
moreover, the ex-ante prior distribution about types H is non-atomic. In contrast, other
papers (Dufwenberg and Dufwenberg 2018, Khalmetski and Sliwka 2016, Gneezy et al. 2018)
have supposed that there is not necessarily incomplete information about at least some of
the dimensions of the type space, and that H has atoms. For example, Dufwenberg and
Dufwenberg (2018) consider a model that is related to our Reputation for Honesty model
(Appendix C.2), but where everyone has a single known type. Khalmetski and Sliwka (2016)
and Gneezy et al. (2018) both consider utility functions that are nested by our Reputation for
Honesty + LC model. However, they suppose that there is complete information about the
reputational component (although incomplete information about the LC portion of costs).
We made the assumption that H is non-atomic and an individual’s type is private infor-
mation in order to put the models we consider on equal footing, as some models explicitly
require a distribution of types and private information about the realized type to generate
plausible behavior, e.g., the Reputation for Not Being Greedy model. Recall that our goal of
the paper is to understand which types of model can and cannot rationalize the patterns of
lying observed in the data.50 In order to accomplish this, we have attempted to make minimal
assumptions on the structure of the utility function. Of course, however, our assumptions re-
garding private knowledge of types may be substantive, and it is important to understand, in
particular, whether it leads us to falsify a class of models which would not be falsified under
a different assumption.51
It turns out that supposing there is only a single realized type does not change the main
finding of our study. The predicted behavior of some models for some of our empirical tests
does change if we suppose that H is degenerate and each individual’s type is common knowl-
edge, instead of H being non-atomic and the type private knowledge. However, the set of
50This is different than the goal of papers whose impetus is to show how much behavior a given model could
potentially explain. In this case, making as strong as assumptions as possible, and showing that the behavior
one is interested in can still occur, is typically more interesting.
51In contrast, this is a lesser problem, given our goal, for those models which cannot be falsified with private
knowledge of types. Suppose that, for any of that set of models, common knowledge of types implies the model
can be falsified. But, given that the model is not falsified under private information, we should still consider
it as a plausible explanation.
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falsified models, which we take as our main finding, does not change.52 First, consider the set
of models which we describe as matching Findings 1–4 (listed in Table 1). It turns out that
the models that can be falsified by the new tests with binary states when H is non-atomic,
can also be falsified when H is degenerate. Six of the nine falsified models listed in Table 1
deliver the exact same prediction for binary states (with the assumption that the G exhibits
full support, i.e., we look at full support equilibria). The Reputation for Not Being Greedy
model generates different predictions (it now exhibits f -, g- and o-invariance) but is still not
in line with the data. The Inequality Aversion + LC and Conformity in LC model can now,
depending on parameters, predict drawing in, drawing out, or f -invariance, but otherwise
make the same predictions. Thus, supposing that H is degenerate does not lead to differ-
ent conclusions about how well these models can match the data. The following proposition
formalizes this.
Proposition 14 Suppose n = 2. Then all models listed in Table 1, that fail to match the
data of our four empirical tests when H is non-atomic and private information, also fail to
do so when H is degenerate and common knowledge.
Proof: For the LC model, because an individual engages in a simple one-person optimization
problem, the predictions of the model will not change, although all individuals drawing the low
state will generically take the same action (since generically individuals will not be indifferent
between the two states, and everyone drawing the low state has the same best response). The
same reasoning applies to the Choice Error model and the Ko˝szegi-Rabin + LC model.
In the Conformity in LC model, individuals will never lie down regardless of H. This
implies that to observe an equilibrium with full support individuals drawing the low state
must weakly prefer to report the low state, i.e., strictly prefer or be indifferent. Thus, we
have two cases to consider.
(i) First, suppose the former. If we shift weight in F from the ω1 to ω2, with the assumption
of a unique equilibrium, we observe f -invariance since no one was willing to lie up before, and
the shift in F hasn’t increased the aggregate lying costs.
52The two models which are not falsified (the Reputation for Honesty + LC model and the LC-Reputation
model) also generate different predictions. As explained before, since our goal is to identify models which, under
plausible assumptions, fail to match the data, and these models can match the data under some assumptions,
we do not focus on them here.
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(ii) Next, suppose the latter. Because the equilibrium is unique, there exists a unique
proportion of individuals that must be lying up in equilibrium so that individuals drawing
the low state are indifferent between reports. This particular proportion doesn’t depend on
F (it is a feature of the preferences). But, when we shift weight in F from the low to high
state, the total proportion of individuals drawing the low state falls. There are two subcases.
(a) If after the shift we still observe individuals drawing the low state and reporting the high
state, then those drawing the low state must still be indifferent between both report. Then
to keep the proportion of individuals lying constant, more individuals drawing the low state
need to lie, so we observe drawing in. (b) Alternatively, it could be that after the shift the
equilibrium does not feature anyone drawing the low state giving the high report. This would
happen if after the shift there are very few individuals who draw the low state, then even
if everyone else drawing the low state lies up, it is not a best reponse for someone drawing
the low state to give the high report (recall that lying costs are normalized by the average
amount of lying). Thus, since the equilibrium features no individuals drawing the low state
and giving the high report, we have drawing out. We observe affinity, o-invariance, and no
lying down for the same reasons as in the body of the paper.
We next consider Inequality Aversion. Because individuals’ utility does not depend on
their drawn state, to get full support it must be the case that all individuals are indifferent
between the two states. However, the set of equilibria will not vary with F , for the same
reason as in the body of the paper. The rest of the results do not change.
In the Inequality Aversion + LC model there are several possibilities.
(i) First, individuals drawing each state could strictly prefer to report their state (because
of the LC cost, it can never be the case that those drawing the low state strictly prefer
to report high and vice versa). In this case, increases inf(ω2) will increase the fraction of
individuals reporting r2, making the high state more attractive relative to the low state, and
so cause either f -invariance or drawing in.
(ii) The second possibility is that those drawing the high state strictly prefer to give the
high report and those drawing the low state are indifferent. There are three subcases. (a) If
after the increase in f(ω2) individuals drawing the low state are still indifferent in equilibrium,
the probability of reporting high, conditional on drawing the low state, must have fallen. This
implies we observe drawing out. (b) If we moved to an equilibrium without full support we
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could have drawing in, since after the shift, there are no longer enough individuals drawing
the low state and reporting the low state to maintain indifference. (c) The third case is that,
after the shift in F , those drawing the low state now strictly prefer to give the low report and
those drawing the high state are indifferent. This can generate either drawing in or drawing
out. The former could occur because individuals who draw the high state now are a high
enough fraction so that, if none of them lie down, they all prefer to give the high report. The
latter could occur because to maintain indifference between the two reports, the probability of
reporting low, conditional on drawing high, must increase. Thus, depending on parameters,
we can have drawing in, drawing out or f -invariance. We observe affinity, o-invariance, and,
depending on parameters, lying down or not for the same reasons as in the body of the paper.
In the Censored Conformity in LC model, individuals will never lie down regardless
of H. This implies that, to observe an equilibrium with full support, individuals drawing the
low state must weakly prefer to report the low state, i.e., strictly prefer or be indifferent. We
consider each case separately.
(i) In the former case, as in the Conformity in LC model described above, we will observe
f -invariance.
(ii) In the latter case, there is a unique proportion, conditional on drawing the low state,
that must report the high state, in order to ensure that individuals drawing the low state are
indifferent. This proportion doesn’t change with F . Recall that in the Censored Conformity
in LC model the LC costs are “normalized” by the average lying cost among those who
could lie, which is the average lying cost of those who drew the low state, or the proportion
of those drawing the low state and reporting the high state. Since, as just described, the
equilibrium value of this doesn’t change with F , we still observe f -invariance. We observe
affinity, o-invariance, and no lying down for the same reasons as in the body of the paper.
In the Reputation for Not Being Greedy model, individuals care about their mon-
etary payoff and their estimated type. If individuals’ types are known then the second mo-
tivation disappears, and individuals behave exactly as if they simply want to maximize their
monetary payoff; and so will exhibit f , gˆ and o-invariance and no lying down.
We next consider Guilt Aversion. Because individuals’ utility does not depend on their
drawn state, to get full support it must be the case that all individuals are indifferent between
the two states. However, the set of equilibria will not vary with F , for the same reason as in
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the body of the paper. Shifts in Gˆ also induce the same effects, observability does not change
behavior, and we wil observe lying down for the same reasons also. 
Second, consider the set of models that, given our assumption on H, fail to match Find-
ings 1–4 (discussed in Appendix C). These consist of the standard model, the Reputation
for Honesty model and the Audit model. As should be relatively clear from the previous
discussions, the standard model’s predictions do not depend on our assumptions regarding H
and the Audit model still fails to match the stylized findings, for the same reason as when
H is non-atomic. However, the predictions of the Reputation for Honesty model with a de-
generate H differ from the predictions in Appendix C. A degenerate H implies individuals
must be indifferent between all reports that are made with positive probability in equilib-
rium. Since individuals can randomize differently based on their drawn state, equilibria can
be constructed that have full support and thus Reputation for Honesty with degenerate H
can explain Findings 1–4. However, such a model fails to match the data from our new tests,
in particular the Gˆ treatments.
Proposition 15 Suppose subjects’ utility functions are as in the Reputation for Honesty
model but H is degenerate and common knowledge. Then, for n = 2, we have affinity.
Proof: A degenerate H implies individuals must be indifferent between all reports that are
made with positive probability in equilibrium (since if one subject had a strict preference for
one report, all subjects would exhibit the same strict preference). Given indifference, subjects
can randomize differently based on their drawn state. In the Gˆ treatments, Gˆ cannot provide
information about H since this is already common knowledge. It can only provide information
about which equilibrium (out of the multiple potential equilibria) is being selected. The
treatments induce a belief Gˆ about the equilibrium distribution of reports, and thus subjects’
equilibrium strategy generates a reporting distribution G = Gˆ.53 Thus, if a “higher” Gˆ (in
the sense of representing a higher average report) is induced, then a “higher” G will result.
This implies affinity. 
53If we only assume best-response behavior, then any behavior in the Gˆ treatments can be rationalized. This
is because all subjects play a mixed strategy and are thus indifferent between the different reports. However,
in order to support Gˆ as an equilibrium distribution, it has to be the case that subjects play G = Gˆ to preserve
the indifference of the other players.
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The prediction of affinity is not in line with the data from our Gˆ treatments.
Third, we can use a particular aspect of the OBSERVABLE treatment to further distin-
guish between models. In the OBSERVABLE treatment, we know the true state ω of subjects.
We find that subjects who drew the same state differ in their behavior. Some report honestly
(r = ω) and others lie up (r > ω) (see Figure 7). Such within-state heterogeneity can be
generated, in a robust way (in the sense explained below), by models with non-atomic H
(our maintained assumption outside this appendix) and that is a reason why we do not focus
on this behavioral regularity in the body of the text. In particular, it is straightforward to
show that this pattern of behavior can be robustly generated by the two models that our
empirical exercise cannot falsify, Reputation for Honesty + LC and LC-Reputation. How-
ever, this behavior is at odds with several of our models if we assume a degenerate H. In
particular, as the next proposition shows, this behavior cannot be generated in a way that is
robust to perturbations in θ. It can only occur for an isolated set of points in at least one
of the dimensions of Θ. In other words, suppose we begin with a situation where individuals
drawing the same state make different reports – if we peturbed individuals’ common θs then
all individuals drawing the same state would make the same report.
Proposition 16 Suppose H is degenerate and the drawn state is observed by the audience
as in our OBSERVABLE treatment. Then under the LC, Reputation for Honesty+LC, LC-
Reputation, Reputation for Being Not Greedy, Reputation for Honesty and Audit models we
observe individuals drawing the same state and making the same report only for a discrete
subset of at least one dimension of Θ.
Proof: Assume subjects have LC utility. Then r and r′ are both reported if and only if
φ(r, c(r, ω; θLC) = φ(r′, c(r′, ω; θLC). Observe that, for any θLC′ in a neighborhood around
θLC , by the assumptions on cross partials φ(r, c(r, ω; θLC′) 6= φ(r′, c(r′, ω; θLC′). Moreover,
we can always find a small enough neighborhood such that for all θLC′ no other indifferences
occur. This shows that that if we peturb θLC we break indifference and so any θLC generating
indifference must be isolated. The result follows by the definition of a discrete set.
The Reputation for Honesty+LC model reduces to the LC model plus an additional fixed cost
of lying if states are observed, and the previous result thus carries over. The LC-Reputation
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model reduces to (a monotone transformation of) the LC model if θLC is known, i.e., the
same result obtains. Under the Reputation for Being Not Greedy model, if θRNG is known,
then the model reduces to (a monotone transformation of) the standard model. This means
the result obtains (since we know the standard model generates a degenerate G).
The Reputation for Honesty model, under observability, reduces to an LC model with a fixed
cost of lying. The fixed cost is the same for all individuals with a degenerate H and so the
result above follows. The Audit model under observability reduces to an LC model with zero
cost of lying down and a fixed cost of lying up; thus the LC model result follows. 
In contrast, the other models we consider in our paper can generate within-state hetero-
geneity in the OBSERVABLE treatment robustly even if H is degenerate. The Choice Error
model generates a distribution of reports for any given single θCE < ∞. The Conformity
in LC, Censored Conformity in LC, Inequality Aversion, Inequality Aversion+LC and Guilt
Aversion models still feature non-trivial equilibrium considerations and thus allow for mixing
across reports. For example, consider the Conformity in LC model with n = 2. It could be
the case that given a particular θCLC , we observe individuals drawing the low state giving
both the low and high report. Fixing others’ behavior, adusting the preference parameter
slightly will break indifference. But equilibrium behavior can adjust to maintain overall in-
difference. Suppose, for example, θCLC increases slightly. Then more individuals could lie up
and under the new equilibrium indifference between making the low and high report could be
maintained.54 This can also occur in the Ko˝szegi-Rabin + LC model when a PPE may involve
randomization; the adjustments are made not to equilibrium strategies of other players as in
the Conformity in LC model, but rather by the individual themselves.
54This behavior is linked to the fact that there are multiple equilibria.
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F Additional Experiments
In this Appendix we present two additional sets of experiments that we conducted to test
specific predictions of some of the models considered in the paper.
Our first set of additional experiments test predictions of the LC model regarding specific
shifts in the distribution F for n states. We can show that if we change the distribution of
F , but only for the highest M states, then the LC models predicts that the distribution of
reports will not change for the lowest n−M states. Essentially, changes in F for the highest
states do not cause changes in G for lower states/reports.
Proposition 17 Under LC, consider two distributions FA and FB such that fA(ωˆ) = fB(ωˆ)
for all ωˆ ≤ ω∗. Then for all rˆ ≤ r∗ = ω∗: gA(rˆ) = gB(rˆ).
Proof: Recall no individuals lie down in the LC model. Moreover, the optimal report by an
individual is a function only of θLC and of ω. Thus, conditional on drawing an ω ≤ ω∗, any
decision-maker’s best response is the same under FA and FB (for a given θLC). Thus, the
distribution of reports for rˆ ≤ r∗ = ω∗ must be the same. 
To test this prediction, we use an experiment with 10-state distributions. The setup is
identical to that described in the main paper except that the tray contains chips numbered
1 to 10. In one treatment (F10 LOW) the tray contains 5 chips with each of the numbers
1–6, 17 chips with the number 7, and 1 chip with each of the numbers 8, 9 and 10. In the
other treatment (F10 HIGH) the tray contains 5 chips with each of the numbers 1–6, 1 chip
with each of the numbers 7, 8 and 9, and 17 chips with the number 10. Note that the left
tails of the distributions (i.e. the probabilities of numbers 1–6) are identical across the two
treatments. The two treatments differ in the right tail of the distribution and in particular in
the probability mass at 7 and 10. The LC model predicts that there will be no difference in the
fraction of subjects reporting numbers 1–6. These experiments were conducted in Nottingham
between May and June 2015 with a total of 284 subjects.
We find a significant difference in the distribution of reports of our F10 treatments. Figure
F.1 shows the distribution of reports across the two treatments. Fewer subjects report 1 to
6 in F10 HIGH than F10 LOW (14 percent vs. 24 percent, p= 0.045, OLS with robust SE;
p = 0.048, χ2 test). Thus, shifting the probability of high outcomes in the right tail of the
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distribution draws in subjects from the left tail of the distribution.
This finding is not in line with the predictions of the LC model. The concurrent papers
by Gneezy et al. (2018) and Garbarino et al. (2016) also run FFH-type experiments in which
they vary the prior probability of the most profitable state. Similar to our findings in the
F10 treatments, Gneezy et al. observe an increase in the frequency of non-maximal reports
when the probability of the most profitable state decreases. Garbarino et al. find a similar
drawing-in effect as we do.
Figure F.1: Distribution of reports in F10 LOW and F10 HIGH
The second set of additional experiments tests some specific predictions of the Ko˝szegi-
Rabin + LC model regarding the role of expectations using a design that follows closely the
design of Abeler et al. (2011). Subjects report ten times the outcome of a coin flip. Their
earnings are equal to the number of tails they report in pounds. However, subjects’ reports
are only paid out with 50 percent probability, and with the other 50 percent subjects receive a
fixed payment which differed by treatment. In one treatment (KR HIGH) the fixed payment is
£8, while in the other (KR LOW) it is £4. The payment lottery is only resolved after subjects
made their report. Because the fixed payment enters expectations, the Ko˝szegi-Rabin + LC
model predicts that subjects will lie more if the fixed payment is higher. These experiments
were conducted in Oxford in October 2013 with a total of 155 subjects.
We find no significant difference between treatments. The average report is 6.49 in
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KR HIGH and 6.36 in KR LOW, the difference is not statistically significant (p=0.676, OLS
with robust SE; p = 0.651, Wilcoxon rank-sum test).
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G Experimental Instructions
In this appendix we reproduce the instructions used in our experiments. We first present the
instructions and questionnaire used in the F LOW treatment and highlight, using numbers in
square brackets, where and how the F HIGH treatment instructions differ. We then present
the instructions for the G LOW treatment and highlight the differences for G HIGH. Then we
present the instructions for the OBSERVABLE and UNOBSERVABLE treatments. Finally,
a photo of the lab setup.
G.1 Instructions for F LOW
Welcome and thank you for taking part in this study. The study is run by the “Centre for
Decision Research and Experimental Economics” and has been financed by various research
foundations. During the experiment, we request that you turn off your mobile phone, remain
quiet, and do not attempt to communicate with other participants.
In this study we ask you to complete a questionnaire, which you can find on your desk.
For completing the questionnaire you will receive an amount of money. To determine how
much money you will be paid, we ask you to randomly draw a chip from an envelope after
completing the questionnaire. The envelope will contain 50 chips with the numbers 4 or 10
on them. The composition of the envelope is shown in the figure below. You can also see the
chips on the tray in front of you.
[1]
[2] The envelope will contain 45 chips with the number 4; and 5 chips with the number 10.
The number represents the amount of money that you will be paid for this study if you draw
a chip with that number. If you draw a chip with a 4, you will be paid £4; if you draw a chip
with a 10, you will be paid £10. This payment already includes your show-up fee.
When you have finished the questionnaire, click the CONTINUE button that will appear on
your computer screen. On the next screen you will find instructions for how to perform the
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draw that will determine your payment.
After the draw, turn off your computer using the power button. Write down the number of
your chip on the PAYMENT SHEET that is on your desk. Then bring the questionnaire and
payment sheet to the experimenter who will be waiting outside the lab.
If you have a question now, please raise your hand and the experimenter will come to your
desk to answer it.
The on-screen instructions about how to perform the draw were as follows:
When you have finished your questionnaire click the CONTINUE button to proceed to the
next screen where you will find instructions for how to perform the draw that will determine
your payment.
On your desk you find a tray containing 50 chips with the numbers 4 or 10 on them.
Place all the chips into the brown envelope that is also placed on your desk. Shake the
envelope a few times and then, without looking, randomly draw a chip from the envelope.
Your payment in £ is equal to the number of the chip you have drawn from the envelope.
After observing the outcome of the draw, place the chip back into the envelope.
When you have finished click the OK button to proceed to the next screen.
Please now turn off your computer using the power button and write down the number of
your chip on your payment sheet.
Then bring the questionnaire and the payment sheet to the experimenter who is waiting
outside.
G.2 Instructions for F HIGH
The instructions for F HIGH are identical to the ones for F LOW except in two places:
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[1]
[2] The envelope will contain 20 chips with the number 4; and 30 chips with the number 10.
G.3 Questionnaire Used in the F LOW and F HIGH Experiments
QUESTIONNAIRE
This is a questionnaire consisting of 22 questions.
Please complete this questionnaire as clearly and accurately as possible. All your responses
will be completely confidential. Please leave blank any questions you do not feel comfortable
answering.
Thank you in advance for your cooperation.
QUESTIONS
1. What is your gender? Answ: Female Male
2. What is your age? Answ: years
3. What is your nationality? (Open answer)
4. Are you currently: Married; Living together as married; Separated; Widowed; Single
5. What is your major area of study? Answ: Engineering; Economics; Law; Business eco-
nomics; Political economics; Other Social sciences; Humanities; Health-related sciences; Nat-
ural sciences; Other (please specify)
6. Which of the following ethnic groups is appropriate to indicate your cultural background?
Answ: White; Mixed; Asian or Asian British; Black or Black British; Chinese; Other ethnic
group (please specify)
7. How important is religion to you? Answ: Very important; Moderately important; Mildly
important; Not important
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8. How would you rate your money management? (the way you handle your finances) Answ:
Poor; Average; Good; Excellent
9. How would you rate your knowledge of financial products such as ISAs, credit cards, loans
and mortgages? Answ: Poor; Average; Good; Excellent
10. Whilst growing up, were your parents/guardians open to discussing financial matters
within the home? Answ: YES NO
11. Since becoming a student & receiving maintenance loans/grants, would you say that you
budget effectively or that you struggle to purchase basic necessities? (Necessities meaning
food, toiletries and standard living costs - not eating out) Answ: I’ve always known how to
budget; I’ve had to learn to budget whilst at University; I struggle to purchase necessities; I
can afford everything but I don’t budget
12. If you struggle to purchase necessities, what would you put this down to? Answ: Not
budgeting; Cost of necessities too expensive; Too care-free with money; Other priorities such
as shopping & nightlife take a priority; I don’t struggle, I’m good with budgeting; I have no
idea
13. What are your top five spending priorities? (Open Answer)
14. Do you regularly know how much money you have in your bank account? Answ: YES
NO
15. Do you keep track of your spending? Answ: YES NO
16. Do you have money set aside for an emergency? Answ: YES NO
17. Are you in debt? Answ: YES NO
18. Do you shop around to get the best deal when selecting financial products such as
insurance and mobile phones? Answ: YES NO
19. Do you have a job to provide extra income whilst at University? Answ: YES NO
20. If you needed financial advice tomorrow, who would you turn to? Answ: Student Union;
Parents; Friends; Bank; Financial adviser; Other (please specify)
21. What benefits would you expect from being able to better manage your money? (Open
Answer)
22. Is there anything which would help you to better manage your money? (Open Answer)
***
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Thank you for completing this questionnaire.
Please now follow the instructions on your computer screen to determine your payment for
completing the questionnaire.
G.4 Instructions for G LOW
Welcome and thank you for taking part in this study.
The study is run by the “Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics” and
has been financed by various research foundations. During the study, we request that you
turn off your mobile phone, remain quiet, and do not attempt to communicate with other
participants.
In this study we ask you to read a short description of a potential experiment, to imagine
two possible outcomes of this experiment, and then to answer several questions about these
outcomes.
Please turn over to the next page to read the description of the experiment.
DESCRIPTION OF THE POTENTIAL EXPERIMENT
Imagine that we would run the following experiment here in this lab with 50 participants.
Participants are invited by email and asked to complete a questionnaire about their money
management. Participants receive an amount of money for completing the questionnaire. To
determine how much money they are paid, participants are asked to randomly draw a chip
from an envelope after completing the questionnaire. The envelope contains 50 chips with the
numbers 4 or 10 on them. The composition of the envelope is shown in the figure below. You
can also see the chips on the tray in front of you.
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The envelope contains 45 chips with the number 4; and 5 chips with the number 10. The
number represents the amount of money that participants are paid if they draw a chip with
that number. If they draw a chip with a 4, they are paid £4; if they draw a chip with a
10, they are paid £10. When they have finished the questionnaire, participants are asked to
place all the chips into a brown envelope that is placed on their desk (you can also see this
envelope on your desk). Participants are asked to shake the envelope a few times and then,
without looking, randomly draw a chip from the envelope. They are told to place the chip
back into the envelope after having observed the outcome of the draw, and to write down the
number of their chip on a PAYMENT SHEET and then bring the questionnaire and payment
sheet to the experimenter who has been waiting outside the lab for the whole time.
POSSIBLE OUTCOMES OF THE EXPERIMENT
Imagine that the results of the experiment would be as follows.
[3] Of the 50 participants, 35 report to have drawn a 4 and 15 report to have drawn a 10.
This outcome is shown in the figure below.
[4]
We now ask you to answer a number of questions about this imagined outcome of the exper-
iment. Please consider each question carefully before answering it.
1) Each participant had an envelope containing 45 chips with the number 4 and 5 chips with
the number 10. What are the chances that a participant randomly draws a 10 from the
envelope? Your answer:
[5] 2) 15 out of 50 participants reported to have drawn a 10. How many of the participants
who have reported to have drawn 10 do you think have truly drawn a 10? Your answer:
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3) Some of the participants who drew a 4 actually reported 10. Can you imagine why they
would do that? Your answer:
4) Some of the participants who drew a 4 actually reported 4. Can you imagine why they
would do that? Your answer:
5) How satisfied do you think that the participants who reported a 4 will be? Your answer:
very dissatisfied very satisfied
6) How satisfied do you think that the participants who reported a 10 will be? Your answer:
very dissatisfied very satisfied
Now imagine that the results of the experiment would be as follows.
[6] Of the 50 participants, 40 report to have drawn a 4 and 10 report to have drawn a 10.
This outcome is shown in the figure below.
[7]
[8] 7) 10 out of 50 participants reported to have drawn a 10. How many of the participants
who have reported to have drawn 10 do you think have truly drawn a 10? Your answer:
8) How satisfied do you think that the participants who reported a 4 will be? Your answer:
very dissatisfied very satisfied
9) How satisfied do you think that the participants who reported a 10 will be? Your answer:
very dissatisfied very satisfied
[9] 10) Which of the two imagined outcomes described above do you think is more realistic?
Your answer: The outcome where 15 out of 50 participants reported a 10; The outcome where
10 out of 50 participants reported a 10
Last year we actually ran the experiment that we just described to you here in
this lab.
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Please estimate the fraction (in percent) of participants in the previous experiment who
reported to have drawn a 10. If your estimate is accurate with an error of at most +/- 3
percentage points we will pay you £3 at the end of this experiment.
Your answer: out of 100
SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT YOURSELF
1. What is your gender? Female Male
2. What is your age? years
3. What is your nationality?
4. What is your major area of study? Engineering; Economics; Law; Business economics; Po-
litical economics; Other Social sciences; Humanities; Health-related sciences; Natural sciences;
Other (please specify)
YOUR PAYMENT FOR TAKING PART IN TODAY’S STUDY
On top of the money that you may earn if you have answered the question above correctly,
we will pay you an additional sum of money for having taken part in this study.
To determine how much money you will be paid we ask you to randomly draw a chip from
an envelope, as the participants in the experiment that we described before. Please place all
the chips that are displayed in the tray in front of you into the brown envelope that is placed
on your desk. The envelope will thus contain 45 chips with the number 4 and 5 chips with
the number 10. Shake the envelope a few times and then, without looking, randomly draw a
chip from the envelope. Your payment in GBP is equal to the number of the chip you have
drawn from the envelope.
After observing the outcome of the draw, place the chip back into the envelope. Write down
the number of your chip on the first page of this document. Then bring the document to the
experimenter who is waiting outside the lab.
G.5 Instructions for G HIGH
The instructions for G HIGH are identical to the ones for G LOW except in the following
places:
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[3] Of the 50 participants, 15 report to have drawn a 4 and 35 report to have drawn a 10.
This outcome is shown in the figure below.
[4]
[5] 2) 35 out of 50 participants reported to have drawn a 10. How many of the participants
who have reported to have drawn 10 do you think have truly drawn a 10?
[6] Of the 50 participants, 10 report to have drawn a 4 and 40 report to have drawn a 10.
This outcome is shown in the figure below.
[7]
[8] 7) 40 out of 50 participants reported to have drawn a 10. How many of the participants
who have reported to have drawn 10 do you think have truly drawn a 10?
[9] 10) Which of the two imagined outcomes described above do you think is more realistic?
Your answer: The outcome where 35 out of 50 participants reported a 10; The outcome where
40 out of 50 participants reported a 10
G.6 Instructions for UNOBSERVABLE
Welcome and thank you for taking part in this study. The study is run by the “Centre for
Decision Research and Experimental Economics” and has been financed by various research
foundations. During the experiment, we request that you turn off your mobile phone, remain
quiet, and do not attempt to communicate with other participants.
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In this study we ask you to complete a questionnaire, which you can find on your desk.
For completing the questionnaire you will receive an amount of money. To determine how
much money you will be paid, we ask you to randomly draw a chip from an envelope after
completing the questionnaire. The envelope will contain 50 chips with the numbers 1, 2, 3,
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 or 10 on them. The composition of the envelope is shown in the figure below.
You can also see the chips on the tray in front of you.
The envelope will contain exactly 5 chips of each number.
The number represents the amount of money that you will be paid for this study if you draw
a chip with that number. For instance, if you draw a chip with a 1, you will be paid £1; if
you draw a chip with a 2, you will be paid £2; and so on; if you draw a chip with a 10, you
will be paid £10.
When you have finished the questionnaire, click the CONTINUE button that will appear on
your computer screen. On the next screen you will find instructions for how to perform the
draw that will determine your payment.
After the draw, turn off your computer using the power button. Write down the number of
your chip on the PAYMENT SHEET that is on your desk. Then bring the questionnaire and
payment sheet to the experimenter who will be waiting outside the lab.
If you have a question now, please raise your hand and the experimenter will come to your
desk to answer it.
The on-screen instructions about how to perform the draw were as follows:
When you have finished your questionnaire click the CONTINUE button to proceed to the
next screen where you will find instructions for how to perform the draw that will determine
your payment.
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On your desk you find a tray containing 50 chips with the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 or
10 on them.
Place all the chips into the brown envelope that is also placed on your desk. Shake the
envelope a few times and then, without looking, randomly draw a chip from the envelope.
Your payment in £ is equal to the number of the chip you have drawn from the envelope.
After observing the outcome of the draw, place the chip back into the envelope.
When you have finished click the OK button to proceed to the next screen.
Please now turn off your computer using the power button and write down the number of
your chip on your payment sheet.
Then bring the questionnaire and the payment sheet to the experimenter who is waiting
outside.
G.7 Instructions for OBSERVABLE
Welcome and thank you for taking part in this study. The study is run by the “Centre for
Decision Research and Experimental Economics” and has been financed by various research
foundations. During the experiment, we request that you turn off your mobile phone, remain
quiet, and do not attempt to communicate with other participants.
In this study we ask you to complete a questionnaire, which you can find on your desk.
For completing the questionnaire you will receive an amount of money. To determine how
much money you will be paid, we ask you to randomly draw a chip from an envelope after
completing the questionnaire. The envelope will contain 50 chips with the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4,
5, 6, 7, 8, 9 or 10 on them. The composition of the envelope is shown in the figure below.
The envelope will contain exactly 5 chips of each number.
The number represents the amount of money that you will be paid for this study if you draw
a chip with that number. For instance, if you draw a chip with a 1, you will be paid £1; if
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you draw a chip with a 2, you will be paid £2; and so on; if you draw a chip with a 10, you
will be paid £10.
When you have finished the questionnaire, click the CONTINUE button that will appear on
your computer screen. On the next screen you will find instructions for how to perform the
draw that will determine your payment.
After the draw, open the brown envelope that is placed on your desk. The envelope contains
10 coins of £1 each. Take as many coins as the number of the chip you have drawn. Then turn
off your computer using the power button and quietly exit the lab leaving these instructions,
your questionnaire, and the brown envelope on the desk. (Note: you do not have to sign a
receipt for this experiment).
If you have a question now, please raise your hand and the experimenter will come to your
desk to answer it.
The on-screen instructions about how to perform the draw were as follows:
When you have finished your questionnaire click the CONTINUE button to proceed to the
next screen where you will find instructions for how to perform the draw that will determine
your payment.
Click the START button to shake the envelope. One of the chips will fall out of the envelope.
Your payment in £ is equal to the number on the chip that falls out of the envelope.
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Please now open the brown envelope that you can find on your desk. The envelope contains
10 coins of £1 each. Take as many coins as the number of the chip you have drawn.
Then turn off your computer using the power button (click only once and then release) and
quietly leave the lab, leaving all material on your desk. (Note: you do not have to sign a
receipt for this experiment.)
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G.8 Laboratory Setup
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H Calibration Details
H.1 Details of the Conformity in LC Calibration
This section describes the details of the calibration of the Conformity in LC model presented
in Section 4. We calibrate the Conformity in LC model in order to understand the potential
size of the Gˆ treatment effect. For the calibration, we make a number of assumptions. First,
we assume that utility takes the form r − θCLC c(r,ω)c¯ . c(r, ω) takes on the value 0 if r = ω,
and 1 if r 6= ω. Recall c¯ is the average cost of lying in society, and so here is equivalent to the
fraction of liars. Moreover, since no individuals lie down in the Conformity in LC model, this
simply represents the fraction of people who drew ω1 but report r2. We normalize r1 = −1
and r2 = 1 in line with our normalized payoffs in the meta study. Moreover, we will suppose
that θCLC is uniformly distributed on [0, κCLC ]. Given an equilibrium with full support the
threshold type (who draws the low state) must satisfy the condition 1 − θ¯CLC 1c¯ = −1 or
θ¯CLC = 2c¯. We can calibrate the threshold by observing that the proportion of high reports
was 0.45 in the F LOW treatment, and so 35 percent of the population lied. Thus θ¯CLC = 0.7.
Moreover, the fraction of liars, conditional on drawing the low state (which in the F LOW
treatment happened with probability equal to 0.9), is equal to θ¯CLC
κCLC
= .7
κCLC
= 0.350.9 . In other
words κCLC = 1.8. Given this, suppose that f(ω1) = 0.9 and that c¯ shifts from 0.31 to
0.52 which is the shift implied by the average change in beliefs in our Gˆ treatment, since our
treatment shifted beliefs about the proportion of high reports from 0.41 to 0.62. Then the
threshold type shifts from 0.621.8 = 0.344 to
1.08
1.8 = 0.578, implying that 21 percent of subjects
(since 90 percent of subjects draw the low state) will increase their report across treatments.
More broadly, if social comparison models are calibrated so as to fit other facets of our data
(i.e., full support or drawing in), social comparisons must be a reasonably large component
of utility. Given this, and the assumption that the marginal types (and types close to them)
are drawn with “reasonable” frequency, it must be the case that a relatively large fraction of
subjects should respond to shifts in beliefs about G.
H.2 Details of the Reputation for Honesty + LC Calibration
This section describes the details of the calibration of the Reputation for Honesty + LC model
presented in Section 4. When there are six states, observe that because the fixed cost is 3,
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individuals who draw ω3 and above will never want to lie. Moreover, individuals who draw ω1
will never lie to below r5 and individuals who draw ω2 will only lie to r6. This immediately
implies there are no liars at r1, r2, r3 and r4. In constructing the equilibrium we suppose that
there are some individuals who drew ω1 who want to report r5, and some who want to report
r6. Similarly, we suppose there are some individuals who are willing to lie to r6 conditional
on drawing ω2. We then verify this is the case.
The threshold type, conditional on drawing ω1, that is indifferent between reporting r1
and r5 is defined by θ11,5 = 4−cΛ(r5) . The threshold, conditional on drawing ω1, between reporting
r5 and r6 is θ15,6 = 1−cΛ(r6)−Λ(r5) . Similarly, the threshold type, conditional on drawing ω2, that
is indifferent between reporting r2 and r6 is θ22,6 = 4−cΛ(r6) . Using these thresholds, we find
that Λ(r5) =
1
6k (θ
1
1,5−θ15,6)
1
6k (θ
1
1,5−θ15,6)+ 16
and Λ(r6) =
1
6k (θ
1
5,6+θ22,6)
1
6k (θ
1
5,6+θ22,6)+
1
6
. We then find the fixed point, i.e.,
the equilibrium. In addition to the values highlighted in the text, it is also the case that
θ11,5 ≈ 6.67, θ15,6 ≈ 4.5 and θ22,6 ≈ 2.7. We thus verify our assumptions on the structure
of the equilibrium made in the previous paragraph (i.e., the thresholds are in line with our
assumptions).
In the case with two states (remember that they pay 1 and 6), and no lying down in
equilibrium, we have a single threshold type for those drawing the low state θ1 = 5−cΛ(r6) . The
fraction of liars at the high report is Λ(r6) =
f(ω1) 1k θ
1
f(ω1) 1k θ1+(1−f(ω1))
. For f(ω1) = 0.4 we find
θ1 ≈ 7.1, and for f(ω1) = 0.9 we find θ1 ≈ 2.9.
When we allow for lying down in equilibrium we now have two thresholds, one for each
state: θ1 = 5−cΛ(r6)−Λ(r1) and θ
6 = 5+cΛ(r6)−Λ(r1) . The fraction of liars at each report is Λ(r6) =
f(ω1) 1k θ
1
f(ω1) 1k θ1+(1−f(ω1)) 1k θ6
and Λ(r1) =
(1−f(ω1)) 1k (k−θ6)
f(ω1) 1k (k−θ1)+(1−f(ω1)) 1k (k−θ6)
. No equilibrium of this type
exists when f(ω1) = 0.4, but when f(ω1) = 0.9 we find θ1 ≈ 2.5 and θ2 ≈ 9.9.
We last show that given our calibration, for the equilibrium induced by f = 0.9 that
features lying down, the derivative of Λ(r6) is larger than the derivative of Λ(r1) with respect
to the shifts in H that Gˆ could induce. As shown in the proof for the Reputation for Honesty
+ LC model in Proposition 2, this implies shifting probability mass of H from above θ1 (but
not above θ6) to below it will cause aversion, and shifting weight from below θ6 (but above
θ1) to above it will cause affinity. However, both will cause an increase in gˆ(r6). Simple
calculation indeed verifies that for both shifts in weight (in H) the derivative of Λ(r6) is
larger than the derivative of Λ(r1).
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